Hi Everyone!

We are adding the following CQL queries in this patch for adding and
dropping identities in the new `system_auth.identity_to_role` table.

ADD IDENTITY 'testIdentity' TO ROLE 'testRole';
DROP IDENTITY 'testIdentity';

Please let us know if anyone has any concerns!

Thanks,
Jyothsna Konisa.


On Sat, Jun 3, 2023 at 7:18 AM Derek Chen-Becker <de...@chen-becker.org>
wrote:

> Sounds great, thanks for the clarification!
>
> Cheers,
>
> Derek
>
> On Sat, Jun 3, 2023 at 12:48 AM Dinesh Joshi <djo...@apache.org> wrote:
>
>> On Jun 2, 2023, at 9:06 PM, Derek Chen-Becker <de...@chen-becker.org>
>> wrote:
>>
>> This certainly looks like a nice addition to the operator's tools for
>> securing cluster access. Out of curiosity, is there anything in this work
>> that would *preclude* a different authentication scheme for internode at
>> some point in the future? Has there ever been discussion of pluggability
>> similar to the client protocol?
>>
>>
>> This is a pluggable implementation so it's not mandatory to use it and
>> doesn't preclude one from using a different mechanism in the future. We
>> haven't explicitly discussed pluggability i.e. part of protocol negotiation
>> in the past for internode connections. However, this work also does not
>> preclude us from implementing such changes. If we do add negotiation this
>> could be one of the authentication mechanisms. So it would be complimentary.
>>
>>
>> Also, am I correct in understanding that this would allow for multiple
>> certificates for the same identity (e.g. distinct cert per node)? I
>> certainly understand the decision to keep things simple and have all nodes
>> share identity from the perspective of operational simplicity, but I also
>> don't want to get in a situation where a single compromised node would
>> require an invalidation and redeployment on all nodes in the cluster.
>>
>>
>> I don't recommend all nodes share the same certificate. Each node in the
>> cluster should obtain a unique certificate with the same SPIFFE. In the
>> event a node is compromised, the operator can revoke that node's
>> certificate without having to redeploy to all nodes in the cluster.
>>
>> thanks,
>>
>> Dinesh
>>
>
>
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> | Derek Chen-Becker                                             |
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