In order to make progress I propose the following resolution to this issue:
Modify text in the third paragraph from the end of section 10 to read: "For GPSK-3, a peer MUST silently discard messages where the RAND_Peer or the CSuite_Sel fields do not match those transmitted in GPSK-2. An EAP peer MUST silently discard any packet whose MAC fails." Modify text in section 12.9 third paragraph to read: "The client has to keep state information after receiving the GPSK-1 message. To prevent a replay attack, all the client needs to do is to ensure that the value of RAND_Peer is consistent between GPSK-2 and GPSK-3. Message GPSK-3 contains all the material required to re- compute the keying material. Thus, if a client chooses to implement this client-side DoS protection mechanism it may manage RAND_Peer and CSuite_Sel on a per-server basis for servers it knows instead of on a per-message basis." Please send any comments you have on this proposal to the list by August 19, 2008. Thanks, Joe _______________________________________________ Emu mailing list Emu@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
