Re: [Emu] Notes on session resumption with TLS-based EAP methods

Mohit Sethi M <mohit.m.se...@ericsson.com>; wrote:
>
>For me, an EAP-TLS server should not only refuse resumption if a client 
>was not authenticated, it should also refuse resumption if the client 
>was authenticated with other methods than certificates (such as passwords).

>Do you agree?

(Everything below is from a pure EAP-TLS (0x0d) perspective without considering 
any cross-method things)

- From an EAP-TLS perspective, I think these two cases ("not authenticated" and 
"authenticate via some other means") are the same, the peer is not 
authenticated as far as EAP-TLS is concerned. I read the sentence "other means" 
as outside of TLS.

- RFC 5216 allows deployments with only server authentication:

RFC 5216: "While the EAP server SHOULD require peer authentication, this is not 
mandatory, since there are circumstances in which peer authentication will not 
be needed (e.g., emergency services, as described in [UNAUTH]), or where the 
peer will authenticate via some other means."

I don't know if there exists EAP-TLS (0x0d) deployments where the "peer 
authentication will not be needed" or "peer will authenticate via some other 
means", but if they do exist, we should probably not forbid them to do 
resumption unless we have good reasons.

- Looking at e.g. emergency services (RFC 7406), the peer would indicate 
emergency by forming a specific NAI, the network access would then have to be 
restricted based on the fact that the peer is unauthenticated. With this 
functionality in place, I do not see that resumption as such is the problem.

I think draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13 needs some sentence about the peer can use 
specific NAIs to affect the server's behaviour. Emergency services being one. 
Was there anything in the discussion between Alan DeKok and Dr. Pala about 
identities that should be added to draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13? I need to get back 
to that thread.

Cheers,
John

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