On 24 January 2014 01:15, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On Thursday, January 23, 2014 5:39:08 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: >> >> On 13 January 2014 00:40, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: >> > Here then is simpler and more familiar example of how computation can >> > differ >> > from natural understanding which is not susceptible to any mereological >> > Systems argument. >> > >> > If any of you have use passwords which are based on a pattern of >> > keystrokes >> > rather than the letters on the keys, you know that you can enter your >> > password every day without ever knowing what it is you are typing >> > (something >> > with a #r5f^ in it…?). >> > >> > I think this is a good analogy for machine intelligence. By storing and >> > copying procedures, a pseudo-semantic analysis can be performed, but it >> > is >> > an instrumental logic that has no way to access the letters of the >> > ‘human >> > keyboard’. The universal machine’s keyboard is blank and consists only >> > of >> > theoretical x,y coordinates where keys would be. No matter how good or >> > sophisticated the machine is, it will still have no way to understand >> > what >> > the particular keystrokes "mean" to a person, only how they fit in with >> > whatever set of fixed possibilities has been defined. >> > >> > Taking the analogy further, the human keyboard only applies to public >> > communication. Privately, we have no keys to strike, and entire >> > paragraphs >> > or books can be represented by a single thought. Unlike computers, we do >> > not >> > have to build our ideas up from syntactic digits. Instead the >> > public-facing >> > computation follows from the experienced sense of what is to be >> > communicated >> > in general, from the top down, and the inside out. >> >> I think you have a problem with the idea that a system could display >> properties that are not obvious from examining its parts. There's no >> way to argue around this, you just believe it and that's that. > > > I don't have a problem with the idea that a "system" could DISPLAY > properties that are not obvious from EXAMINING its "parts", but you overlook > that DISPLAYING and EXAMINING are functions of consciousness only. If they > were not, then consciousness would be superfluous. If my brain could examine > the display of the body's environment, then it would, and the presence or > absence of perceptual experience would not make any difference. > > Systems and parts are defined by level of description - scales and scopes of > perception and abstracted potential perception. They aren't primitively > real. A machine is not a machine in its own eyes, but our body is an > expression of a single event which spans a human lifetime. A person is > another expression of that event. The "system" of a person does not emerge > from the activity of the body parts, as the entire coherence of the body is > as a character within relativistically scoped perceptual experiences. > > I don't think that I believe, I think that I understand. I think that you do > not understand what I mean, but are projecting that onto me, and therefore > have assigned a straw man to take my place. It is your straw man projection > who must believe. > > Craig
Tell me what you believe so we can be clear: My understanding is that you believe that if the parts of the Chinese Room don't understand Chinese, then the Chinese Room can't understand Chinese. Have I got this wrong? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
