Yet another vector
On Thu, May 22, 2014 at 8:07 AM, Erik Weber <terbol...@gmail.com> wrote: > What prevents root from revealing and using the domain admin api / secret > Key? > > Erik > 22. mai 2014 15:54 skrev "Marcus" <shadow...@gmail.com> følgende: > > > I've always viewed the permissions to be additive, if a domain admin has > > the ability to set up network sniffing on the VPC I'd imagine the root > > admin should be able to as well. Although perhaps not. Even though they > > have unfettered access to destroy all vms, networks, zones, the root > admin > > may not have access to the VM hosts, and may not already have access to > the > > VMs themselves if the root passwords are not known. This would introduce > a > > vector whereby a root admin without host access could spin up a network > and > > vm for a tenant and see their traffic where they'd normally only be able > to > > if they had access to the root passwords of the tenant's instances or the > > hosts. I imagine the overwhelming majority of root admins have host or > > network access, but not all. In the end I'm not sure such an untrusted > user > > should be a root admin, as there are many other attack vectors (such as > > downloading a tenant's volume). Perhaps I'm missing the point. > > > > It would certainly be easier to implement from an orchestration > perspective > > on the router. The collection could happen on the router, but the storage > > of the packet data probably not, and for the analysis it seems kind of > > dangerous to run more user-accessible tools on a system that is supposed > to > > be locked down. Especially since it would likely be a web service of > some > > sort running on the public interface. IDS software setup and maintenance > is > > pretty involved, I'm not sure the CS community would be interested in > > maintaining that. We generally promote the virtual router as an > appliance, > > and so I think we'd need to maintain that software install on the router. > > These (along with the migration issues) are the reasons why I was leaning > > toward a 'sniffer net', where the users could have what they'd normally > > have in a datacenter with a 'port mirror', and they can decide how to > > collect and analyze the data. > > > > > > On Thu, May 22, 2014 at 2:34 AM, Daan Hoogland <daan.hoogl...@gmail.com > > >wrote: > > > > > Marcus, you mention a permission issue that triggers the though: > > > should a root admin be allowed? I think not. This brings up extra > > > requirements on the IAM, does it? > > > > > > I would implement the functionality on the router. > > > > > > On Thu, May 22, 2014 at 6:42 AM, Marcus <shadow...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > I really like the lower overhead of just port mirroring from one of > the > > > > router's interfaces to an instance interface host-side, but I really > > > > dislike the affinity it creates between the router and the listener, > > and > > > > all of the complications it creates for host maintenance and > > migrations. > > > It > > > > may also require that whomever creates a network or vms on a network > > with > > > > this permission be a domain admin, since it has the ability to see > > > > everything on the wire for the whole VPC. > > > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, May 21, 2014 at 4:25 PM, Marcus <shadow...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > >> Hi guys, > > > >> Not sure if this has been discussed before, but we are getting > > > feature > > > >> requests for an IDS or packet-sniffing/monitoring capability. I > have a > > > >> prototyped idea of how to do this (manual config), but would like > some > > > >> input. > > > >> > > > >> We create a network offering or network capability/detail that is > > > >> specifically a 'sniffer net'. This would be relatively simple, and > > just > > > do > > > >> two things: > > > >> > > > >> 1) when network is added to VPC, spin up a simple daemon on the VPC > > > router > > > >> that does traffic mirroring (netsniff-ng or daemonlogger are debian > > > >> packages) from the public interface to the 'sniffer net' interface. > > > >> > > > >> 2) disables mac learning on the bridges created for the sniffer net, > > so > > > >> that an IDS system can come up in this net and see all of the > mirrored > > > >> traffic. It wouldn't handle making the IDS appliance, that would be > up > > > to > > > >> the customer, it would simply create a network that enables traffic > > > >> monitoring for the VPC. > > > >> > > > >> I think we'd prefer any VMs brought up in this network to live on > the > > > same > > > >> host as the router for performance reasons, but that's probably not > an > > > >> immediate requirement. I dislike the idea of trying to run an actual > > > >> capture saved to the VPC router, or an IDS software on the VPC > router > > > that > > > >> would need to be updated. > > > >> > > > >> We could also run traffic mirroring from the VPC router's interface > > > >> directly to another VM's interface, host side (daemonlogger -i > vpcintf > > > -o > > > >> idsintf), but it would need to be on the same host. > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Daan > > > > > >
