On Tue, Nov 14, 2000 at 12:00:05AM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote: > Could someone explain to me, in simple terms, how Condorcet-based > voting schemes work in the face of a supermajority requirement?
Hmmm. The current way it's meant to work is that the supermajority only comes into play on the final vote, where YES needs the appropriate supermajority over NO and FURTHER DISCUSSION (see A.6(7)). If you required a supermajority over *every* other option, you'd end up with the situation where if *everyone* prefers, say, both Manoj's and Branden's possibilities over the current situation, but they're split as to which one they think is the better of the two, then neither will be accepted (since there'll be a 1:1 split between the two, rather than a 3:1 supermajority). It might be enough to simply require a 3:1 (or whatever) supermajority of the winning option to NO and FURTHER DISCUSSION? It might be possible for the vote counting systems in the previous mail to pick a winner that only has a 2:1 supermajority when a 3:1 supermajority's required. Exactly how to resolve that probably requires detailed thought. Whether it should be resolved, is another matter too (if "remove non-free" is ranked as slightly preferable to "we love non-free", but doesn't quite meet its supermajority requirements (supposing there are some), should "we love non-free" win instead, or should the vote devolve to further discussion, or...?) Cheers, aj -- Anthony Towns <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/> I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred. ``We reject: kings, presidents, and voting. We believe in: rough consensus and working code.'' -- Dave Clark
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