* When I have to introduce this work to our AAA server folks then they will obviously ask me the following question: What is the benefit and what does it cost? As you mentioned in the operational considerations section there is cost associated with updating the EAP methods, putting new information into the AAA server database, providing additional policies into the AAA server to accomplish the authorization check. Now, the question really is whether folks are so concerned about the attack. I know the Lying NAS problem but the current text isn't scary enough. Have you ever seen some data that this attack is a real issue? In case you do then it would certainly be valuable information to convey this to the reader.
* Reading the operational consideration section I get the impression that you consider that the AAA server database is populated with information about the access points and what information they are going to send to their peers. That might be one way of doing it. Another way would be for the AAA client to send the same set of parameters to the AAA server for comparison. * I am not sure how this fuzzy comparison would look like and how one would do that in practice. Does it mean that you just compare some parameters? Incorporating channel binding information into the key derivation functions would, for sure, get things to break even if the operator running the AAA server decides not to enforce it. It is good that you did not go for that approach. * Figure 1 I think that there is a possible information exchange missing in Figure 1. Shouldn't you also include an arrow between the Authenticator and the EAP server? * You write: " The server MAY send the Cost-Information AVP from the Diameter Credit-Control Application [RFC4006] to the peer indicating how much peers will be billed for service. " To my knowledge, this is not done for network access. This may be done for higher layer applications but AoC isn't really something that you find quite often... * IEEE 802.16 The case is somewhat different here since the access network can actually be authenticated. _______________________________________________ Emu mailing list Emu@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu