From: Ragothaman Jayaraman <ragothaman.jayara...@cavium.com>
The functions present in cpt_request_mgr.c manages the work of
enqueing/dequeing the request/response to/from cpt hardware unit.
Signed-off-by: Ankur Dwivedi <ankur.dwiv...@cavium.com>
Signed-off-by: Murthy NSSR <nidadavolu.mur...@cavium.com>
Signed-off-by: Nithin Dabilpuram <nithin.dabilpu...@cavium.com>
Signed-off-by: Ragothaman Jayaraman <ragothaman.jayara...@cavium.com>
Signed-off-by: Srisivasubramanian Srinivasan
<srisivasubramanian.sriniva...@cavium.com>
---
drivers/crypto/cpt/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/crypto/cpt/cpt_pmd_cryptodev.c | 4 +-
drivers/crypto/cpt/cpt_pmd_ops.c | 859 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/crypto/cpt/cpt_pmd_ops.h | 10 +
4 files changed, 872 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/cpt/Makefile b/drivers/crypto/cpt/Makefile
index bf22c2b..63553e0 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/cpt/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/crypto/cpt/Makefile
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ SRCS-$(CONFIG_RTE_LIBRTE_PMD_CPT) += cpt_pmd_ops.c
# Base code
SRCS-$(CONFIG_RTE_LIBRTE_PMD_CPT) += cpt_device.c
+SRCS-$(CONFIG_RTE_LIBRTE_PMD_CPT) += cpt_request_mgr.c
SRCS-$(CONFIG_RTE_LIBRTE_PMD_CPT) += cpt_ops.c
SRCS-$(CONFIG_RTE_LIBRTE_PMD_CPT) += cpt8xxx_device.c
SRCS-$(CONFIG_RTE_LIBRTE_PMD_CPT) += cpt_vf_mbox.c
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/cpt/cpt_pmd_cryptodev.c
b/drivers/crypto/cpt/cpt_pmd_cryptodev.c
index 939f31b..45e052f 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/cpt/cpt_pmd_cryptodev.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/cpt/cpt_pmd_cryptodev.c
@@ -137,8 +137,8 @@ static int init_global_resources(void)
c_dev->dev_ops = &cptvf_ops;
- c_dev->enqueue_burst = NULL;
- c_dev->dequeue_burst = NULL;
+ c_dev->enqueue_burst = cpt_pmd_pkt_enqueue;
+ c_dev->dequeue_burst = cpt_pmd_pkt_dequeue;
c_dev->feature_flags = RTE_CRYPTODEV_FF_SYMMETRIC_CRYPTO |
RTE_CRYPTODEV_FF_HW_ACCELERATED |
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/cpt/cpt_pmd_ops.c b/drivers/crypto/cpt/cpt_pmd_ops.c
index 37808ce..d10caf5 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/cpt/cpt_pmd_ops.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/cpt/cpt_pmd_ops.c
@@ -1060,6 +1060,70 @@ int cpt_pmd_session_cfg(struct rte_cryptodev *dev,
return -EPERM;
}
+static void *instance_session_cfg(cpt_instance_t *instance,
+ struct rte_crypto_sym_xform *xform, void *sess)
+{
+ struct rte_crypto_sym_xform *chain;
+
+ PMD_INIT_FUNC_TRACE();
+
+ /*
+ * Microcode only supports the following combination.
