Dan Harkins wrote: > "channel bindings" are supposed to solve the lying NAS problem* > which is an issue of authentication (is this guy really who he claims > to be?). What you want to do is use the EAP tunnel to transfer other > kinds of data to do NEA posture checking. And, yes, we should determine > whether it is permissible for EMU to work on such a thing. What we > shouldn't do is say that it's really part of "authentication" or it's > part of "channel binding" and just proceed.
My question again is where do we draw the line? What information is permissible as authentication credentials, and what isn't permissible? And why? Some sites determine that username/password authentication is sufficient. Others also require that the MAC be known, too. Is the MAC part of the authentication credentials? Or is the site doing "posture checking" by requiring that the MAC be known? We need to achieve a common understanding before making any decisions. > *the example given, at the Philly IETF I think, was of a Russian > mobile phone operator that made its cell towers broadcast out that > they were actually from an Estonian mobile phone operator and then > billed Estonians whose phones connected to them (even when they had > manual network selection turned on to intentionally avoid accidentially > connecting to the Russian network) as if they were roaming on the > Russian network. That is largely an issue of fraud, and best *resolved* through legal methods. But channel bindings may permit the end user to *detect* the fraud, at least. Alan DeKok. _______________________________________________ Emu mailing list Emu@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
