On Sat, Jun 10, 2000 at 02:31:23PM -0700, Kris Kennaway wrote: > between two programs who mktemp() and come up with the same random > filename, which is a theoretical security risk (at present only something > with the same PID can come up with a colliding tempfile name) but the > probability is altogether pretty small. I'll do some calculations to > estimate the exact level of risk here. Please note that you turn never probavility into small one, and it is degradation. "never" is not completely never, of course, but if temp file stays until pids wrapped. -- Andrey A. Chernov <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://ache.pp.ru/ To Unsubscribe: send mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with "unsubscribe freebsd-current" in the body of the message
- Re: mktemp() patch Andrey A. Chernov
- Re: mktemp() patch Jeroen C. van Gelderen
- Re: mktemp() patch Andrey A. Chernov
- Re: mktemp() patch Andrey A. Chernov
- Re: mktemp() patch Andrey A. Chernov
- Re: mktemp() patch Kris Kennaway
- Re: mktemp() patch Kris Kennaway
- Re: mktemp() patch Jeroen C. van Gelderen
- Re: mktemp() patch Kris Kennaway
- Re: mktemp() patch Jeroen C. van Gelderen
- Re: mktemp() patch Andrey A. Chernov
- Re: mktemp() patch Matthew Dillon
- Re: mktemp() patch Andrey A. Chernov
- Re: mktemp() patch Andrey A. Chernov
- Re: mktemp() patch Mark Murray
- Re: mktemp() patch Mark Murray
- Re: mktemp() patch Andrey A. Chernov
- Re: mktemp() patch Andrey A. Chernov
- Re: mktemp() patch Mark Murray
- Re: mktemp() patch Mark Murray
- Re: mktemp() patch Mark Murray