+ * Encryption followed by authentication
+ * Authentication followed by decryption
+ */
+ if (xform->next) {
+ if ((xform->type == RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_AUTH) &&
+ (xform->next->type == RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_CIPHER) &&
+ (xform->next->cipher.op == RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_OP_ENCRYPT)) {
+ PMD_DRV_LOG(ERR, "Unsupported combination by "
+ "microcode\n");
+ goto err;
+ /* Unsupported as of now by microcode */
+ }
+ if ((xform->type == RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_CIPHER) &&
+ (xform->next->type == RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_AUTH) &&
+ (xform->cipher.op == RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_OP_DECRYPT)) {
+ /* For GMAC auth there is no cipher operation */
+ if (xform->aead.algo != RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_AES_GCM ||
+ xform->next->auth.algo !=
+ RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC) {
+ PMD_DRV_LOG(ERR, "Unsupported combination by "
+ "microcode\n");
+ goto err;
+ /* Unsupported as of now by microcode */
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ chain = xform;
+ while (chain) {
+ if (chain->type == RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_AEAD) {
+ if (fill_sess_aead(instance, chain, sess))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (chain->type == RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_CIPHER) {
+ if (fill_sess_cipher(instance, chain, sess))
+ goto err;
+ } else if (chain->type == RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_AUTH) {
+ if (chain->auth.algo == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC) {
+ if (fill_sess_gmac(NULL, chain, sess))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (fill_sess_auth(instance, chain, sess))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ chain = chain->next;
+ }
+
+ return sess;
+
+err:
+ return NULL;
+}
+
void
cpt_pmd_session_clear(struct rte_cryptodev *dev,
struct rte_cryptodev_sym_session *sess)
@@ -1075,3 +1139,798 @@ int cpt_pmd_session_cfg(struct rte_cryptodev *dev,
rte_mempool_put(sess_mp, session_private);
}
}
+
+static inline void *
+alloc_op_meta(struct rte_mbuf *m_src,
+ buf_ptr_t *buf,
+ int32_t len)
+{
+ uint8_t *mdata;
+
+#ifndef CPT_ALWAYS_USE_SEPARATE_BUF
+ if (likely(m_src && (m_src->nb_segs == 1))) {
+ int32_t tailroom;
+ phys_addr_t mphys;
+
+ /* Check if tailroom is sufficient to hold meta data */
+ tailroom = rte_pktmbuf_tailroom(m_src);
+ if (likely(tailroom > len + 8)) {
+ mdata = (uint8_t *)m_src->buf_addr + m_src->buf_len;
+ mphys = m_src->buf_physaddr + m_src->buf_len;
+ mdata -= len;
+ mphys -= len;
+ buf->vaddr = mdata;
+ buf->dma_addr = mphys;
+ buf->size = len;
+ /* Indicate that this is a mbuf allocated mdata */
+ mdata = (uint8_t *)((uint64_t)mdata | 1ull);
+ return mdata;
+ }
+ }
+#else
+ (void) m_src;
+#endif
+
+ if (unlikely(rte_mempool_get(cpt_meta_pool, (void **)&mdata) < 0))
+ return NULL;
+
+ buf->vaddr = mdata;
+ buf->dma_addr = rte_mempool_virt2iova(mdata);
+ buf->size = len;
+
+ return mdata;
+}
+
+/**
+ * cpt_free_metabuf - free metabuf to mempool.
+ * @param instance: pointer to instance.
+ * @param objp: pointer to the metabuf.
+ */
+static inline void free_op_meta(void *mdata)
+{
+ bool nofree = ((uint64_t)mdata & 1ull);
