Hi Alberto G. Corona
If we can define what we are talking about, most of our problems will be solved. That is why I believe we ought to use the Descartes-Leibniz definition of physical existence as that which is in spacetime (is extended). Thus the brain exists. Nonphysical existence (mind) is that which is not extended in space and hence is said to be nonextended or inextended. I have been referring to this type of existence as living, but number does not seem tpo be alive since it does not change while living things do. I sucggest that we use the term "mental" for inextended entities. Then both number and mind are mental. Roger Clough, [email protected] 9/22/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-21, 12:42:47 Subject: Re: Does Platonia exist ? Hi, Anyone serious about knowing truths must either spend its life trying to define the concept of existence and fighting for it or? to discard it for all uses. The concept of phisical exsitence has a primitive utilitary nature: ?re there men in the other side of the mountain?. This urgent need to fix the knowledge of the phisical environment makes existence something crucial for communication. More sophisticated civilizations added to the existence more subtle concepts, which had effects in the personal and social life of the people: philosophical, psichological , political, religious. In this?ense materialism is a return to primitivism. ? In pragmatic terms, ?nything that has effects in life exist. Are you humans with hands, minds etc ?r are you allucinations, robots? I don? know it properly, but you exist for me.? This makes the concept of existence redundant, or at most, a matter of public consensus in the context of a community. But probably existence has never been more than this. Alberto. 2012/9/21 Bruno Marchal On 21 Sep 2012, at 12:21, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal ? I think we should only use the word "exists" ?nly when we are referring to physical existence. Hmm.... That might aggravate the naturalist or materialist human penchant. Thus I can truthfully say, for example, that God does not exist. ? Wikipedia says, "In common usage, it [existence] is the world we are aware of through our senses, ? and that persists independently without them." But that points on the whole problem. With comp and QM, even when you observe the moon, it is not "really" there. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existence On the other hand, Platonia, Plotinus, Plato, Kant and Leibniz, take the opposite view or what is real and what exists. To them ideas and other nonphysical items such as numbers or anything not extended in space, anything outside of spacetime are what exist, the physical world out there is merely an appearance, a phenomenon. ?ollowing Leibniz, I would say of such things that they live, since life has such attributes. Hmm... Then numbers lives, but with comp, only universal or Lobian numbers can be said reasonably enough to be living. You might go to far. Even in Plato, the No? content (all the ideas) is richer that its living part. I doubt Plato would have said that a circle is living. Life will need the soul to enact life in the intelligible. So when we say that a man exists, we are speaking of the physical man. But when we say that he lives, we are speaking of man as a mental or living being. The person and its body. OK. For the term "exist" I think we should allow all reading, and just ask people to remind us of the sense before the use. With comp, all the exists comes from the "ExP(x)" use in arithmetic, and their arithmetical epistemological version, like []Ex[]P(x), or?]<>Ex[]<>P(x), etc. That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains the physics as a subpart). Bruno ----- Receiving the following content ----- ? From: Bruno Marchal ? Receiver: everything-list ? Time: 2012-09-21, 04:10:52 Subject: Re: Numbers in Space On 21 Sep 2012, at 03:28, Stephen P. King wrote: On 9/20/2012 12:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, September 20, 2012 11:48:15 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: It's not doing the computations that is hard, the computations are already there. ?he problem is learning their results. The problem is doing anything in the first place. Computations don't do anything at all. The reason that we do things is that we are not computations. We use computations. We can program things, but we can't thing programs without something to thing them with. This is a fatal flaw. If Platonia exists, it makes no sense for anything other than Platonia to exist. It would be redundant to go through the formality of executing any function is already executed non-locally. Why 'do' anything? ??runo can 't answer that question. He is afraid that it will corrupt Olympia. Not at all, the answer is easy here. In the big picture, that is arithmetic, nothing is done. The computations are already "done" in it. "doing things" is a relative internal notion coming from the first person perspectives. Also, Platonia does not really exist, nor God, as existence is what belongs to Platonia. Comp follows Plotinus on this, both God and Matter does not belong to the category exist (ontologically). They are epistemological beings. Bruno -- ? Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- ? You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
