> On 9 Jun 2020, at 19:08, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > > For the present discussion/question, I want to ignore the testable > implications of computationalism on physical law, and instead focus on the > following idea: > > "How can we know if a robot is conscious?”
That question is very different than “is functionalism/computationalism unfalsifiable?”. Note that in my older paper, I relate computationisme to Putnam’s ambiguous functionalism, by defining computationalism by asserting the existence of of level of description of my body/brain such that I survive (ma consciousness remains relatively invariant) with a digital machine (supposedly physically implemented) replacing my body/brain. > > Let's say there are two brains, one biological and one an exact computational > emulation, meaning exact functional equivalence. I guess you mean “for all possible inputs”. > Then let's say we can exactly control sensory input and perfectly monitor > motor control outputs between the two brains. > > Given that computationalism implies functional equivalence, then identical > inputs yield identical internal behavior (nerve activations, etc.) and > outputs, in terms of muscle movement, facial expressions, and speech. > > If we stimulate nerves in the person's back to cause pain, and ask them both > to describe the pain, both will speak identical sentences. Both will say it > hurts when asked, and if asked to write a paragraph describing the pain, will > provide identical accounts. > > Does the definition of functional equivalence mean that any scientific > objective third-person analysis or test is doomed to fail to find any > distinction in behaviors, and thus necessarily fails in its ability to > disprove consciousness in the functionally equivalent robot mind? With computationalism, (and perhaps without) we cannot prove that anything is conscious (we can know our own consciousness, but still cannot justified it to ourself in any public way, or third person communicable way). > > Is computationalism as far as science can go on a theory of mind before it > reaches this testing roadblock? Computationalism is indirectly testable. By verifying the physics implied by the theory of consciousness, we verify it indirectly. As you know, I define consciousness by that indubitable truth that all universal machine, cognitively enough rich to know that they are universal, finds by looking inward (in the Gödel-Kleene sense), and which is also non provable (non rationally justifiable) and even non definable without invoking *some* notion of truth. Then such consciousness appears to be a fixed point for the doubting procedure, like in Descartes, and it get a key role: self-speeding up relatively to universal machine(s). So, it seems so clear to me that nobody can prove that anything is conscious that I make it into one of the main way to characterise it. Consciousness is already very similar with consistency, which is (for effective theories, and sound machine) equivalent to a belief in some reality. No machine can prove its own consistency, and no machines can prove that there is reality satisfying their beliefs. In all case, it is never the machine per se which is conscious, but the first person associated with the machine. There is a core universal person common to each of “us” (with “us” in a very large sense of universal numbers/machines). Consciousness is not much more than knowledge, and in particular indubitable knowledge. Bruno > > Jason > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUhpWiuoSoOyeW2DS3%2BqEaahequxkDcGK-bF2qjgiuqrAg%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUhpWiuoSoOyeW2DS3%2BqEaahequxkDcGK-bF2qjgiuqrAg%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6BFB3D6E-1AFB-4DDA-988E-B7BA03FF897F%40ulb.ac.be.