+
+ if (likely(nofree))
+ return;
+ rte_mempool_put(cpt_meta_pool, mdata);
+}
+
+static inline uint32_t
+prepare_iov_from_pkt(struct rte_mbuf *pkt,
+ iov_ptr_t *iovec, uint32_t start_offset)
+{
+ uint16_t index = 0;
+ void *seg_data = NULL;
+ phys_addr_t seg_phys;
+ int32_t seg_size = 0;
+
+ if (!pkt) {
+ iovec->buf_cnt = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!start_offset) {
+ seg_data = rte_pktmbuf_mtod(pkt, void *);
+ seg_phys = rte_pktmbuf_mtophys(pkt);
+ seg_size = pkt->data_len;
+ } else {
+ while (start_offset >= pkt->data_len) {
+ start_offset -= pkt->data_len;
+ pkt = pkt->next;
+ }
+
+ seg_data = rte_pktmbuf_mtod_offset(pkt, void *, start_offset);
+ seg_phys = rte_pktmbuf_mtophys_offset(pkt, start_offset);
+ seg_size = pkt->data_len - start_offset;
+ if (!seg_size)
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* first seg */
+ iovec->bufs[index].vaddr = seg_data;
+ iovec->bufs[index].dma_addr = seg_phys;
+ iovec->bufs[index].size = seg_size;
+ index++;
+ pkt = pkt->next;
+
+ while (unlikely(pkt != NULL)) {
+ seg_data = rte_pktmbuf_mtod(pkt, void *);
+ seg_phys = rte_pktmbuf_mtophys(pkt);
+ seg_size = pkt->data_len;
+ if (!seg_size)
+ break;
+
+ iovec->bufs[index].vaddr = seg_data;
+ iovec->bufs[index].dma_addr = seg_phys;
+ iovec->bufs[index].size = seg_size;
+
+ index++;
+
+ /* FIXME: Not depending on wqe.w0.s.bufs to break */
+ pkt = pkt->next;
+ }
+
+ iovec->buf_cnt = index;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline uint32_t
+prepare_iov_from_pkt_inplace(struct rte_mbuf *pkt,
+ fc_params_t *param,
+ uint32_t *flags)
+{
+ uint16_t index = 0;
+ void *seg_data = NULL;
+ phys_addr_t seg_phys;
+ uint32_t seg_size = 0;
+ iov_ptr_t *iovec;
+
+ seg_data = rte_pktmbuf_mtod(pkt, void *);
+ seg_phys = rte_pktmbuf_mtophys(pkt);
+ seg_size = pkt->data_len;
+
+ /* first seg */
+ if (likely(!pkt->next)) {
+ uint32_t headroom, tailroom;
+
+ *flags |= SINGLE_BUF_INPLACE;
+ headroom = rte_pktmbuf_headroom(pkt);
+ tailroom = rte_pktmbuf_tailroom(pkt);
+ if (likely((headroom >= 24) &&
+ (tailroom >= 8))) {
+ /* In 83XX this is prerequivisit for Direct mode */
+ *flags |= SINGLE_BUF_HEADTAILROOM;
+ }
+ param->bufs[0].vaddr = seg_data;
+ param->bufs[0].dma_addr = seg_phys;
+ param->bufs[0].size = seg_size;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ iovec = param->src_iov;
+ iovec->bufs[index].vaddr = seg_data;
+ iovec->bufs[index].dma_addr = seg_phys;
+ iovec->bufs[index].size = seg_size;
+ index++;
+ pkt = pkt->next;
+
+ while (unlikely(pkt != NULL)) {
+ seg_data = rte_pktmbuf_mtod(pkt, void *);
+ seg_phys = rte_pktmbuf_mtophys(pkt);
+ seg_size = pkt->data_len;
+
+ if (!seg_size)
+ break;
+
+ iovec->bufs[index].vaddr = seg_data;
+ iovec->bufs[index].dma_addr = seg_phys;
+ iovec->bufs[index].size = seg_size;
+
+ index++;
+
+ pkt = pkt->next;
+ }
+
+ iovec->buf_cnt = index;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+find_kasumif9_direction_and_length(uint8_t *src,
+ uint32_t counter_num_bytes,
+ uint32_t *addr_length_in_bits,
+ uint8_t *addr_direction)
+{
+ uint8_t found = 0;
+ while (!found && counter_num_bytes > 0) {
+ counter_num_bytes--;
+ if (src[counter_num_bytes] == 0x00)
+ continue;
+ if (src[counter_num_bytes] == 0x80) {
+ *addr_direction = src[counter_num_bytes - 1] & 0x1;
+ *addr_length_in_bits = counter_num_bytes * 8 - 1;
