On Monday, March 17, 2014, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On Sunday, March 16, 2014 10:02:04 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, March 17, 2014, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, March 16, 2014 1:02:08 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 14 March 2014 13:12, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZH2QXQu-HGE >>>>> >>>>> A brief, handy rebuttal to materialistic views of consciousness. I >>>>> would go further, and say that information, even though it is immaterial >>>>> in >>>>> its conception, is still derived from the principles of object >>>>> interaction. >>>>> Even when forms and functions are divorced from any particular physical >>>>> substance, they are still tethered to the third person omniscient view - >>>>> artifacts of communication *about* rather *appreciation of*. Real >>>>> experiences are not valued just because they inform us about something or >>>>> other, they are valued because of their intrinsic aesthetic and semantic >>>>> content. It’s not even content, it is the experience itself. Information >>>>> must be made evident through sensory participation, or it is nothing at >>>>> all. >>>>> >>>>> The thing is, this happens in the brain as well. You look at >>>> something, neurons fire, and there is no obvious reason why that should >>>> result in a particular sensation rather than another, or any sensation at >>>> all. And yet it does. If it's magic, then why can't the same magic happen >>>> with the computer? If it isn't magic, but a natural effect, then why can't >>>> the same natural effect happen with the computer? >>>> >>> >>> For the same reason that words on a page can't write a book. Computers >>> host meaningless patterns which we use to represent ideas that we find >>> significant. The patterns are not even patterns on their own, just the >>> presence of billions of disconnected micro-phenomenal states. >>> >> >> But if you look at a brain the patterns in it are no more meaningful than >> the patterns in a computer, and the matter in it is no more meaningful than >> the matter in a computer. >> > > Right. That's why we can't assume that the patterns that we see of other > bodies through our body is the relevant picture. It is the patterns which > we feel directly which are important as far as consciousness is concerned. > So why do you think the meaningless patterns and matter in a brain but not in a computer can be associated with consciousness? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
