Paul
(and others, so it seems)

On Tue, Jan 7, 2025 at 6:05 PM Paul Hoffman <paul.hoff...@icann.org> wrote:

> On Jan 7, 2025, at 14:30, Tim Wicinski <tjw.i...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > Paul Hoffman makes a very important point on section 2 of rfc8624-bis:
> >> The WG should consider whether the publication requirements in Section
> 2 are correct. I feel they are not, but I also know that this topic elicits
> strong opinions in this WG, in SAAG, and in the IETF in general.
> >>
> >  The guidance the chairs have received is that all new cryptographic
> algorithms which folks are considering implementing in DNSSEC must go
> through the Independent Stream (ISE).
>
> Who gave that guidance? And, more importantly, why was it given to the
> chairs and not the WG? This is certainly not what we hear from the Security
> ADs these days.
>
>
This came up during the 5933-bis Process.
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/XZoakWUDruPXylJ2wLIS4l4vevo/#
Warren wrote up something as well
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/hv-dlx8rRXHXzB7DMzETLM-Q_vQ/

>> In specific, I think the bar for all levels should be "publication that
> includes the use in DNSSEC", not an RFC. RFCs take a long time to get
> through the system, and there is active debate about whether all
> cryptographic algorithms should even have RFCs. The extra vetting that a
> standards track document requires rarely helps the community understand the
> security properties of the algorithm.
> >>
> > I agree with Paul that "RFC Required" and "Standards Action" are a high
> bar that takes time, which could slow down new algorithms.
> > But at the same time implementers do not wish to be spending developer
> time on algorithms very few will want, and I agree with them.
>
> Of course, but this document does not help determine what algorithms
> anyone will want. For example, if all algorithms must go through the ISE
> (as stated above), the ISE does not pick which RFCs to publish based on
> their determination of what algorithms anyone will want.
>
> draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc8624-bis as it stands now makes a good distinction:
> any algorithm can get a MAY-level entry, and it is up to the IETF
> (hopefully via the DNSOP WG) to determine if that should instead be higher
> (or lower, if a MAY-level algorithm is determined to be dangerous). In my
> mind, there is no reason to require that those determinations to be
> standards-track: they can be informational as long as they are IETF
> consensus.
>

But doesn't "publication that includes the use in DNSSEC" translate to
> "Specifcation Required" or is this something different?



> Again, I don't think that the determinations have to describe the
> algorithm or its use in DNSSEC. A national standard (such as from NIST) or
> an academic paper should be fine for getting a MAY-level allocation, and
> the IETF can follow up with a consensus RFC saying what level beyone "MAY"
> the algorithm should have.
>
> > I will now ask - could we change the requirements in this document to
> these suggestions?
> > What would be the unintended consequences of simplifying the process
> hurdles?
> >
> >      NewEntry -> MAY    => "Specification Required/Expert Review"
> (Currently RFC Required)
> >
> >      MAY -> AnythingElse  =>  "RFC Required/Expert Review" (Currently
> Standards Action)
> >
> >      AnythingElse -> MAY  => (Could this even happen??)
> >
> > My personal opinion (which I am confident is universally hated by
> everyone) is that the "DNS Security Algorithm Numbers" Registry and "Digest
> Algorithms" Registry should either have a Private Use section for algorithm
> testing OR make the registries "Specification Required".  Simplify the
> process for experiments with new algorithms.
>
> I'll raise my hand to hating that. :-) The IETF has a spectacularly bad
> track record for later changing experimental anything into requirements
> when it becomes clear that the experiment went well. For these tables,
> having "MAY" mean "we know these things exist, but we don't have any
> positive or negative opinions on them" is more clear to the developers and
> implementers than making them guess how well an experiment is going.
>
>
I can accept that (I am confident that my bad ideas are bad).  But this
also sounds like having a section of the registry marked "Private Use"
allows for testing with having an official IETF Experiment.

My goal here is to help developers, researchers, etc work on new ideas
without a lot of process.

tim
_______________________________________________
DNSOP mailing list -- dnsop@ietf.org
To unsubscribe send an email to dnsop-le...@ietf.org

Reply via email to