Ed,

On Nov 27, 2013, at 6:00 AM, Edward Lewis <ed.le...@neustar.biz> wrote:
> My excuse is - operators limit "the effort expended in fighting entropy."  
> Imagine an average operations environment operating as most environments go.
> ...
> Eventually one day something breaks and then... .... ...include here "the 
> only one who can fix it has left."

I suspect this argument applies _far_ more to configuring/operating DNSSEC than 
it does to slaving the root zone, particularly when you take into account the 
rolling of the root key. For one thing, consider the time intervals between 
change events that might cause problems.

> I'd argue that the resolver admin is also incentivized to do a good or better 
> job too.  Joe's right in general,

Actually, he isn't... :)

Slaving a zone is not (or perhaps should not be, despite BIND configuration 
language) rocket science. Hand wringing about poor resolver operators being 
unable to master the complexities feels like the "don't look behind the 
curtain" scene of the Wizard of Oz.

The root represents one of the few single points of failure on the Internet. 
Continued reliance on that single point of failure, particularly in the days of 
multi-hundred of gigabit DoS attack at the flip of a switch potential, is ... 
questionable. Given the lack of ability for the Internet operations community 
to effectively deploy BCP 38, I anticipate this situation to only get worse.  
Arguments along the lines of "but anycast!" don't really help when the root 
instances you get routed to have fallen over due to the latest DoS attack. Yes, 
the system as a whole can still be said to be responsive, but you're SOL.  

I would agree that existing resolver technology makes it more challenging than 
it should be to decentralize the root. Fixing that is long overdue IMHO.

Regards,
-drc


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