Errata 5768: https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5768
Proposed State: Verified
Revision:
Section 4.2.13. Says:
Length
76
It should say:
Length
36 plus the length of the 2 MAC fields
Section 4.2.13. Says:
EMSK Compound MAC
The EMSK Compound MAC field is 20 octets. This can be the Server
MAC (B1_MAC) or the Client MAC (B2_MAC). The computation of the
MAC is described in Section 5.3.
MSK Compound MAC
The MSK Compound MAC field is 20 octets. This can be the Server
MAC (B1_MAC) or the Client MAC (B2_MAC). The computation of the
MAC is described in Section 5.3.
It Should Say:
EMSK Compound MAC
The computation of the MAC is described in Section 5.3. This can be
the Server MAC (B1_MAC) or the Client MAC (B2_MAC).
MSK Compound MAC
The computation of the MAC is described in Section 5.3. This can be
the Server MAC (B1_MAC) or the Client MAC (B2_MAC).
Section 5.3 Says:
The Compound MAC computation is as follows:
CMK = CMK[j]
Compound-MAC = MAC( CMK, BUFFER )
where j is the number of the last successfully executed inner EAP
method, MAC is the MAC function negotiated in TLS 1.2 [RFC5246], and
BUFFER is created after concatenating these fields in the following
order:
1 The entire Crypto-Binding TLV attribute with both the EMSK and MSK
Compound MAC fields zeroed out.
2 The EAP Type sent by the other party in the first TEAP message.
It Should say:
The Compound MAC computation is as follows:
CMK = CMK[j]
Compound-MAC = MAC( CMK, BUFFER )
where j is the number of the last successfully executed inner EAP
method, MAC is HMAC [RFC2104] using the hash function negotiated in
TLS [RFC5246]. The output length is the length of the output of the HMAC
function. The BUFFER is created after concatenating these fields in
the following order:
1 The entire Crypto-Binding TLV attribute with both the EMSK and MSK
Compound MAC fields zeroed out.
2 The EAP Type sent by the other party in the first TEAP message. This
is a single octet encoded as (0x37)
Notes:
This corrects the problem that the MAC output will vary depending upon the
TLS hash function. It clarifies that HMAC is used with the hash function
negotiated in TLS. It also clarifies that the EAP Type used in the TLS
message is the TEAP EAP type encoded as a single byte.
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