+ found = 1;
+ } else {
+ int i = 0;
+ uint8_t last_byte = src[counter_num_bytes];
+ for (i = 0; i < 8 && found == 0; i++) {
+ if (last_byte & (1 << i)) {
+ *addr_direction = (last_byte >> (i+1))
+ & 0x1;
+ if (i != 6)
+ *addr_length_in_bits =
+ counter_num_bytes * 8
+ + (8 - (i + 2));
+ else
+ *addr_length_in_bits =
+ counter_num_bytes * 8;
+
+ found = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+/*
+ * This handles all auth only except AES_GMAC
+ */
+static void *
+fill_digest_params(struct rte_crypto_op *cop,
+ struct cpt_sess_misc *sess,
+ void **mdata_ptr,
+ int *op_ret)
+{
+ uint32_t space = 0;
+ struct rte_crypto_sym_op *sym_op = cop->sym;
+ void *mdata;
+ phys_addr_t mphys;
+ uint64_t *op;
+ uint32_t auth_range_off;
+ uint32_t flags = 0;
+ uint64_t d_offs = 0, d_lens;
+ void *prep_req = NULL;
+ struct rte_mbuf *m_src, *m_dst;
+ uint16_t auth_op = sess->cpt_op & CSP_OP_AUTH_MASK;
+ uint8_t zsk_flag = sess->zsk_flag;
+ uint16_t mac_len = sess->mac_len;
+ fc_params_t params;
+ char src[SRC_IOV_SIZE];
+ uint8_t iv_buf[16];
+
+ m_src = sym_op->m_src;
+
+ /* For just digest lets force mempool alloc */
+ mdata = alloc_op_meta(NULL, ¶ms.meta_buf, cpt_op_mlen);
+ if (mdata == NULL) {
+ PMD_DRV_LOG(ERR, "Error allocating meta buffer for request\n");
+ *op_ret = -ENOMEM;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ mphys = params.meta_buf.dma_addr;
+
+ op = mdata;
+ op[0] = (uint64_t)mdata;
+ op[1] = (uint64_t)cop;
+ op[2] = op[3] = 0; /* Used to indicate auth verify */
+ space += 4 * sizeof(uint64_t);
+
+ auth_range_off = sym_op->auth.data.offset;
+
+ flags = VALID_MAC_BUF;
+ params.src_iov = (void *)src;
+ if (unlikely(zsk_flag)) {
+ /*
+ * Since for Zuc, Kasumi, Snow3g offsets are in bits
+ * we will send pass through even for auth only case,
+ * let MC handle it
+ */
+ d_offs = auth_range_off;
+ auth_range_off = 0;
+ params.auth_iv_buf = rte_crypto_op_ctod_offset(cop,
+ uint8_t *, sess->auth_iv_offset);
+ if (zsk_flag == K_F9) {
+ uint32_t length_in_bits, num_bytes;
+ uint8_t *src, direction = 0;
+ uint32_t counter_num_bytes;
+
+ memcpy(iv_buf, rte_pktmbuf_mtod(cop->sym->m_src,
+ uint8_t *), 8);
+ /*
+ * This is kasumi f9, take direction from
+ * source buffer
+ */
+ length_in_bits = cop->sym->auth.data.length;
+ num_bytes = (length_in_bits >> 3);
+ counter_num_bytes = num_bytes;
+ src = rte_pktmbuf_mtod(cop->sym->m_src, uint8_t *);
+ find_kasumif9_direction_and_length(src,
+ counter_num_bytes,
+ &length_in_bits,
+ &direction);
+ length_in_bits -= 64;
+ cop->sym->auth.data.offset += 64;
+ d_offs = cop->sym->auth.data.offset;
+ auth_range_off = d_offs / 8;
+ cop->sym->auth.data.length = length_in_bits;
+
+ /* Store it at end of auth iv */
+ iv_buf[8] = direction;
+ params.auth_iv_buf = iv_buf;
+ }
+ }
+
+ d_lens = sym_op->auth.data.length;
+
+ params.ctx_buf.vaddr = SESS_PRIV(sess);
+ params.ctx_buf.dma_addr = sess->ctx_dma_addr;
+
+ if (auth_op == CSP_OP_AUTH_GENERATE) {
+ if (sym_op->auth.digest.data) {
+ /*
+ * Digest to be generated
+ * in separate buffer
+ */
+ params.mac_buf.size =
+ sess->mac_len;
+ params.mac_buf.vaddr =
+ sym_op->auth.digest.data;
+ params.mac_buf.dma_addr =
+ sym_op->auth.digest.phys_addr;
+ } else {
+ uint32_t off = sym_op->auth.data.offset +
+ sym_op->auth.data.length;
+ int32_t dlen, space;
+
+ m_dst = sym_op->m_dst ?
