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Hi Paul,

So this is another solution, which I want out there in the solution
space because it is stateless.  And there are many things to consider ...

Sending the qname as the zone name in plaintext is not a good idea.
For hop-by-hop encryption there is no need to send more bytes, and it
reveals the zone you are contacting in the clear - which is exactly
what you are trying to hide.

How is the ENCRYPT PAD record different from a TXT record in the sense
of being able to add arbitrary data to a packet?  I obviously did not
want to use TXT.  The reason it is added is that otherwise the
packetsize becomes a highly deterministic value.  We could make it be
full of zeroes (or other deterministic content) ?

On 11/28/2013 06:25 PM, Paul Wouters wrote:
> On Thu, 28 Nov 2013, Glen Wiley wrote:
> 
>>> Asking the LAN's resolver for a specific record (type ENCRYPT
>>> to QNAME ".")  seems a bit dangerous.  This is of course
>>> completely MITM-able, but I see no real other way to trust
>>> something fundamentally untrustworthy. So that's okay. But I
>>> fear too many of these queries might end up on AS112. I'd
>>> rather see an EDNS advertisement.
>> 
>> If the query is done via validated DNSSEC [...]
> 
> You cannot do that. The DNS resolver DHCP gave you is 192.168.1.1.
> How are you validating anything? how will you distinguish my rogue
> 192.168.1.1 from the real starbucks 192.168.1.1?
> 
> That's why the recursive case is so different from the
> authoritative case.

Well in both cases the idea is to use a completely-MITM-able query for
ENCRYPT KEY to start the exchange.  So that this technique can work in
both problem spaces.

At the end-client all you have is DHCP and somebody claims some IP
address is your DNS.  So the key lookup is just like that DHCP
exchange, an initial exchange...

EDNS advertisement.  Well I agree a lot may end up being wasted
queries.  EDNS does not have a TTL, I want cachable resource records,
and the plain new-type-lookup may find it slightly different to bypass
end-client middleboxes than EDNS.  But otherwise this is a
DNS-packet-transportation issue.

Best regards,
   Wouter

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