Hello Joe, Is there a configuration or example to test Kafka security piece?
Thanks, Pramod On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 5:20 PM, Pramod Deshmukh <dpram...@gmail.com> wrote: > Thanks Joe, > > This branch works. I was able to proceed. I still had to set scala version > to 2.9.2 in kafka-run-class.sh. > > > > On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 3:57 PM, Joe Stein <joe.st...@stealth.ly> wrote: > >> That is a very old branch. >> >> Here is a more up to date one >> https://github.com/stealthly/kafka/tree/v0.8.2_KAFKA-1477 (needs to be >> updated to latest trunk might have a chance to-do that next week). >> >> You should be using gradle now as per the README. >> >> /******************************************* >> Joe Stein >> Founder, Principal Consultant >> Big Data Open Source Security LLC >> http://www.stealth.ly >> Twitter: @allthingshadoop <http://www.twitter.com/allthingshadoop> >> ********************************************/ >> >> >> On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 3:49 PM, Pramod Deshmukh <dpram...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >> > Thanks Joe for this, >> > >> > I cloned this branch and tried to run zookeeper but I get >> > >> > Error: Could not find or load main class >> > org.apache.zookeeper.server.quorum.QuorumPeerMain >> > >> > >> > I see scala version is still set to 2.8.0 >> > >> > if [ -z "$SCALA_VERSION" ]; then >> > >> > SCALA_VERSION=2.8.0 >> > >> > fi >> > >> > >> > >> > Then I installed sbt and scala and followed your instructions for >> different >> > scala versions. I was able to bring zookeeper up but brokers fail to >> start >> > with error >> > >> > Error: Could not find or load main class kafka.Kafka >> > >> > I think I am doing something wrong. Can you please help me? >> > >> > Our current production setup is with 2.8.0 and want to stick to it. >> > >> > Thanks, >> > >> > Pramod >> > >> > >> > On Tue, Jun 3, 2014 at 3:57 PM, Joe Stein <joe.st...@stealth.ly> wrote: >> > >> > > Hi,I wanted to re-ignite the discussion around Apache Kafka Security. >> > This >> > > is a huge bottleneck (non-starter in some cases) for a lot of >> > organizations >> > > (due to regulatory, compliance and other requirements). Below are my >> > > suggestions for specific changes in Kafka to accommodate security >> > > requirements. This comes from what folks are doing "in the wild" to >> > > workaround and implement security with Kafka as it is today and also >> > what I >> > > have discovered from organizations about their blockers. It also >> picks up >> > > from the wiki (which I should have time to update later in the week >> based >> > > on the below and feedback from the thread). >> > > >> > > 1) Transport Layer Security (i.e. SSL) >> > > >> > > This also includes client authentication in addition to in-transit >> > security >> > > layer. This work has been picked up here >> > > https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/KAFKA-1477 and do appreciate >> any >> > > thoughts, comments, feedback, tomatoes, whatever for this patch. It >> is a >> > > pickup from the fork of the work first done here >> > > https://github.com/relango/kafka/tree/kafka_security. >> > > >> > > 2) Data encryption at rest. >> > > >> > > This is very important and something that can be facilitated within >> the >> > > wire protocol. It requires an additional map data structure for the >> > > "encrypted [data encryption key]". With this map (either in your >> object >> > or >> > > in the wire protocol) you can store the dynamically generated >> symmetric >> > key >> > > (for each message) and then encrypt the data using that dynamically >> > > generated key. You then encrypt the encryption key using each public >> key >> > > for whom is expected to be able to decrypt the encryption key to then >> > > decrypt the message. For each public key encrypted symmetric key >> (which >> > is >> > > now the "encrypted [data encryption key]" along with which public key >> it >> > > was encrypted with for (so a map of [publicKey] = >> > > encryptedDataEncryptionKey) as a chain. Other patterns can be >> > implemented >> > > but this is a pretty standard digital enveloping [0] pattern with >> only 1 >> > > field added. Other patterns should be able to use that field to-do >> their >> > > implementation too. >> > > >> > > 3) Non-repudiation and long term non-repudiation. >> > > >> > > Non-repudiation is proving data hasn't changed. This is often (if not >> > > always) done with x509 public certificates (chained to a certificate >> > > authority). >> > > >> > > Long term non-repudiation is what happens when the certificates of the >> > > certificate authority are expired (or revoked) and everything ever >> signed >> > > (ever) with that certificate's public key then becomes "no longer >> > provable >> > > as ever being authentic". That is where RFC3126 [1] and RFC3161 [2] >> come >> > > in (or worm drives [hardware], etc). >> > > >> > > For either (or both) of these it is an operation of the encryptor to >> > > sign/hash the data (with or without third party trusted timestap of >> the >> > > signing event) and encrypt that with their own private key and >> distribute >> > > the results (before and after encrypting if required) along with their >> > > public key. This structure is a bit more complex but feasible, it is a >> > map >> > > of digital signature formats and the chain of dig sig attestations. >> The >> > > map's key being the method (i.e. CRC32, PKCS7 [3], XmlDigSig [4]) and >> > then >> > > a list of map where that key is "purpose" of signature (what your >> > attesting >> > > too). As a sibling field to the list another field for "the >> attester" as >> > > bytes (e.g. their PKCS12 [5] for the map of PKCS7 signatures). >> > > >> > > 4) Authorization >> > > >> > > We should have a policy of "404" for data, topics, partitions (etc) if >> > > authenticated connections do not have access. In "secure mode" any >> non >> > > authenticated connections should get a "404" type message on >> everything. >> > > Knowing "something is there" is a security risk in many uses cases. >> So >> > if >> > > you don't have access you don't even see it. Baking "that" into Kafka >> > > along with some interface for entitlement (access management) systems >> > > (pretty standard) is all that I think needs to be done to the core >> > project. >> > > I want to tackle item later in the year after summer after the other >> > three >> > > are complete. >> > > >> > > I look forward to thoughts on this and anyone else interested in >> working >> > > with us on these items. >> > > >> > > [0] >> > > >> > > >> > >> http://www.emc.com/emc-plus/rsa-labs/standards-initiatives/what-is-a-digital-envelope.htm >> > > [1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3126 >> > > [2] http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3161 >> > > [3] >> > > >> > > >> > >> http://www.emc.com/emc-plus/rsa-labs/standards-initiatives/pkcs-7-cryptographic-message-syntax-standar.htm >> > > [4] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XML_Signature >> > > [5] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PKCS_12 >> > > >> > > /******************************************* >> > > Joe Stein >> > > Founder, Principal Consultant >> > > Big Data Open Source Security LLC >> > > http://www.stealth.ly >> > > Twitter: @allthingshadoop <http://www.twitter.com/allthingshadoop> >> > > ********************************************/ >> > > >> > >> > >
