On 10/17/2012 12:38 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, October 17, 2012 12:11:00 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Oct 2012, at 02:42, Stephen P. King wrote:
> It is the inability of comp to solve the arithmetic body problem
> that is its Achilles heel.
No. It is the strongest point of comp. It does solve it
constructively, so it makes comp testable and/or our simulation level
measurable.
You can see it in another way, comp explains how and where the
laws of
physics, and psychology, come from, and with the whole consciousness/
matter coupling. It does not solve the problem because the math are
hard, only. Then the logic of observability, perhaps in a toy case,
are already given and tested.
That there is a body problem is the interesting thing, imo.
The other theories assume the body, and the mind, and some relation
shown incompatible with comp.
Comp, as such, is not an explanation. Just a frame where we can
formulate the problem mathematically, and that is the main reason to
study it, even if false. In fact, you need to study to comp to
develop
an authentic non-comp theory.
Comp is not an explanation per se, neither of the mind nor of the
body. The explanation is in the reasoning and the math. Comp
itself is
just the bet that we are Turing emulable at *some* level.
This is exactly why Comp is misguided, as awareness is by definition
not emulable in any way.
Hi Craig,
I think that you and Bruno are using different dictionaries of
words and are tangled in a web of semantic miscommunication. The 1p
demands that it is possible for a conscious entity to have an emulation
of its content of awareness if that 1p content is anything more than
just a momentary singular coincidence of BP &P - like a Boltzmann
brain... What you might not understand is that Bruno is using the Kleene
(of Church-Curry) relation between equivalent computations to "collapse
into each other" all of the emulations of the same experiential content
of the entity.
In order to even conceptualize 'emulation' there has to already be an
a priori discernment between authenticity and inauthenticity, i.e.
emulation requires the existence of something to emulate which is
itself ultimately traceable back to something which is genuine and unique.
Comp bets on the Baudrillard simulacra - the copy without an original,
beyond even the capacity to recover the deception. A copy through
which no trace of an original can be accessed.
Nice idea! http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simulacra_and_Simulation
But the concept of a self-erasing copy (a copy without an original) is
just a restatement of the Kleene
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kleene%27s_recursion_theorem>/Church-Curry
<http://pages.cpsc.ucalgary.ca/%7Erobin/FMCS/FMCS_04/material/seldin.pdf> relation
of the application of computable functions to their own descriptions!
This idea is interesting to me because this sorta backs up Bruno's
claims about quantum aspects implied by comp!
This is indeed an interesting and powerful hypothesis, however it is
ultimately inside out.
So? Why are you kicking against the pricks? All you need to show is
that your concept of Sense is just the involution of Bruno's object of
bets and thus bridge the gap between your ideas that are mutually
exclusive at this point.
You can't claim to be revealing the primacy of unreality while
insisting on the same time of the reality of that revelation. In Comp,
Comp itself is just another Bp, and the significance of whether it is
Bp or Bp + p is really an obscure footnote.
Wow, reflexivity! Nice, but your going too far, Craig. Your
argument does not demolish Bruno's comp, it just shows that it is
"different" from yours.
--
Onward!
Stephen
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