Re: randomdev entropy gathering is really weak

[Kris Kennaway]

On Sat, 22 Jul 2000, Jeroen C. van Gelderen wrote:

> You don't care in practice, 256 bits are unguessable.

Actually, I do..that's the entire point of using long keys.

> If you do care, you load a different random module :-)

The core of my complaint is that even though our old PRNG did crappy
entropy handling, we used to have such a method, which is now gone. I'd
like to see yarrow hang off /dev/urandom and have /dev/random tap directly
into the entropy pool (perhaps a third pool separate from Yarrow's
fast/slow) so I can generate my large keys safely.

Kris

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