In message <23a55564-aaf1-4786-9663-c38a019c9...@vpnc.org>, Paul Hoffman writes
:
> On Jul 5, 2015, at 6:16 PM, Mark Andrews <ma...@isc.org> wrote:
> > 
> > 
> > In message <b3fdac88-1da8-4be3-9d75-115386f7d...@vpnc.org>, Paul Hoffman wr
> ites
> > :
> >> Greetings. This is a WG LC review of draft-ietf-dnsop-cookies, which I had
>  no
> >> t looked at carefully in some time. In short: it looks great, the document
>  is
> >> complete and easy-to-read, and we probably should have done this nearly a 
> de
> >> cade ago when Donald started the work.
> >> 
> >> Substantial:
> >> 
> >> In Sections 4.1 and 4.2, it says that the cookies MUST NOT be the same for
>  al
> >> l recipients. This should be SHOULD NOT, to match the SHOULDs above. If an
>  im
> >> plementation does a stupid and uses the same cookies everywhere, it is no 
> wor
> >> se off for it, it just isn't getting as much protection as expected. (If I
> 'm 
> >> wrong about that latter bit, then the reason for the MUST NOT should be gi
> ven
> >> in both sections.)
> >> 
> >> Section 5.4 seems unnecessary and possibly harmful. Why have an additional
>  me
> >> ans to detect support other than "ask any question, even one that is going
>  to
> >> get a REFUSED or NXDOMAIN answer"? The new mechanism will wreak havoc on t
> oo
> >> ls that are watching DNS requests, for no real reason. I propose that this
>  se
> >> ction be removed, or replaced with a simply "if you want to know whether t
> he 
> >> server supports cookies, ask anything".
> > 
> > "Wreak havoc" is a little bit over dramatic.  If the tools can't
> > handle QCOUNT == 0 they are already broken.  This is the Internet
> > and the tools should be expecting to get total garbage packets.
> > Not sending QCOUNT == 0 won't help them.  QCOUNT == 0 is potentially
> > useful for other things.  Existing nameservers mostly return FORMERR
> > though Google's nameservers (8.8.8.8) just drop the query despite
> > it being a legitimate RFC 103[45] query.  We looked to see if we
> > needed a Updates RFC 103[45] and as far as we can tell we don't.
> 
> It really doesn't matter if they are "already broken" in your view: what matt
> ers is creating a protocol that doesn't unnecessarily cause damage to the DNS
> .

How can a intrinsically hop-by-hop "extension" "damage" the protocol?
It either works for the client/server pair or it doesn't just the
same as sending a NSID option either works or it doesn't or sending
a IQUERY either works or it doesn't.  This is all client driven.

"extension" because it is already permitted.

> > As for sending a random query you then have to deal with all the
> > different behaviours for sending a query to a server which is not
> > expecting the QNAME on top of discovering if COOKIE is supported.
> 
> Why? As I described above, it is fine if the QNAME is nonsense to the server:
>  it will still answer with the cookie.

And it complicates the code handling the responses.

> > Additionally this is just the equivalent of syn / syn ack / ack at
> > the DNS/UDP level.  I'm yet to extend dig to do this but it is on
> > my to do list (dig +get-cookie-first (defaulting on) looks like a
> > good option name).  "dig +cookie" will be on by default so that
> > broken EDNS option behaviour by servers is made visible and it more
> > closely matches what recursive servers supporting COOKIE will do.
> 
> It sounds like you want this protocol to purposely cause problems for servers
>  that are not implemented the way you want. A less brittle design would not d
> o that.

It will cause zero problems for servers.  All the issues fall on
the clients.  This is true of using new EDNS options and/or when
sending qcount == 0.  The problem is not exercising the new code
paths from the very begining.

For example no one exercised/tested EDNS version negotiation in the
wild and now everyone is afraid to go to EDNS(1).  That said I ran
a EDNS recursive server for months that sent EDNS(1) queries and
for the most part there were few issues.

> So, I again propose that this part of the new protocol be removed because it 
> is unnecessary and possibly harmful.

-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: ma...@isc.org

_______________________________________________
DNSOP mailing list
DNSOP@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop

Reply via email to