I think we've gone way off track here. DoH exists, and you can't undo that. Maybe it was a mistake, maybe it wasn't, but that ship has sailed. I think you're implicitly arguing that the IETF should have done a better job of modeling the threats before advancing the protocol, and if we had done, perhaps we wouldn't have advanced it. So why are you now arguing that the IETF shouldn't do a similarly good job of modeling the threats around configuring DoH using DHCP?
On Mon, Aug 20, 2018 at 10:51 PM, Paul Vixie <p...@redbarn.org> wrote: > > > Marek Vavruša wrote: > >> ... >> >> I'm still not sure that IETF should define the provider of trust, as >> the trust is relative. But you're right Ted, it should definitely be >> at written down andformalized if we want to move forward. >> >> I have to compose my thoughts on this first. I'll try next weekend if I >> get >> some of that bravery or willpower back. >> > > if you write down trust assumptions you'll be enumerating disjoint sets of > same as actually practiced by different users and different operators whose > reasons should be treated as valid rather than challenged. > > mine is, i monitor and control the network path between my dhcp client and > my dhcp server very much more carefully than i can monitor and control the > network path to RDNS servers. therefore i am comfortable having the former > introduce me to the latter. other perspectives differ. > > -- > P Vixie > >
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