+ sym_op->m_dst : sym_op->m_src;
+ dlen = rte_pktmbuf_pkt_len(m_dst);
+
+ space = off + mac_len - dlen;
+ if (space > 0)
+ if (!rte_pktmbuf_append(m_dst, space)) {
+ PMD_DRV_LOG(ERR, "Failed to extend "
+ "mbuf by %uB\n", space);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ params.mac_buf.vaddr =
+ rte_pktmbuf_mtod_offset(m_dst,
+ void *, off);
+ params.mac_buf.dma_addr =
+ rte_pktmbuf_mtophys_offset(m_dst, off);
+ params.mac_buf.size = mac_len;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Need space for storing generated mac */
+ params.mac_buf.vaddr =
+ (uint8_t *)mdata + space;
+ params.mac_buf.dma_addr = mphys + space;
+ params.mac_buf.size = mac_len;
+ space += RTE_ALIGN_CEIL(mac_len, 8);
+ op[2] = (uint64_t)params.mac_buf.vaddr;
+ op[3] = mac_len;
+
+ }
+
+ params.meta_buf.vaddr = (uint8_t *)mdata + space;
+ params.meta_buf.dma_addr = mphys + space;
+ params.meta_buf.size -= space;
+
+ /* Out of place processing */
+ params.src_iov = (void *)src;
+
+ /*Store SG I/O in the api for reuse */
+ if (prepare_iov_from_pkt(m_src, params.src_iov,
+ auth_range_off)) {
+ PMD_DRV_LOG(ERR, "Prepare src iov failed\n");
+ *op_ret = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ prep_req = cpt_fc_enc_hmac_prep(flags, d_offs, d_lens,
+ ¶ms, op, op_ret);
+ *mdata_ptr = mdata;
+ return prep_req;
+err:
+ if (unlikely(!prep_req))
+ free_op_meta(mdata);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static inline void *
+fill_fc_params(struct rte_crypto_op *cop,
+ struct cpt_sess_misc *sess_misc,
+ void **mdata_ptr,
+ int *op_ret)
+{
+ uint32_t space = 0;
+ struct rte_crypto_sym_op *sym_op = cop->sym;
+ void *mdata;
+ uint64_t *op;
+ uint32_t mc_hash_off;
+ uint32_t flags = 0;
+ uint64_t d_offs, d_lens;
+ void *prep_req;
+ struct rte_mbuf *m_src, *m_dst;
+ uint8_t cpt_op = sess_misc->cpt_op;
+ uint8_t zsk_flag = sess_misc->zsk_flag;
+ uint8_t aes_gcm = sess_misc->aes_gcm;
+ uint16_t mac_len = sess_misc->mac_len;
+#ifdef CPT_ALWAYS_USE_SG_MODE
+ uint8_t inplace = 0;
+#else
+ uint8_t inplace = 1;
+#endif
+ fc_params_t fc_params;
+ char src[SRC_IOV_SIZE];
+ char dst[SRC_IOV_SIZE];
+ uint32_t iv_buf[4];
+
+ if (likely(sess_misc->iv_length)) {
+ flags |= VALID_IV_BUF;
+ fc_params.iv_buf = rte_crypto_op_ctod_offset(cop,
+ uint8_t *, sess_misc->iv_offset);
+ if (sess_misc->aes_ctr &&
+ unlikely(sess_misc->iv_length != 16)) {
+ memcpy((uint8_t *)iv_buf,
+ rte_crypto_op_ctod_offset(cop,
+ uint8_t *, sess_misc->iv_offset), 12);
+ iv_buf[3] = htobe32(0x1);
+ fc_params.iv_buf = iv_buf;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (zsk_flag) {
+ fc_params.auth_iv_buf = rte_crypto_op_ctod_offset(cop,
+ uint8_t *,
+ sess_misc->auth_iv_offset);
+ if (zsk_flag == K_F9) {
+ PMD_DRV_LOG(ERR, "Should not reach here for "
+ "kasumi F9\n");
+ }
+ if (zsk_flag != ZS_EA)
+ inplace = 0;
+ }
+ m_src = sym_op->m_src;
+ m_dst = sym_op->m_dst;
+
+ if (aes_gcm) {
+ uint8_t *salt;
+ uint8_t *aad_data;
+ uint16_t aad_len;
+
+ d_offs = sym_op->aead.data.offset;
+ d_lens = sym_op->aead.data.length;
+ mc_hash_off = sym_op->aead.data.offset +
+ sym_op->aead.data.length;
+
+ aad_data = sym_op->aead.aad.data;
+ aad_len = sess_misc->aad_length;
