What prevents root from revealing and using the domain admin api / secret Key?
Erik 22. mai 2014 15:54 skrev "Marcus" <shadow...@gmail.com> følgende: > I've always viewed the permissions to be additive, if a domain admin has > the ability to set up network sniffing on the VPC I'd imagine the root > admin should be able to as well. Although perhaps not. Even though they > have unfettered access to destroy all vms, networks, zones, the root admin > may not have access to the VM hosts, and may not already have access to the > VMs themselves if the root passwords are not known. This would introduce a > vector whereby a root admin without host access could spin up a network and > vm for a tenant and see their traffic where they'd normally only be able to > if they had access to the root passwords of the tenant's instances or the > hosts. I imagine the overwhelming majority of root admins have host or > network access, but not all. In the end I'm not sure such an untrusted user > should be a root admin, as there are many other attack vectors (such as > downloading a tenant's volume). Perhaps I'm missing the point. > > It would certainly be easier to implement from an orchestration perspective > on the router. The collection could happen on the router, but the storage > of the packet data probably not, and for the analysis it seems kind of > dangerous to run more user-accessible tools on a system that is supposed to > be locked down. Especially since it would likely be a web service of some > sort running on the public interface. IDS software setup and maintenance is > pretty involved, I'm not sure the CS community would be interested in > maintaining that. We generally promote the virtual router as an appliance, > and so I think we'd need to maintain that software install on the router. > These (along with the migration issues) are the reasons why I was leaning > toward a 'sniffer net', where the users could have what they'd normally > have in a datacenter with a 'port mirror', and they can decide how to > collect and analyze the data. > > > On Thu, May 22, 2014 at 2:34 AM, Daan Hoogland <daan.hoogl...@gmail.com > >wrote: > > > Marcus, you mention a permission issue that triggers the though: > > should a root admin be allowed? I think not. This brings up extra > > requirements on the IAM, does it? > > > > I would implement the functionality on the router. > > > > On Thu, May 22, 2014 at 6:42 AM, Marcus <shadow...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > I really like the lower overhead of just port mirroring from one of the > > > router's interfaces to an instance interface host-side, but I really > > > dislike the affinity it creates between the router and the listener, > and > > > all of the complications it creates for host maintenance and > migrations. > > It > > > may also require that whomever creates a network or vms on a network > with > > > this permission be a domain admin, since it has the ability to see > > > everything on the wire for the whole VPC. > > > > > > > > > On Wed, May 21, 2014 at 4:25 PM, Marcus <shadow...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > >> Hi guys, > > >> Not sure if this has been discussed before, but we are getting > > feature > > >> requests for an IDS or packet-sniffing/monitoring capability. I have a > > >> prototyped idea of how to do this (manual config), but would like some > > >> input. > > >> > > >> We create a network offering or network capability/detail that is > > >> specifically a 'sniffer net'. This would be relatively simple, and > just > > do > > >> two things: > > >> > > >> 1) when network is added to VPC, spin up a simple daemon on the VPC > > router > > >> that does traffic mirroring (netsniff-ng or daemonlogger are debian > > >> packages) from the public interface to the 'sniffer net' interface. > > >> > > >> 2) disables mac learning on the bridges created for the sniffer net, > so > > >> that an IDS system can come up in this net and see all of the mirrored > > >> traffic. It wouldn't handle making the IDS appliance, that would be up > > to > > >> the customer, it would simply create a network that enables traffic > > >> monitoring for the VPC. > > >> > > >> I think we'd prefer any VMs brought up in this network to live on the > > same > > >> host as the router for performance reasons, but that's probably not an > > >> immediate requirement. I dislike the idea of trying to run an actual > > >> capture saved to the VPC router, or an IDS software on the VPC router > > that > > >> would need to be updated. > > >> > > >> We could also run traffic mirroring from the VPC router's interface > > >> directly to another VM's interface, host side (daemonlogger -i vpcintf > > -o > > >> idsintf), but it would need to be on the same host. > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > -- > > Daan > > >
