> Since we're already using a Condorcet-base scheme, it's probably best to
> keep doing that (ie, keeping the "foo DOMINATES bar"). From the latter
> URL, it seems that "Tideman" and "Schulze" are probably the most suitable
> (they're not vulnerable to most of the nasty strategies). Mike Ossipoff
> listed a whole bunch of related systems in his letters too.
>
<snip>
>
> I presume the best way to handle different possiblities on ballots is
> just to vote on them at once (eg, "Remove non-free // We love non-free! //
> Status-quo // Further discussion") and have whichever one wins (according
> to the voting rules, and any supermajority requirements), win.
Could someone explain to me, in simple terms, how Condorcet-based
voting schemes work in the face of a supermajority requirement?
My understanding of Condorcet is that a ballot like Anthony Towns used
as an example ("Remove non-free // We Love non-free! // Status-quo //
Further discussion") would be, during the first analysis, treated as if
it were 6 separate 1-on-1 votes, with each of the four choices paired
against each of the remaining 3. If any of the four wins all three of
the 1-on-1 votes it's part of, it wins the full balloting. Otherwise,
we use a fall-back resolution method (of which there are several
varieties in the literature to choose in advance from).
This works fine if all the options required a plurality to win (note:
I'm not even sure if "majority" or "plurality" are appropriate
descriptions of the victory condition in Condorcet-based schemes). The
system is balanced.
But if one of the choices explicitly requires a 3:1 supermajority to work, I
don't see how it works quite so well.
Can someone clear this up for me?
--
Buddha Buck [EMAIL PROTECTED]
"Just as the strength of the Internet is chaos, so the strength of our
liberty depends upon the chaos and cacophony of the unfettered speech
the First Amendment protects." -- A.L.A. v. U.S. Dept. of Justice