+ if (likely((aad_data + aad_len) ==
+ rte_pktmbuf_mtod_offset(m_src,
+ uint8_t *,
+ sym_op->aead.data.offset))) {
+ d_offs = (d_offs - aad_len) | (d_offs << 16);
+ d_lens = (d_lens + aad_len) | (d_lens << 32);
+ } else {
+ fc_params.aad_buf.vaddr = sym_op->aead.aad.data;
+ fc_params.aad_buf.dma_addr = sym_op->aead.aad.phys_addr;
+ fc_params.aad_buf.size = aad_len;
+ flags |= VALID_AAD_BUF;
+ inplace = 0;
+ d_offs = d_offs << 16;
+ d_lens = d_lens << 32;
+ }
+
+ salt = fc_params.iv_buf;
+ if (unlikely(*(uint32_t *)salt != sess_misc->salt)) {
+ cpt_fc_salt_update(SESS_PRIV(sess_misc), salt);
+ sess_misc->salt = *(uint32_t *)salt;
+ }
+ fc_params.iv_buf = salt + 4;
+ if (likely(mac_len)) {
+ struct rte_mbuf *m = (cpt_op & CSP_OP_ENCODE) ? m_dst :
+ m_src;
+
+ if (!m)
+ m = m_src;
+
+ /* hmac immediately following data is best case */
+ if (unlikely(rte_pktmbuf_mtod(m, uint8_t *) +
+ mc_hash_off !=
+ (uint8_t *)sym_op->aead.digest.data)) {
+ flags |= VALID_MAC_BUF;
+ fc_params.mac_buf.size = sess_misc->mac_len;
+ fc_params.mac_buf.vaddr =
+ sym_op->aead.digest.data;
+ fc_params.mac_buf.dma_addr =
+ sym_op->aead.digest.phys_addr;
+ inplace = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ d_offs = sym_op->cipher.data.offset;
+ d_lens = sym_op->cipher.data.length;
+ mc_hash_off = sym_op->cipher.data.offset +
+ sym_op->cipher.data.length;
+ d_offs = (d_offs << 16) | sym_op->auth.data.offset;
+ d_lens = (d_lens << 32) | sym_op->auth.data.length;
+
+ if (mc_hash_off < (sym_op->auth.data.offset +
+ sym_op->auth.data.length)){
+ mc_hash_off = (sym_op->auth.data.offset +
+ sym_op->auth.data.length);
+ }
+ /* for gmac, salt should be updated like in gcm */
+ if (unlikely(sess_misc->is_gmac)) {
+ uint8_t *salt;
+ salt = fc_params.iv_buf;
+ if (unlikely(*(uint32_t *)salt != sess_misc->salt)) {
+ cpt_fc_salt_update(SESS_PRIV(sess_misc), salt);
+ sess_misc->salt = *(uint32_t *)salt;
+ }
+ fc_params.iv_buf = salt + 4;
+ }
+ /* */
+ if (likely(mac_len)) {
+ struct rte_mbuf *m =
+ (cpt_op & CSP_OP_ENCODE) ? m_dst : m_src;
+
+ if (!m)
+ m = m_src;
+
+ /* hmac immediately following data is best case */
+ if (unlikely(rte_pktmbuf_mtod(m, uint8_t *) +
+ mc_hash_off !=
+ (uint8_t *)sym_op->auth.digest.data)) {
+ flags |= VALID_MAC_BUF;
+ fc_params.mac_buf.size =
+ sess_misc->mac_len;
+ fc_params.mac_buf.vaddr =
+ sym_op->auth.digest.data;
+ fc_params.mac_buf.dma_addr =
+ sym_op->auth.digest.phys_addr;
+ inplace = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ fc_params.ctx_buf.vaddr = SESS_PRIV(sess_misc);
+ fc_params.ctx_buf.dma_addr = sess_misc->ctx_dma_addr;
+
+ if (likely(!m_dst && inplace)) {
+ /* Case of single buffer without AAD buf or
+ * separate mac buf in place and
+ * not air crypto
+ */
+ fc_params.dst_iov = fc_params.src_iov = (void *)src;
+
+ if (unlikely(prepare_iov_from_pkt_inplace(m_src,
+ &fc_params,
+ &flags))) {
+ PMD_DRV_LOG(ERR, "Prepare inplace src iov failed\n");
+ *op_ret = -1;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ } else {
+ /* Out of place processing */
+ fc_params.src_iov = (void *)src;
+ fc_params.dst_iov = (void *)dst;
+
+ /*Store SG I/O in the api for reuse */
+ if (prepare_iov_from_pkt(m_src, fc_params.src_iov, 0)) {
