Hi, If you think I have addressed all comments I received, if you believe that is not the case or if there are other comments, please let me know. Otherwise I expect to publish a new version by the end of the week.
Yours, Daniel On Fri, Jan 13, 2023 at 5:21 PM Daniel Migault <mglt.i...@gmail.com> wrote: > Hi, > > I am just wondering if you have any further comments or thoughts or we > declare your concerns being addressed. If you think we are fine, just let > me know. > > Yours, > Daniel > > On Tue, Jan 3, 2023 at 7:14 PM Daniel Migault <mglt.i...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Hi Vladimir and Florian, >> >> Thanks for the comment regarding the use of 5011, to update the >> trust anchors. There are two situations where TAs need to be updated: >> * 1) configuration so the server instances are started with >> the up-to-date TA. >> * 2) a running resolver instance that has been started with the old TA >> and that needs a new TA to be considered. >> >> 1) configuration: >> >> TA trust store is an essential element of the configuration, and the >> document recommends having a special process to ensure every new resolver >> instance starts with the up-to-date TAs. TAs are so essential in the >> elaboration of trust that special care must be considered. This means that >> you need a robust mechanism to update the TAs trust store. >> Many DRO will not implement that process and instead rely on software >> updates to delegate the TA trust store update to the software vendor. >> If the DRO is willing to have a *special/specific* additional TA that is >> not updated delegated to the software vendor, the DRO will have to put in >> place such a mechanism. This is a critical operation and the DRO must have >> strong reasons to do so and must balance the additional operational risks >> versus the additional benefits. >> Given the essential aspect of the TA trust store, we recommend updates to >> be handled by an automated process (as opposed to manually being performed) >> BUT we also recommend the process to be manually supervised, that is with a >> manual confirmation. >> This mechanism is likely to require a specific relation between the DRO >> and the TA issuer with potentially the mechanism, being out-of band. To >> that point 5011 is probably not the best choice as mentioned by 5011 itself >> in section 8.3. >> >> 2) running servers >> >> For running resolvers, there is a need to ensure that the resolver is >> using the up-to-date TA. For this we recommend to follow 5011 that >> indicates how to automatically put significant trust into the newly >> published DNSKEY. On the other hand, if resolvers are retarted every days >> we may not need to have 5011 and monitor the roll over. I think that is the >> purpose of your comment. >> >> My impression is that there were some confusions in the text where 5011 >> was used. When it is limited to the running resolver, I would >> recommend enabling 5011 when the TA signer implements 5011 in case the >> software is not updated in a timely manner - or at least let the DRO decide >> whether it is willing to enable this option as a sort of insurance - even >> if it is relying on the software update as a general mechanism. I think it >> might be a bit different from what you proposed initially, which is to >> leave that to DRO with DNSSEC strong expertise and recommend to >> only stay with software updates. If there are any strong feelings on just >> relying on software updates and leaving 5011 to DNSSEC experts, I am also >> fine to push toward such a direction. >> >> I updated the text as follows: >> * clarifying TA updates for configuration versus running instances >> * clarifying 5011 dot not apply for updating configuration - at least as >> a primary mechanism >> * emphasize that the non default model is only recommended for DRO with >> DNSSEC expertise >> * adding that TA update for running resolver may be performed also by >> software update under the condition the DRO is likely to ensure a very >> recent release is run. >> * add a recommendation that when 5011 is used, the signer needs to >> implement 5011 timings. >> >> The changes can be seen there: >> >> https://github.com/mglt/draft-mglt-dnsop-dnssec-validator-requirements/commit/dbb75b72a1806520ac77cf04424b0f6de0df29b5 >> >> Yours, >> Daniel >> >> On Sun, Nov 27, 2022 at 7:26 AM Florian Obser <florian+i...@narrans.de> >> wrote: >> >>> On 2022-11-25 12:26 -05, Daniel Migault <mglt.i...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> > On Wed, Nov 23, 2022 at 10:29 AM Vladimír Čunát < >>> vladimir.cunat+i...@nic.cz> >>> > wrote: >>> >> I am surprised you would not recommend RFC 5011 >>> >> >>> >> 5011 needs persistent state, a thing that resolvers/validators often >>> don't >>> >> need at all otherwise (cache is safe to delete). 5011 doesn't always >>> work, >>> >> so you need to combine with some fallback mechanism(s) anyway - for >>> new >>> >> installations and for stale ones (missed rotation). Root rollover has >>> >> happened only once in history, non-root TAs aren't that common, and >>> 5011 >>> >> algorithm isn't very simple, so the code can easily get some bugs >>> without >>> >> anyone noticing until it's too late. >>> >> >>> >> Lots of down-sides, so I rather put the TAs into SW updates, for the >>> root >>> >> TA case at least. I'd recommend trying to avoid non-root TAs, but if >>> I had >>> >> to choose, I'd put them into configuration. Again a thing that I >>> have to >>> >> provision *anyway*, so I get the occasional TA updates basically for >>> free, >>> >> without needing to worry about those 5011 disadvantages. (occasional >>> = >>> >> 5011 defaults to requiring 30 days of overlap) >>> >> >>> >> >>> > Oh! sure for the TA. My understanding of the text is that it recommends >>> > 5011 for running instances, but that new instances are configured with >>> > up-to-date TA that in most cases are updated by software update. So >>> yes I >>> > agree and will check this appears clearly. >>> >>> Another issue with 5011 is that it needs cooperation from the entity >>> signing the zone during a KSK rollover. 7583 spells this out in section >>> 2.2. I think Vladimír is hinting at this already, I'd say it should be >>> spelled out. Especially since this is aimed at non-DNSSEC-Experts as you >>> were saying earlier in the thread. >>> >>> If a DRO unilaterally decides to put in a TA for example.com as >>> suggested in section 7.1.1 and using 5011 this will not end well if they >>> don't tell the people operating the signer. They will probably not >>> follow the correct timing during a KSK roll. >>> >> >> >> -- >> Daniel Migault >> Ericsson >> > > > -- > Daniel Migault > Ericsson > -- Daniel Migault Ericsson
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