On 22 May 2019, at 23:30, Paul Hoffman wrote:

> Greetings again. Based on the input from the DNSOP and DOH lists, we revised 
> draft-sah-resolver-information. We also created a new draft, 
> draft-sah-resinfo-doh, to cover the main use case we have for getting 
> information from a resolver, namely to get the DoH URI template and 
> authentication information.
>
>> From the mailing list traffic, it seems like some of y'all only care about 
>> getting resolver information from DNS (hopefully DNSSEC-signed), while 
>> others are fine to use HTTPS with web PKI authentication, particularly when 
>> DNSSEC signing is not possible. We have left both methods in the main draft.
>
> We encourage more input.
>
> --Paul Hoffman
>
> ======
>        Title           : DNS Resolver Information Self-publication
>        Authors         : Puneet Sood
>                          Roy Arends
>                          Paul Hoffman
>       Filename        : draft-sah-resolver-information-01.txt
>       Pages           : 9
>       Date            : 2019-05-22
>
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sah-resolver-information/
>

Reference to SUDN in Introduction is no longer needed.

DNS-over-TLS and DNS-over-HTTPS are both abbreviated to DoT in the Security 
Considerations

Section 4 P3 s/returen/return/

Section 4 and 5.2 are a bit hard to follow (maybe I need more caffeine). I 
would suggest that you use the term key-value pair in place of name-value pair. 
Using the word name in DNS docs is bound to lead to confusion.

Also I was a bit confused by

4: “All names in the returned object MUST be defined in the IANA registry
   or begin with the substring "temp-“” and
   “As defined in Section 5.2, the
   IANA registry will not register names that begin with "temp-", so
   these names can be used freely by any implementer”

5.2: “Name: The name to be used in the JSON object.  This name MUST NOT
   begin with "temp-".

until I reread the words “or begin with the substring "temp-“” I think the 
could be clearer, something like:

All keys in the returned object MUST either be defined in the IANA registry or 
if for local use only they MAY begin with the substring "temp-“ since IANA 
registry will not register names that begin with "temp-“.

Finally, section 2

“Note that the answer given by the resolver cannot be validated with DNSSEC.”
Whilst I understand the reasons, is it reasonable that we are still trying to 
standardise responses that can not be signed? Is it not time to start mandating 
that DNSSEC is a MUST for all DNS responses and that includes ones sent over 
DoT and DoH (and any future DoFOO)? At the very least, there should be very 
detailed discussion in the security considerations section about the reasons 
for and impact of not using DNSSEC, which you have done, although I don’t like 
text that says “if it is using DoT it will know if the communication is 
authenticated (DoH is always authenticated)”

regards
John

John Dickinson

https://sinodun.com

Sinodun Internet Technologies Ltd.
Magdalen Centre
Oxford Science Park
Robert Robinson Avenue
Oxford OX4 4GA
U.K.

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