A short follow-up on my own review: I wrote:
> " > Pre-Shared Key (PSK) authentication SHALL NOT be used except > for resumption. > " > What you want to say that that EAP-TLS MUST NOT use external PSKs. I wonder > why you want to rule that use case out? It is a perfectly fine use case for > TLS 1.3 and there is even the possibility to use PSK with ECDHE. What is the > motivation? I noticed now that the working group had a discussion about this already and that there is a new document being published specifically focused on EAP-TLS-PSK-based authentication. Hence, ignore the second part of my comment. Ciao Hannes IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. _______________________________________________ Emu mailing list Emu@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
