On 8/3/2025 10:29 PM, Michael Niedermayer wrote:
Hi TimoOn Sun, Aug 03, 2025 at 10:01:42PM +0200, Timo Rothenpieler wrote:On 8/3/2025 9:02 PM, Michael Niedermayer wrote:Hi On Sun, Aug 03, 2025 at 05:31:39PM +0200, Michael Niedermayer wrote: [...]The solutions are obvious: 1. ignore security and supply chain attacks 2. use merges not rebases on the server 3. rebase locally, use fast forward only 4. verify on server rebasesMaybe not everyone understood the problem. So let me try a different explanation. Without any signatures. In the ML workflow: (for simplicity we assume reviewer and commiter is the same person) 1. someone posts a patch 2. patch is locally applied or rebased 3. commit is reviewed 4. commit is tested 5. commit is pushed Here the only way to get bad code in, is through the reviewer If the reviewer doesnt miss anything and his setup is not compromised then what he pushes is teh reviewed code if its manipulated after its pushed git should light up like a christmess tree on the next "git pull --rebase" With the rebase on webapp (gitlab or forgejo) workflow 1. someone posts a pull request 2. pr is reviewed 3. pr is approved 4. pr is rebased 5. pr is tested 6, pr is pushed now here of course the same reviewer trust or compromised scenarios exist but we also have an extra one and that is the server because the server strips the signatures during rebase it can modify the commit. And this happens after review and because a rebase was litterally requested by the reviewer its not likely to be noticed as something out of placeIf you as a pusher of commits want to sign them with your own key, you have to do that manually. There is no sane way for Forgjo to do that for you.yesI can configure Forgejo to sign commits it itself generates, that is an option.is there a disadvantage ?See here for how it can do it on merges. https://forgejo.org/docs/latest/admin/advanced/signing/#pull-request-mergesconfusing, so many optionsI think if I set it to "commitssigned", it'll check all commits in the PR against the users configured GPG/SSH key, and if they are all valid, it'll then sign them with the instance key whenever it needs to modify them for an operation. "twofa" would also be an option, cause it indicates that the author of that commit has some reasonably strong proof that they are them themselves.yeah, I have not thought deeply about it, they seem to want to indicate something by signing commmits. To me signing my commits primarly is a way to say the commit was not tampered with after I signed it.
I'll add a key to the instance and enable it in commitssigned mode for now. That seems to be the most conservative option for a start.
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