* When I have to introduce this work to our AAA server folks then they
will obviously ask me the following question: What is the benefit and
what does it cost? As you mentioned in the operational considerations
section there is cost associated with updating the EAP methods, putting
new information into the AAA server database, providing additional
policies into the AAA server to accomplish the authorization check. Now,
the question really is whether folks are so concerned about the attack.
I know the Lying NAS problem but the current text isn't scary enough.
Have you ever seen some data that this attack is a real issue? In case
you do then it would certainly be valuable information to convey this to
the reader. 

* Reading the operational consideration section I get the impression
that you consider that the AAA server database is populated with
information about the access points and what information they are going
to send to their peers. That might be one way of doing it.
Another way would be for the AAA client to send the same set of
parameters to the AAA server for comparison. 

* I am not sure how this fuzzy comparison would look like and how one
would do that in practice. Does it mean that you just compare some
parameters? 

Incorporating channel binding information into the key derivation
functions would, for sure, get things to break even if the operator
running the AAA server decides not to enforce it. It is good that you
did not go for that approach. 

*  Figure 1

I think that there is a possible information exchange missing in Figure
1. Shouldn't you also include an arrow between the Authenticator and the
EAP server? 


* You write: 

"
   The server MAY send the Cost-Information AVP from the Diameter
   Credit-Control Application [RFC4006] to the peer indicating how much
   peers will be billed for service.
"

To my knowledge, this is not done for network access. This may be done
for higher layer applications but AoC isn't really something that you
find quite often...

* IEEE 802.16

The case is somewhat different here since the access network can
actually be authenticated. 

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