All Daniel and I noticed some weird formatting issues with his -02 draft, so he's pushed out -03 which is just fixing some broken formatting.
Tim On Tue, Jan 24, 2023 at 2:28 PM Tim Wicinski <tjw.i...@gmail.com> wrote: > Thanks Daniel. We've been waiting for your updated draft. > > tim > > > On Tue, Jan 24, 2023 at 10:14 AM Daniel Migault <mglt.i...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Hi, >> >> If you think I have addressed all comments I received, if you believe >> that is not the case or if there are other comments, please let me know. >> Otherwise I expect to publish a new version by the end of the week. >> >> Yours, >> Daniel >> >> On Fri, Jan 13, 2023 at 5:21 PM Daniel Migault <mglt.i...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> Hi, >>> >>> I am just wondering if you have any further comments or thoughts or we >>> declare your concerns being addressed. If you think we are fine, just let >>> me know. >>> >>> Yours, >>> Daniel >>> >>> On Tue, Jan 3, 2023 at 7:14 PM Daniel Migault <mglt.i...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Vladimir and Florian, >>>> >>>> Thanks for the comment regarding the use of 5011, to update the >>>> trust anchors. There are two situations where TAs need to be updated: >>>> * 1) configuration so the server instances are started with >>>> the up-to-date TA. >>>> * 2) a running resolver instance that has been started with the old TA >>>> and that needs a new TA to be considered. >>>> >>>> 1) configuration: >>>> >>>> TA trust store is an essential element of the configuration, and the >>>> document recommends having a special process to ensure every new resolver >>>> instance starts with the up-to-date TAs. TAs are so essential in the >>>> elaboration of trust that special care must be considered. This means that >>>> you need a robust mechanism to update the TAs trust store. >>>> Many DRO will not implement that process and instead rely on software >>>> updates to delegate the TA trust store update to the software vendor. >>>> If the DRO is willing to have a *special/specific* additional TA that >>>> is not updated delegated to the software vendor, the DRO will have to put >>>> in place such a mechanism. This is a critical operation and the DRO must >>>> have strong reasons to do so and must balance the additional operational >>>> risks versus the additional benefits. >>>> Given the essential aspect of the TA trust store, we recommend updates >>>> to be handled by an automated process (as opposed to manually being >>>> performed) BUT we also recommend the process to be manually supervised, >>>> that is with a manual confirmation. >>>> This mechanism is likely to require a specific relation between the DRO >>>> and the TA issuer with potentially the mechanism, being out-of band. To >>>> that point 5011 is probably not the best choice as mentioned by 5011 itself >>>> in section 8.3. >>>> >>>> 2) running servers >>>> >>>> For running resolvers, there is a need to ensure that the resolver is >>>> using the up-to-date TA. For this we recommend to follow 5011 that >>>> indicates how to automatically put significant trust into the newly >>>> published DNSKEY. On the other hand, if resolvers are retarted every days >>>> we may not need to have 5011 and monitor the roll over. I think that is the >>>> purpose of your comment. >>>> >>>> My impression is that there were some confusions in the text where 5011 >>>> was used. When it is limited to the running resolver, I would >>>> recommend enabling 5011 when the TA signer implements 5011 in case the >>>> software is not updated in a timely manner - or at least let the DRO decide >>>> whether it is willing to enable this option as a sort of insurance - even >>>> if it is relying on the software update as a general mechanism. I think it >>>> might be a bit different from what you proposed initially, which is to >>>> leave that to DRO with DNSSEC strong expertise and recommend to >>>> only stay with software updates. If there are any strong feelings on just >>>> relying on software updates and leaving 5011 to DNSSEC experts, I am also >>>> fine to push toward such a direction. >>>> >>>> I updated the text as follows: >>>> * clarifying TA updates for configuration versus running instances >>>> * clarifying 5011 dot not apply for updating configuration - at least >>>> as a primary mechanism >>>> * emphasize that the non default model is only recommended for DRO with >>>> DNSSEC expertise >>>> * adding that TA update for running resolver may be performed also by >>>> software update under the condition the DRO is likely to ensure a very >>>> recent release is run. >>>> * add a recommendation that when 5011 is used, the signer needs to >>>> implement 5011 timings. >>>> >>>> The changes can be seen there: >>>> >>>> https://github.com/mglt/draft-mglt-dnsop-dnssec-validator-requirements/commit/dbb75b72a1806520ac77cf04424b0f6de0df29b5 >>>> >>>> Yours, >>>> Daniel >>>> >>>> On Sun, Nov 27, 2022 at 7:26 AM Florian Obser <florian+i...@narrans.de> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 2022-11-25 12:26 -05, Daniel Migault <mglt.i...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>> > On Wed, Nov 23, 2022 at 10:29 AM Vladimír Čunát < >>>>> vladimir.cunat+i...@nic.cz> >>>>> > wrote: >>>>> >> I am surprised you would not recommend RFC 5011 >>>>> >> >>>>> >> 5011 needs persistent state, a thing that resolvers/validators >>>>> often don't >>>>> >> need at all otherwise (cache is safe to delete). 5011 doesn't >>>>> always work, >>>>> >> so you need to combine with some fallback mechanism(s) anyway - for >>>>> new >>>>> >> installations and for stale ones (missed rotation). Root rollover >>>>> has >>>>> >> happened only once in history, non-root TAs aren't that common, and >>>>> 5011 >>>>> >> algorithm isn't very simple, so the code can easily get some bugs >>>>> without >>>>> >> anyone noticing until it's too late. >>>>> >> >>>>> >> Lots of down-sides, so I rather put the TAs into SW updates, for >>>>> the root >>>>> >> TA case at least. I'd recommend trying to avoid non-root TAs, but >>>>> if I had >>>>> >> to choose, I'd put them into configuration. Again a thing that I >>>>> have to >>>>> >> provision *anyway*, so I get the occasional TA updates basically >>>>> for free, >>>>> >> without needing to worry about those 5011 disadvantages. >>>>> (occasional = >>>>> >> 5011 defaults to requiring 30 days of overlap) >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>> > Oh! sure for the TA. My understanding of the text is that it >>>>> recommends >>>>> > 5011 for running instances, but that new instances are configured >>>>> with >>>>> > up-to-date TA that in most cases are updated by software update. So >>>>> yes I >>>>> > agree and will check this appears clearly. >>>>> >>>>> Another issue with 5011 is that it needs cooperation from the entity >>>>> signing the zone during a KSK rollover. 7583 spells this out in section >>>>> 2.2. I think Vladimír is hinting at this already, I'd say it should be >>>>> spelled out. Especially since this is aimed at non-DNSSEC-Experts as >>>>> you >>>>> were saying earlier in the thread. >>>>> >>>>> If a DRO unilaterally decides to put in a TA for example.com as >>>>> suggested in section 7.1.1 and using 5011 this will not end well if >>>>> they >>>>> don't tell the people operating the signer. They will probably not >>>>> follow the correct timing during a KSK roll. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Daniel Migault >>>> Ericsson >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Daniel Migault >>> Ericsson >>> >> >> >> -- >> Daniel Migault >> Ericsson >> _______________________________________________ >> DNSOP mailing list >> DNSOP@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop >> >
_______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list DNSOP@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
