Risks are mitigated to an arguably acceptable level by wrappering the entire release process at Apache around the point to point secure transport guarantee that signing is meant to provide.
That holds only true if you don't use mirrors and people get the releases directly from us.
I am generally hesitant to introduce any more overhead for folks to step up to RM'ing releases than is strictly necessary, given that this community needs a lot more of 'em.
I agree ...but as said. I am happy to step up and just do the signing if that really is the bottleneck.
The amount of security rigor applied that would cause an unsigned key to be a blocking factor for signing releases would probably also discount the above from being acceptable.
Why is that? I cannot follow that argument
As one data point of the operational reality, there were several artifacts released using my key which was unsigned for years until a little over a week ago.
Not good. But now that your key is signed it retroactively validates the releases. Actually with all the release nitpicking we do I am surprised this hasn't been brought up - or got ignored ;)
Frankly speaking I think the signing is the least blocking part in our release process. We have enough PMC members that have a cross signed key.
Finally, from reading Matt's email at the top of the thread I did get the sense that he was keen on getting his key signed, so I didn't stress that any further.
Let's get him signed :) cheers -- Torsten --------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe, e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] For additional commands, e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
