> On 26 Jun 2020, at 21:37, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/25/2020 11:29 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 25 Jun 2020, at 20:02, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/25/2020 8:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>> From your irreducible material universe in which you seem to believe?
>>>>> Where did I say "irreducible"?  I'm not in the belief business.  I'm in 
>>>>> the finding out business.
>>>> A scientist can only propose a theory, and means of verification, and a 
>>>> finite number of evidences for it. Someone doubting the interest of the 
>>>> theory must either refute it, or find something simpler, or something with 
>>>> wider range of explanations. I think we agree on all this.
>>> No we don't.  It's not sufficient to be simpler unless it also has the same 
>>> or greater scope of predictions that are at least as accurate.  
>>> "Explanations" are a dime dozen.  Prediction is the gold standard.
>> Prediction of what? You seem again to confuse physics and metaphysics, which 
>> is the Aristotelian metaphysics.
> 
> On the contrary, you are the one claiming to discover physics via 
> metaphysics...but never making a prediction.

I do not discover physics via metaphysics. I show that the laws of physics are 
predictable, entirely predictable from an hypothesis in metaphysics 
(Mechanism), and up to now, Nature conforms to the predictions, where 
physicalism does not (it relies on an implicit non mechanist theory of mind, as 
the UDA should make clear).

The physics being shown to be entirely derivable, it is hard to make sense of 
your “never making a prediction”.



> 
>> 
>> Practically, we predict only number relation. Prediction is necessary, as I 
>> said, but a simplet theory with a greater range of explanation is always 
>> better in the fundamental science,
> 
> Then you should be happy with, "God did it." which explains everything and 
> anything...perfect for everythingism.


"God did it" explains nothing, unless you explain how God did it.  That is what 
is done with mechanism, where the elementary arithmetic truth justifies 
completely the existence of the digital machines and their activities, and how 
the physical phenomenology reappears through some of the modes of 
self-reference. This explains the how and why of the physical laws, and this 
without the need to eliminate consciousness, first person, etc.

“God did it” is how the materialists, who take the physical reality are a 
granted primary reality, explains, or how they attempt to dismiss the 
“metaphysical” open problem.

If you agree that metaphysics is not physics, as you did recently, there should 
be no problem with this.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
>> and that is the case for Mechanism in metaphysics, and perhaps in physics 
>> too in some far future. In metaphysics, physicalism is basically incomplete, 
>> if not refuted, as it needs to abandon Mechanism, (and thus Descartes, 
>> Darwin, etc.
>> 
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
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