> 2  The EAP Type sent by the other party in the first TEAP message. This
is a single octet encoded as (0x37)

Shouldn't we clarify the motivation for placing the octet with TEAP type
0x37 into the BUFFER? Joe, I remember you explained that it is for
protection against cross protocol attacks if Crypto-Binding TLV was reused
(e.g. from PEAP).

On Sun, Oct 25, 2020 at 12:45 AM Joseph Salowey <j...@salowey.net> wrote:

> Errata 5768:  https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5768
> Proposed State: Verified
> Revision:
>
> Section 4.2.13. Says:
>
> Length
>
>     76
>
> It should say:
>
> Length
>
>      36 plus the length of the 2 MAC fields
>
> Section 4.2.13. Says:
>
>    EMSK Compound MAC
>
>       The EMSK Compound MAC field is 20 octets.  This can be the Server
>       MAC (B1_MAC) or the Client MAC (B2_MAC).  The computation of the
>       MAC is described in Section 5.3.
>
>    MSK Compound MAC
>
>       The MSK Compound MAC field is 20 octets.  This can be the Server
>       MAC (B1_MAC) or the Client MAC (B2_MAC).  The computation of the
>       MAC is described in Section 5.3.
>
> It Should Say:
>
>    EMSK Compound MAC
>
>       The computation of the MAC is described in Section 5.3.  This can be
>       the Server MAC (B1_MAC) or the Client MAC (B2_MAC).
>
>    MSK Compound MAC
>
>       The computation of the MAC is described in Section 5.3.  This can be
>       the Server MAC (B1_MAC) or the Client MAC (B2_MAC).
>
> Section 5.3 Says:
>
>  The Compound MAC computation is as follows:
>
>       CMK = CMK[j]
>       Compound-MAC = MAC( CMK, BUFFER )
>
>    where j is the number of the last successfully executed inner EAP
>    method, MAC is the MAC function negotiated in TLS 1.2 [RFC5246], and
>    BUFFER is created after concatenating these fields in the following
>    order:
>
>    1  The entire Crypto-Binding TLV attribute with both the EMSK and MSK
>       Compound MAC fields zeroed out.
>
>    2  The EAP Type sent by the other party in the first TEAP message.
>
> It Should say:
>
>  The Compound MAC computation is as follows:
>
>       CMK = CMK[j]
>       Compound-MAC = MAC( CMK, BUFFER )
>
>    where j is the number of the last successfully executed inner EAP
>    method, MAC is HMAC [RFC2104] using the hash function negotiated in
>    TLS [RFC5246].  The output length is the length of the output of the
> HMAC
>    function.  The BUFFER is created after concatenating these fields in
>    the following order:
>
>    1  The entire Crypto-Binding TLV attribute with both the EMSK and MSK
>       Compound MAC fields zeroed out.
>
>    2  The EAP Type sent by the other party in the first TEAP message. This
>        is a single octet encoded as (0x37)
>
> Notes:
>
> This corrects the problem that the MAC output will vary depending upon the
> TLS hash function. It clarifies that HMAC is used with the hash function
> negotiated in TLS.   It also clarifies that the  EAP Type used in the TLS
> message is the TEAP EAP type encoded as a single byte.
>
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