On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 02:48:53PM -0500, Stephen Paul King wrote: > Dare Jason, > > > On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 1:48 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > So why can't zombies have intentions? Remember the only thing zombies > > supposedly lack is qualia. If a zombie is hungry and goes out to buy a > > burger, I would say it had an intention to fill its stomach. > > > > Intentions require self-models. Zombies by definition cannot have > self-models otherwise they would have first person experience. My point is > that I am claiming that self-models are, content-wise, the same as first > person experience. 1-p is, after all what we are considering that a zombie > does not have, so how can it have intentionality? It has no object to whom > the intention obtains, thus no intentionality.
I don't see the obviousness in "Zombies by definition cannot have self-models otherwise they would have first person experience". The presence of a self model is something that is objectively verifiable, by albeit rather intrusive neurophysiological means. Your statement would entail a physical difference between a zombie and a non-zombie, whereas, conventionally a p-zombie is physically indistinguishable from the conscious person. -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected] University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
