Thanks Joe, This branch works. I was able to proceed. I still had to set scala version to 2.9.2 in kafka-run-class.sh.
On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 3:57 PM, Joe Stein <joe.st...@stealth.ly> wrote: > That is a very old branch. > > Here is a more up to date one > https://github.com/stealthly/kafka/tree/v0.8.2_KAFKA-1477 (needs to be > updated to latest trunk might have a chance to-do that next week). > > You should be using gradle now as per the README. > > /******************************************* > Joe Stein > Founder, Principal Consultant > Big Data Open Source Security LLC > http://www.stealth.ly > Twitter: @allthingshadoop <http://www.twitter.com/allthingshadoop> > ********************************************/ > > > On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 3:49 PM, Pramod Deshmukh <dpram...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > > Thanks Joe for this, > > > > I cloned this branch and tried to run zookeeper but I get > > > > Error: Could not find or load main class > > org.apache.zookeeper.server.quorum.QuorumPeerMain > > > > > > I see scala version is still set to 2.8.0 > > > > if [ -z "$SCALA_VERSION" ]; then > > > > SCALA_VERSION=2.8.0 > > > > fi > > > > > > > > Then I installed sbt and scala and followed your instructions for > different > > scala versions. I was able to bring zookeeper up but brokers fail to > start > > with error > > > > Error: Could not find or load main class kafka.Kafka > > > > I think I am doing something wrong. Can you please help me? > > > > Our current production setup is with 2.8.0 and want to stick to it. > > > > Thanks, > > > > Pramod > > > > > > On Tue, Jun 3, 2014 at 3:57 PM, Joe Stein <joe.st...@stealth.ly> wrote: > > > > > Hi,I wanted to re-ignite the discussion around Apache Kafka Security. > > This > > > is a huge bottleneck (non-starter in some cases) for a lot of > > organizations > > > (due to regulatory, compliance and other requirements). Below are my > > > suggestions for specific changes in Kafka to accommodate security > > > requirements. This comes from what folks are doing "in the wild" to > > > workaround and implement security with Kafka as it is today and also > > what I > > > have discovered from organizations about their blockers. It also picks > up > > > from the wiki (which I should have time to update later in the week > based > > > on the below and feedback from the thread). > > > > > > 1) Transport Layer Security (i.e. SSL) > > > > > > This also includes client authentication in addition to in-transit > > security > > > layer. This work has been picked up here > > > https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/KAFKA-1477 and do appreciate any > > > thoughts, comments, feedback, tomatoes, whatever for this patch. It > is a > > > pickup from the fork of the work first done here > > > https://github.com/relango/kafka/tree/kafka_security. > > > > > > 2) Data encryption at rest. > > > > > > This is very important and something that can be facilitated within the > > > wire protocol. It requires an additional map data structure for the > > > "encrypted [data encryption key]". With this map (either in your object > > or > > > in the wire protocol) you can store the dynamically generated symmetric > > key > > > (for each message) and then encrypt the data using that dynamically > > > generated key. You then encrypt the encryption key using each public > key > > > for whom is expected to be able to decrypt the encryption key to then > > > decrypt the message. For each public key encrypted symmetric key > (which > > is > > > now the "encrypted [data encryption key]" along with which public key > it > > > was encrypted with for (so a map of [publicKey] = > > > encryptedDataEncryptionKey) as a chain. Other patterns can be > > implemented > > > but this is a pretty standard digital enveloping [0] pattern with only > 1 > > > field added. Other patterns should be able to use that field to-do > their > > > implementation too. > > > > > > 3) Non-repudiation and long term non-repudiation. > > > > > > Non-repudiation is proving data hasn't changed. This is often (if not > > > always) done with x509 public certificates (chained to a certificate > > > authority). > > > > > > Long term non-repudiation is what happens when the certificates of the > > > certificate authority are expired (or revoked) and everything ever > signed > > > (ever) with that certificate's public key then becomes "no longer > > provable > > > as ever being authentic". That is where RFC3126 [1] and RFC3161 [2] > come > > > in (or worm drives [hardware], etc). > > > > > > For either (or both) of these it is an operation of the encryptor to > > > sign/hash the data (with or without third party trusted timestap of the > > > signing event) and encrypt that with their own private key and > distribute > > > the results (before and after encrypting if required) along with their > > > public key. This structure is a bit more complex but feasible, it is a > > map > > > of digital signature formats and the chain of dig sig attestations. > The > > > map's key being the method (i.e. CRC32, PKCS7 [3], XmlDigSig [4]) and > > then > > > a list of map where that key is "purpose" of signature (what your > > attesting > > > too). As a sibling field to the list another field for "the attester" > as > > > bytes (e.g. their PKCS12 [5] for the map of PKCS7 signatures). > > > > > > 4) Authorization > > > > > > We should have a policy of "404" for data, topics, partitions (etc) if > > > authenticated connections do not have access. In "secure mode" any non > > > authenticated connections should get a "404" type message on > everything. > > > Knowing "something is there" is a security risk in many uses cases. So > > if > > > you don't have access you don't even see it. Baking "that" into Kafka > > > along with some interface for entitlement (access management) systems > > > (pretty standard) is all that I think needs to be done to the core > > project. > > > I want to tackle item later in the year after summer after the other > > three > > > are complete. > > > > > > I look forward to thoughts on this and anyone else interested in > working > > > with us on these items. > > > > > > [0] > > > > > > > > > http://www.emc.com/emc-plus/rsa-labs/standards-initiatives/what-is-a-digital-envelope.htm > > > [1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3126 > > > [2] http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3161 > > > [3] > > > > > > > > > http://www.emc.com/emc-plus/rsa-labs/standards-initiatives/pkcs-7-cryptographic-message-syntax-standar.htm > > > [4] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XML_Signature > > > [5] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PKCS_12 > > > > > > /******************************************* > > > Joe Stein > > > Founder, Principal Consultant > > > Big Data Open Source Security LLC > > > http://www.stealth.ly > > > Twitter: @allthingshadoop <http://www.twitter.com/allthingshadoop> > > > ********************************************/ > > > > > >
