On Saturday, May 18, 2019, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On Saturday, May 18, 2019 at 8:00:42 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote: >> >> >> >> On Saturday, May 18, 2019, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 6:09:18 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 5/17/2019 3:33 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 5:21:41 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 5/16/2019 11:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 5:14:46 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 1:48 PM Philip Thrift <[email protected]> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> *> Information processing absent actual first-class entities >>>>>>> of qualia (or experiences) can only produce zombies. One needs >>>>>>> information >>>>>>> processing operating in a material substrate where those entities are >>>>>>> available to be combined and manipulated.* >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> So something can behave intelligently but if it is lacking "f*irst-class >>>>>> entities of qualia*" it can only be a intelligent zombie. But >>>>>> "*first-class >>>>>> qualia*" sounds like consciousness to me, so you're basically >>>>>> saying only conscious things can be conscious. A tautology has the virtue >>>>>> of always being true but it involves a unnecessary non-required >>>>>> pointless repetition and reiteration of words where you end up at >>>>>> the exact same place you started with. And that is typical of all >>>>>> consciousness theories. >>>>>> >>>>>> John K Clark >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> To be clearer: Qualia (the "ingredients" of consciousness) cannot be >>>>> reduced to information processing. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> That's nothing but unsupported assertion. It's not even clear what >>>>> "reduced" means in that context. >>>>> >>>>> (That is what I mean by "first-class". If qualia could be reduced to >>>>> information processing, then they would derivative from information, or >>>>> "second-class".) >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Is life derivative from chemistry? Only within a certain >>>>> environment. Same with information processing. In general it's streams >>>>> of >>>>> bits being processed being changed according to some algorithm. But it's >>>>> qualia if the streams are in some entity whose environment and actions >>>>> give >>>>> meaning to the information, like "I've got a headache and I'm going to lie >>>>> down." >>>>> >>>>> Brent >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Isn't *qualia can be reduced to information processing* the >>>> unsupported assertion? >>>> >>>> >>>> No. It's very well supported. Interfere with information processing >>>> by drugs or electrical stimulus of the brain and qualia are changed or >>>> eliminated. >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>> >>> >>> *Information processing (IP) is necessary for consciousness*, but IP >>> has to occur in a substrate that produces qualia. *Stop the IP and you >>> stop consciousness.* But *the same IP* *in a different substrate* could >>> be consciousnessless. >>> >> >> Maybe you're the only person in the world with the right gene mutation to >> synthesize the right protein that is a substrate for consciousness, and all >> the other philosophers of consciousness who came before you and wrote books >> on consciousness were pzombies that had no idea about what consciousness >> was. >> >> You might consider this situation ridiculous, but it's exactly what you >> get when you introduce substrate dependence. A simulated human brain could >> describe it's back pain in every detail, write whole paragraphs about what >> it's like, while according to the theory of substrate dependence, it knows >> nothing of what it's writing about. Where then does this knowledge if pain >> come from when the AI writes a page about the back pain it is in? >> >> >>> >>> The above substate is the material of the brain: neurons, >>> neurochemistry, glia, ... >>> >>> A simulation of gravity running in a smartphone does not produce gravity. >>> >>> >> Simulating the processing of information does produce processed >> information. Consciousness might be like multiplication. There's no way to >> simulate it without actually doing it. >> >> Jason >> >> >>> >>> >>> People talk of telepathy and precognition as delusional - broadly >>> speaking, it is. But the "IP delusion" (that consciousness is >>> substate-independent IP) is up there. >>> >>> @philipthrift >>> >>> -- >>> Y >>> >> > *A simulated human brain could describe it's back pain in every detail, > write whole paragraphs about what it's like, while according to the theory > of substrate dependence, it knows nothing of what it's writing about. Where > then does this knowledge if pain come from when the AI writes a page about > the back pain it is in?* > > > > A simulated human brain could read the Wikipedia article on pain [ > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pain ] and integrate this knowledge into > its knowledge base, but it could not experience pain. > Let's consider a simulated brain that is identical to yours, not one that's read Wikipedia. We might imagine having two identical copies of a person, one with a biological brain and another with a functionally identical (but non-biological) artificial brain. If weak AI is true, then the artificial brain lacks any conscious awareness, but surprisingly, it would still provide just as much information about its (non-existent) mental states as the biological brain would. Consider if we provided the same exact stimulus of back pain to each of the two brains, and then provided each a questionnaire to fill out, asking them to: 1. Rate the intensity of the pain on a scale from 1 to 10 2. Chose which of these words best describes the pain: dull, sharp, burning 3. Write a few paragraphs detailing how the pain makes them feel Owing to the behavioral equivalence between the two brains, we would find both the biological and non-biological brains provide the exact same answers, for these questions or any others we might choose to ask. But then we can’t help to wonder, as Minsky did, how does the non-biological brain, which supposedly has no access to consciousness experience, know so much about what the pain is like and how it makes them feel? Jason > > @philipthrift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/ > msgid/everything-list/bd1e614c-f584-42cd-9b18-ed5d8bbf13ff%40googlegroups. > com > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/bd1e614c-f584-42cd-9b18-ed5d8bbf13ff%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUjO1iV%2Bxg%2B%3Dawz6_5hytA8DsB1QHZCfypfGrtChuUZHfQ%40mail.gmail.com.
