On Feb 25, 2021, at 8:06 AM, Ben Schwartz <bemasc=40google....@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote: > >> On Thu, Feb 25, 2021 at 10:26 AM Paul Hoffman <paul.hoff...@icann.org> wrote: >> In reading draft-schwartz-dnsop-dnssec-strict-mode, I still don't understand >> why it is even useful. If I am signing one of my zones with two algorithms, >> I must intend to do so. What is the value of me saying that only one of the >> signing algorithms is the strong one? >> > That's not especially the intent. Currently, if you sign with two > algorithms, and either of those algorithms becomes insecure*, your zone > becomes susceptible to forgery. If you mark both algorithms as Strict, then > your zone remains secure (for validators who implement both algorithms and > this draft). > *possibly unbeknownst to the public
If the algorithm becomes insecure and the public knows about it, I remove that signature from my zone. If the algorithm because insecure and I don't know about it, I am at the same risk as if my private key was compromised and I don't know about it. Again, this seems like it could only be marginally useful relative to good signing practices. --Paul Hoffman
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