On 02 Dec 2013, at 23:00, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/2/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But I don't think it's so simple as applying Occam's razor. In my
example "red" is an experience that from the perspective of
conscious thoughts may have no explanation, i.e. is fundamental.
Like the guy in Washington cannot explain why he is the one in
Washington. But we can explain why he cannot explain it, and in
general we can explain why machines are first person confronted
with arithmetical first person truth that they have to feel as
fundamental and unexplainable.
But from the perspective of biology has an explanation in terms of
physics and chemistry. From an evolutionary perspective it has an
explanation in terms of survival advantage. So Occam's razor cuts
different ways depending on the perspective.
This is an abstract "base problem", but with comp the points of
view don't depend on the choice of base machine, and we can refine
the use of Occam razor for each points of view. In fact we can use
it only one time, for the Turing universal ontology.
They don't depend on the choice of base machine because you've
chosen Turing computation as fundamental.
I use Church thesis, and the hope/fear to survive a digital
substitution at some level.
That doesn't show that something else could not have been chosen as
fundamental instead.
Or that something has to give some helps to the universal persons
distributed in the arithmetical reality. The Aristotelian God Matter
fails in Comp, so let us look at the God of Plato, being quite open
minded, because we are at the (eternal) beginning (of the machine's
interview).
The universal machine is not God (which is Truth), but it has an inner
God which is the part agreeing with God (Truth). It is the first
person experience. It allows experiences and knowledge states,
deception too.
Bruno
Brent
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