On Jan 16, 2014, at 9:32 AM, Stephen Paul King <[email protected]
> wrote:
Dear Jason,
I see a flaw in your argument.
On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 10:11 AM, Jason Resch <[email protected]>
wrote:
On Jan 16, 2014, at 8:41 AM, Stephen Paul King <[email protected]
> wrote:
Dear Jason,
Could you be more specific about why you are skeptical of p-
zombies? I have my reasons to disbelieve in them, but I am curious
as to your reasoning.
Ask a zombie if it is conscious, and it will say yes. For some
unexplianed reason it is lying, even though it does not believe
itself to be lying, and even though it has all the same
informational patterns in it's brain at the time.
What exactly does it mean to say that a zombie is lying?
What it always means, to speak an untruth, to deceive.
Note all these arguments become stronger if you use "zimboes", which
have beliefs but are not conscious.
I see no reason why a zombie could not have a belief given that their
brains contain all necessary information.
It cannot lie by definition!
What is your definition of lie?
what makes it a zombie is that, at least, it has no self-model that
is pat of its computations. It cannot lie because it does not have
an "I" (model) that is making untrue claims.
Whether or not it has an I model it is making untrue claims which I
consider suffi ent to call lying.
Throw a ball to a zombie and have it catch it. It caught the ball
without seeing it, even though it saw it by every third person
measurable description of what seeing involves. The information
went into it's brain, spread to other parts of it's brain, was used
to catch the ball, was stored, and when you ask the zombie if he saw
the ball his brain recalls the information that it did, again, for
some reason it is lying, since zombies cannot see.
What about this, does seeing without seeing make sense logically to you?
Finally consider a world where everyone is a zombie. They still have
their Descartes and dennett, their mystics, theories of dualism,
epiphrnominalism, functionalism and so on. They have books on
consciousness and thought experiments like inverted qualia. They
have classes on consciousness and mailing list discussions about
zombies. Yet all this, is supposed to be a product of things that
never once were conscious!
That's why I find them so doubtful.
I would agree that Dennett is a p-zombie... LOL! He is unaware,
intentionally?, that he is lying.
So what causes zombies to write about and discuss consciousness?
To me this is like descartes in reverse, you are ascribing causes to
something which is not there. And hence is not physical. It has the
same problems as epiphenominalism.
Jason
Jason
On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 9:17 AM, Jason Resch <[email protected]>
wrote:
On Jan 16, 2014, at 2:11 AM, Stathis Papaioannou
<[email protected]> wrote:
On 16 January 2014 16:26, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote:
The computational metaphor in the sense of the brain works like the
Intel
CPU inside the box on your desk is clearly misleading, but the
sense that a
computer can in theory do everything your brain can do is almost
certainly
correct. It is not that the brain is like a computer, but rather,
that a
computer can be like almost anything, including your brain or body,
or
entire planet and all the people on it.
Jason
I think neuroscientists have, over decades, used the computational
metaphor in too literal a way. It is obviously not true that the
brain
is a digital computer, just as it is not true that the weather is a
digital computer. But a digital computer can simulate the behaviour
of
any physical process in the universe (if physics is computable),
including the behaviour of weather or the human brain. That means
that, at least, it would be possible to make a philosophical zombie
using a computer.
How does this follow? Personally I don't find the notion that
philosophical zombies make logical sense at all.
Jason
The only way to avoid this conclusion would be if
physics, and specifically the physics in the brain, is not
computable.
Pointing out where the non-computable physics is in the brain rarely
figures on the agenda of the anti-computationalists. And even if
there
is non-computational physics in the brain, that invalidates
computationalism, but not its superset, functionalism.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
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