+ PMD_DRV_LOG(ERR, "Prepare src iov failed\n");
+ *op_ret = -1;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(m_dst != NULL)) {
+ uint32_t pkt_len;
+
+ /* Try to make room as much as src has */
+ m_dst = sym_op->m_dst;
+ pkt_len = rte_pktmbuf_pkt_len(m_dst);
+
+ if (unlikely(pkt_len < rte_pktmbuf_pkt_len(m_src))) {
+ pkt_len = rte_pktmbuf_pkt_len(m_src) - pkt_len;
+ if (!rte_pktmbuf_append(m_dst, pkt_len)) {
+ PMD_DRV_LOG(ERR, "Not enough space in "
+ "m_dst %p, need %u more\n",
+ m_dst, pkt_len);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (prepare_iov_from_pkt(m_dst, fc_params.dst_iov, 0)) {
+ PMD_DRV_LOG(ERR, "Prepare dst iov failed for "
+ "m_dst %p\n", m_dst);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ } else {
+ fc_params.dst_iov = (void *)src;
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ if (likely(flags & SINGLE_BUF_HEADTAILROOM))
+ mdata = alloc_op_meta(m_src,
+ &fc_params.meta_buf,
+ cpt_op_sb_mlen);
+ else
+ mdata = alloc_op_meta(NULL,
+ &fc_params.meta_buf,
+ cpt_op_mlen);
+
+ if (unlikely(mdata == NULL)) {
+ PMD_DRV_LOG(ERR, "Error allocating meta buffer for request\n");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ op = (uint64_t *)((uint64_t)mdata & ~1ull);
+ op[0] = (uint64_t)mdata;
+ op[1] = (uint64_t)cop;
+ op[2] = op[3] = 0; /* Used to indicate auth verify */
+ space += 4 * sizeof(uint64_t);
+
+ fc_params.meta_buf.vaddr = (uint8_t *)op + space;
+ fc_params.meta_buf.dma_addr += space;
+ fc_params.meta_buf.size -= space;
+
+ /* Finally prepare the instruction */
+ if (cpt_op & CSP_OP_ENCODE)
+ prep_req = cpt_fc_enc_hmac_prep(flags, d_offs, d_lens,
+ &fc_params, op, op_ret);
+ else
+ prep_req = cpt_fc_dec_hmac_prep(flags, d_offs, d_lens,
+ &fc_params, op, op_ret);
+
+ if (unlikely(!prep_req))
+ free_op_meta(mdata);
+ *mdata_ptr = mdata;
+ return prep_req;
+}
+
+static inline void
+compl_auth_verify(struct rte_crypto_op *op,
+ uint8_t *gen_mac,
+ uint64_t mac_len)
+{
+ uint8_t *mac;
+ struct rte_crypto_sym_op *sym_op = op->sym;
+
+ if (sym_op->auth.digest.data)
+ mac = sym_op->auth.digest.data;
+ else
+ mac = rte_pktmbuf_mtod_offset(sym_op->m_src,
+ uint8_t *,
+ sym_op->auth.data.length +
+ sym_op->auth.data.offset);
+ if (!mac) {
+ op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_ERROR;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(mac, gen_mac, mac_len))
+ op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
+ else
+ op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+
+static inline int __hot
+cpt_pmd_crypto_operation(cpt_instance_t *instance,
+ struct rte_crypto_op *op,
+ bool last_op)
+{
+ struct cpt_sess_misc *sess = NULL;
+ struct rte_crypto_sym_op *sym_op = op->sym;
+ void *prep_req, *mdata = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+ uint64_t cpt_op;
+ uint8_t flags = last_op ? 0 : ENQ_FLAG_NODOORBELL;
+
+
+ if (unlikely(op->sess_type == RTE_CRYPTO_OP_SESSIONLESS)) {
+ void *ptr = NULL;
+ int sess_len;
+
+ sess_len = cpt_pmd_get_session_size(NULL);
+
+ sess = rte_calloc(__func__, 1, sess_len, 8);
+ if (!sess)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ sess->ctx_dma_addr = rte_malloc_virt2iova(sess) +
+ sizeof(struct cpt_sess_misc);
+
