Hi, I wonder if I could please have someone say whether they agree with me on this one:
I've come across a configuration "in the wild" where a given zone 'z' contains both a.z. NS some.name.server. *and* sub.a.z. NS some.other.name.server. and where the owner of 'a.z' could not understand why they have trouble controlling the data registered at the 'sub.a.z' name. My claim is that it is a "Registry Error" for the operator of the registry for the 'z' domain to permit this to happen, as it violates the basic idea of what a "delegation" means. Implementations appear to be slightly inconsistent in whether they expose or hide the sub.a.z. "delegation", a sample shows: NSD 3.2.8 exposes BIND 9.7.0-P2 hides BIND 9.7.3-P1 hides BIND 9.8.0-P4 exposes ironDNS 1.0.1 exposes I'm a little surprised that BIND apparently has regressed on this... "The actual names have been withheld to protect the guilty." Regards, - Håvard _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list DNSOP@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
