On Tuesday, June 9, 2020 at 11:08:30 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote: > > For the present discussion/question, I want to ignore the testable > implications of computationalism on physical law, and instead focus on the > following idea: > > "How can we know if a robot is conscious?" > > Let's say there are two brains, one biological and one an exact > computational emulation, meaning exact functional equivalence. Then let's > say we can exactly control sensory input and perfectly monitor motor > control outputs between the two brains. > > Given that computationalism implies functional equivalence, then identical > inputs yield identical internal behavior (nerve activations, etc.) and > outputs, in terms of muscle movement, facial expressions, and speech. > > If we stimulate nerves in the person's back to cause pain, and ask them > both to describe the pain, both will speak identical sentences. Both will > say it hurts when asked, and if asked to write a paragraph describing the > pain, will provide identical accounts. > > Does the definition of functional equivalence mean that any scientific > objective third-person analysis or test is doomed to fail to find any > distinction in behaviors, and thus necessarily fails in its ability to > disprove consciousness in the functionally equivalent robot mind? > > Is computationalism as far as science can go on a theory of mind before it > reaches this testing roadblock? > > Jason >
*Words alone won't prove anything. Just lie both suckers on an operating table and do some minor invasive surgery. AG * -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b62f5069-e757-44ab-bbe7-53f688a48aeao%40googlegroups.com.