+ ptr = instance_session_cfg(instance,
+ sym_op->xform, (void *)sess);
+ if (ptr == NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else {
+ sess = (struct cpt_sess_misc *)
+ get_session_private_data(sym_op->session,
+ cryptodev_cpt_driver_id);
+ }
+
+ cpt_op = sess->cpt_op;
+
+ if (likely(cpt_op & CSP_OP_CIPHER_MASK))
+ prep_req = fill_fc_params(op, sess, &mdata, &ret);
+ else
+ prep_req = fill_digest_params(op, sess, &mdata, &ret);
+
+ if (unlikely(!prep_req)) {
+ PMD_DRV_LOG_RAW(ERR, "prep cryto req : op %p, cpt_op 0x%x ret "
+ "0x%x\n", op, (unsigned int)cpt_op, ret);
+ goto req_fail;
+ }
+
+ /* Enqueue prepared instruction to HW */
+ ret = cpt_enqueue_req(instance, prep_req,
+ flags, NULL, 0);
+
+ if (unlikely(ret)) {
+ if (unlikely(ret == -EAGAIN))
+ goto req_fail;
+ PMD_DRV_LOG(ERR, "Error enqueing crypto request : error code "
+ "%d\n", ret);
+ goto req_fail;
+ }
+
+ /* TODO: Stats here */
+
+ return 0;
+
+req_fail:
+ if (mdata)
+ free_op_meta(mdata);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+
+uint16_t
+cpt_pmd_pkt_enqueue(void *qptr, struct rte_crypto_op **ops, uint16_t nb_ops)
+{
+ cpt_instance_t *instance = (cpt_instance_t *)qptr;
+ uint16_t count = 0;
+ int ret;
+
+ count = cpt_queue_full(instance);
+ if (nb_ops > count)
+ nb_ops = count;
+
+ count = 0;
+ while (likely(count < nb_ops)) {
+ bool last_op = (count + 1 == nb_ops);
+ ret = cpt_pmd_crypto_operation(instance, ops[count], last_op);
+ if (unlikely(ret))
+ break;
+ count++;
+ }
+ return count;
+}
+
+uint16_t
+cpt_pmd_pkt_dequeue(void *qptr, struct rte_crypto_op **ops, uint16_t nb_ops)
+{
+ cpt_instance_t *instance = (cpt_instance_t *)qptr;
+ uint16_t nb_completed, i = 0;
+ uint8_t compcode[nb_ops];
+
+ nb_completed = cpt_dequeue_burst(instance, nb_ops,
+ (void **)ops, compcode);
+ while (likely(i < nb_completed)) {
+ struct rte_crypto_op *cop;
+ void *metabuf;
+ uint64_t *rsp;
+ uint8_t status;
+
+ rsp = (void *)ops[i];
+ status = compcode[i];
+ if (likely((i + 1) < nb_completed))
+ rte_prefetch0(ops[i+1]);
+ metabuf = (void *)rsp[0];
+ cop = (void *)rsp[1];
+
+ ops[i] = cop;
+
+ if (likely(status == 0)) {
+ if (likely(!rsp[2]))
+ cop->status =
+ RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+ else
+ compl_auth_verify(cop, (uint8_t *)rsp[2],
+ rsp[3]);
+ } else if (status == ERR_GC_ICV_MISCOMPARE) {
+ /*auth data mismatch */
+ cop->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
+ } else {
+ cop->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_ERROR;
+ }
+ free_op_meta(metabuf);
+ i++;
+ }
+ return nb_completed;
+}
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/cpt/cpt_pmd_ops.h b/drivers/crypto/cpt/cpt_pmd_ops.h
index 314b2b1..17b3a09 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/cpt/cpt_pmd_ops.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/cpt/cpt_pmd_ops.h
@@ -83,4 +83,14 @@ int cpt_pmd_session_cfg(struct rte_cryptodev *dev,
void
cpt_pmd_session_clear(struct rte_cryptodev *dev,
struct rte_cryptodev_sym_session *sess);
+
+uint16_t
+cpt_pmd_pkt_enqueue(void *qptr,
+ struct rte_crypto_op **ops,
+ uint16_t nb_ops);
+
+uint16_t
+cpt_pmd_pkt_dequeue(void *qptr,
+ struct rte_crypto_op **ops,
+ uint16_t nb_ops);
#endif
--
1.9.3
