On Sunday, February 16, 2014 2:18:54 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: > > On 16 February 2014 17:48, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]<javascript:> > > wrote: > > Ah, but then you would be faced with the questions posed by the UDA/MWI >>> arguments, because there would then be two conscious "originals" who >>> claimed equal possession of the same history to that point. That is all you >>> need for the duplication arguments to go through. >>> >> >> They would each be their own originals, not the same original. In >> identical twin is as identical as identical can be. >> > > You are blatantly ignoring the challenge this presents to your contention > that a conscious person cannot be duplicated in principle, by quibbling > over the meaning of copy and original. If Craig were the person duplicated > (whilst asleep, say) and there were then two originals (A and B) each of > whom laid claim to being Craig with the same history, how would you know > whether you were A or B? >
A single cell can be divided into many, but full grown organism can't be cut down the middle longitudinally and grow into two separate bodies. Even as a single cell, mitosis can't be induced by slicing a zygote in half - the motive for reproduction has to come from the inside out. I don't think it will ever be possible to duplicate an organism without growing it from scratch. A cloned brain would have to grow in a vat and would come out as a new born unique individual (who would have comparable similarity to their clone parent as an identical twin separated at birth does). The problem is the assumption that duplication is a possibility in the first place, and that the barrier to duplication depends on complexity alone. What I'm saying is that consciousness is an event, not a structure. You cannot duplicate an event because it is connected to all other events. Craig > David > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
