> On 27 Jun 2020, at 19:34, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 6/27/2020 1:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> Practically, we predict only number relation. Prediction is necessary, as >>>> I said, but a simplet theory with a greater range of explanation is always >>>> better in the fundamental science, >>> Then you should be happy with, "God did it." which explains everything and >>> anything...perfect for everythingism. >> "God did it" explains nothing, unless you explain how God did it. That is >> what is done with mechanism, where the elementary arithmetic truth justifies >> completely the existence of the digital machines and their activities, > > No it doesn't. The "existence" of arithmetic and the implicit assumption > that true=exists are just assertions.
My point is that “existence of arithmetic” is an ambiguous statement, and I avoid it. Does that means “existence of the object fo arithmetic”, or “existence of the theory of arithmetic”? In that case those are theorem of RA. Or does it means “existence of a model of arithmetic”, or of the arithmetical reality? In that case, this is not provable in any theory of arithmetic, but it is still provable in set theory, or in the “usual mathematics”. Also, “true = exist” does not mean anything. But for someone assuming RA or PA, “true” means, at the meta-level, “satisfied” in all models, or satisfied in the intended (standard) model. > Not that assertions are impermissible, but they must be justified by > agreement of their consequences with observation. Yes, that is the whole point. > In this case the consequences are either just more metaphysics or they are > unobservable. No, the consequence of mechanism is that physical existence is []<>Ex[]<>P(x), with “[]” being one of the physical modes that I have described. If this modes did not obey []p -> p, and p -> []<>p, Mechanism would have been refuted, but that is not the case. Now, the self-referential modes are very rich, which leaves a lot of testing possible. The UDA shows that physics is a very precise mathematical theory, that I have derived with the translation of UDA in the language of any universal machine. It is hard to find a theology more empirically testable than this, given that we get the whole of physics. > >> and how the physical phenomenology reappears through some of the modes of >> self-reference. > But it doesn't do that. You just say that it could do that. But that is > because it could do anything. Why do you say this? Up to now, it leads to quantum mechanics. It already refutes Aristotle and Newton’s physics. In which sense could you mean it do anything. Neither S4Grz1, nor Z1* nor X1* “do” anything. We get the qualia (missed and even not study by the physical science, and the quanta, so that we can test this). > >> This explains the how and why of the physical laws, and this without the >> need to eliminate consciousness, first person, etc. >> >> “God did it” is how the materialists, who take the physical reality are a >> granted primary reality, explains, or how they attempt to dismiss the >> “metaphysical” open problem. > > You return to complaints that somebody (Democritius?) takes physical reality > to be "primary”. I am not sure Democrat really tackled this question. It is Aristote who made that primary matter/physics assumption, and its followers who tool Aristotle for granted. Democritus has assumed atoms, but he did not assumes that such an assumption is necessary. That is the metaphysical error (assuming mechanism) of Aristotle. The assumption of atoms was rather successful, but is unrelated to the metaphysical questions, or to the mind-body problem. > But "being primary" is just relative to some theory. The theory assumes > what is primary, so it can't prove it, on pain of circularity. Whatever > credence it deserves must come from application of the theory: what it > predicts. Exactly. And I show how to test primary matter, and the test shows that there is no evidence in metaphysics for a primary physical universe. All the evidences available today confirms Mechanism, which is nice given that Mechanism explains the qualia, where the physicists do not aboard the question, for good reason, as it is not physics, but metaphysics or theology, but now being made testable. It looks we agree more than you want to agree. If you are OK that the metaphysical assumption of the existence of a physical universe needs to be tested, then it is just a matter of work to understand that, in the Mechanist frame, that is testable, and that the test already done (a posteriori in empirical physics) confirms mechanism and refute materialism. Bruno > > Brent > >> >> If you agree that metaphysics is not physics, as you did recently, there >> should be no problem with this. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/84c18ce7-3ba1-c188-41be-80e4038928bf%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/84c18ce7-3ba1-c188-41be-80e4038928bf%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9EA8E12E-6AC5-49F0-A4AE-2C313324DD94%40ulb.ac.be.
