On 5/31/2019 5:08 AM, Doug Foster wrote:
Tactically, what I meant was "IETF should be able to ensure that IETF messages are only released with verifiable IETF signatures".
I'm not exactly sure what the above sentence means, in terms of technical details. So while the language all sounds fine, its meaning is far more ambiguous that I suspect you intended.
In any event, are you aware of the recent work on ARC? For some case(s) of what you might mean, above, that's it's goal.
This would mean that either the first signature is not applied, the message is not altered after the first signature is applied, or the first signature is removed after the message is altered. The current configuration leaves open the suspicion that IETF has rogue software operating in its
A message from the IETF list processor has an ietf.org DKIM signature. How does that support your concern?
d/ -- Dave Crocker Brandenburg InternetWorking bbiw.net _______________________________________________ dmarc mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dmarc
