> -----Original Message-----
> From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farr...@cs.tcd.ie>
> Sent: Tuesday, March 12, 2019 5:30 AM
> To: Paul Vixie <p...@redbarn.org>; d...@ietf.org
> Cc: nalini elkins <nalini.elk...@e-dco.com>; Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy
> <tirumaleswarreddy_ko...@mcafee.com>; dnsop@ietf.org; Ackermann,
> Michael <mackerm...@bcbsm.com>; Christian Huitema
> <huit...@huitema.net>; dns-priv...@ietf.org; Vittorio Bertola
> <vittorio.bertola=40open-xchange....@dmarc.ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] [DNSOP] New: draft-bertola-bcp-doh-clients
> 
> 
> (This distribution list is too scattered and diverse. Be great if some AD or
> someone just picked one list for this.
> In the meantime...)
> 
> On 11/03/2019 20:43, nalini elkins wrote:
> >  impact assessment that certain changes such as DoH and TLS1.3 will
> > have on enterprises,
> 
> TLS1.3 will, I expect, noticeably improve security for an awful lot of
> enterprises in time.
> 
> As for DoH, I wonder has anyone done studies on how split-horizon names
> and access patterns leak today?
> 
> I don't recall having read that kind of study. I can imagine many ways in
> which that kind of stuff would leak. I'd be very surprised if it never 
> happens.
> I don't know how often it does.
> 
> For names, leaking once is kinda fatal. For access patterns, I guess one leak
> exposes an IP address that's interested in a name (e.g. secret-
> project.example.com) but more would be needed for broader access
> patterns to be exposed to "foreign"
> recursives and/or in-band networks.
> 
> ISTM that it is quite possible that enterprises that deploy their own DoH
> services could potentially reduce such leakage and gain overall. (I'm
> assuming here that sensible browser-makers will end up providing
> something that works for browsers running in networks with split-horizon
> setups before those browsers turn on DoH as a default at scale.)

If Enterprise network provides a DoT/DoH server, browser should be able to 
discover and use the Enterprise DoT/DoH server.

-Tiru

> 
> Cheers,
> S.
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