On 13 January 2014 00:40, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: > Here then is simpler and more familiar example of how computation can differ > from natural understanding which is not susceptible to any mereological > Systems argument. > > If any of you have use passwords which are based on a pattern of keystrokes > rather than the letters on the keys, you know that you can enter your > password every day without ever knowing what it is you are typing (something > with a #r5f^ in it…?). > > I think this is a good analogy for machine intelligence. By storing and > copying procedures, a pseudo-semantic analysis can be performed, but it is > an instrumental logic that has no way to access the letters of the ‘human > keyboard’. The universal machine’s keyboard is blank and consists only of > theoretical x,y coordinates where keys would be. No matter how good or > sophisticated the machine is, it will still have no way to understand what > the particular keystrokes "mean" to a person, only how they fit in with > whatever set of fixed possibilities has been defined. > > Taking the analogy further, the human keyboard only applies to public > communication. Privately, we have no keys to strike, and entire paragraphs > or books can be represented by a single thought. Unlike computers, we do not > have to build our ideas up from syntactic digits. Instead the public-facing > computation follows from the experienced sense of what is to be communicated > in general, from the top down, and the inside out.
I think you have a problem with the idea that a system could display properties that are not obvious from examining its parts. There's no way to argue around this, you just believe it and that's that. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
