Hi Joe and Sam, I've updated the PT-EAP draft to -03 version and included a new paragraph in section 3.4 to read:
Note that tls-unique, as opposed to invoking a mutual cryptographic binding, is used as there is no keying material being generated by PT-EAP (the method is defined to facilitate the transport of posture data and is not an authentication method). However, the NEA Client may host an EMA which can be used as the means to cryptographically bind the tls-unique content that may be validated by the Posture Validator interfacing with the EAP Server. The binding of the tls-unique to the client authentication prevents the client's message from being used in another context. This prevents a poorly configured client from unintentionally compromising the NEA system. Strong mutual authentication of the NEA server and client is still REQUIRED to prevent the disclosure of possibly sensitive NEA client information to attacker. To address the comments below. Can you please review the updated draft and let me know if that is sufficient? Thanks, Nancy. On 6/7/12 6:02 AM, "Sam Hartman" <hartmans-i...@mit.edu> wrote: >>>>>> "Joe" == Joe Salowey <jsalo...@cisco.com> writes: > > Joe> So, is your concern with using only MSK crypto binding with an >inner EAP authentication method used to authenticate an >unauthenticated/poorly authenticated tunnel or is it more specific to the >nea-pt-eap method? > Joe> For the first concern it may be sufficient to discuss the issue >in the security considerations. > >Sounds good to me and that is my concern. > >I see no reason EAP-PT needs more text than what we did for the cb >draft. >_______________________________________________ >Emu mailing list >Emu@ietf.org >https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu _______________________________________________ Emu mailing list Emu@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
