Folks, any feedback here?

On 6/15/23 12:46, Jyothsna Konisa wrote:
> Hi Everyone!
> 
> We are adding the following CQL queries in this patch for adding and dropping 
> identities in the new `system_auth.identity_to_role` table.
> 
> ADD IDENTITY 'testIdentity' TO ROLE 'testRole';
> DROP IDENTITY 'testIdentity';
> 
> Please let us know if anyone has any concerns!
> 
> Thanks,
> Jyothsna Konisa.
> 
> 
> On Sat, Jun 3, 2023 at 7:18 AM Derek Chen-Becker <de...@chen-becker.org
> <mailto:de...@chen-becker.org>> wrote:
> 
>     Sounds great, thanks for the clarification!
> 
>     Cheers,
> 
>     Derek
> 
>     On Sat, Jun 3, 2023 at 12:48 AM Dinesh Joshi <djo...@apache.org
>     <mailto:djo...@apache.org>> wrote:
> 
>>         On Jun 2, 2023, at 9:06 PM, Derek Chen-Becker
>>         <de...@chen-becker.org <mailto:de...@chen-becker.org>> wrote:
>>
>>         This certainly looks like a nice addition to the operator's
>>         tools for securing cluster access. Out of curiosity, is there
>>         anything in this work that would *preclude* a different
>>         authentication scheme for internode at some point in the
>>         future? Has there ever been discussion of pluggability similar
>>         to the client protocol?
> 
>         This is a pluggable implementation so it's not mandatory to use
>         it and doesn't preclude one from using a different mechanism in
>         the future. We haven't explicitly discussed pluggability i.e.
>         part of protocol negotiation in the past for internode
>         connections. However, this work also does not preclude us from
>         implementing such changes. If we do add negotiation this could
>         be one of the authentication mechanisms. So it would be
>         complimentary.
> 
> 
>>         Also, am I correct in understanding that this would allow for
>>         multiple certificates for the same identity (e.g. distinct
>>         cert per node)? I certainly understand the decision to keep
>>         things simple and have all nodes share identity from the
>>         perspective of operational simplicity, but I also don't want
>>         to get in a situation where a single compromised node would
>>         require an invalidation and redeployment on all nodes in the
>>         cluster.
> 
>         I don't recommend all nodes share the same certificate. Each
>         node in the cluster should obtain a unique certificate with the
>         same SPIFFE. In the event a node is compromised, the operator
>         can revoke that node's certificate without having to redeploy to
>         all nodes in the cluster.
> 
>         thanks,
> 
>         Dinesh
> 
> 
> 
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