On 5/17/05, Michael Poole <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Further, you're claiming that violations of that license must > > be treated by the court as conduct within the scope of that > > contract. > > > > Further, you're claiming that people (such as myself) who > > claim otherwise are ignorant of the law. > > > > I think you're being rather presumptuous. > > The first threshold issue for treating the GPL as some sort of pure > copyright license is finding a basis in law for such treatment. The > US Copyright Act does not mention such a thing. Even in common law > countries, agreements to exchange things of value (such as rights > reserved under law) are customarily treated as contracts.
I don't really know what a "pure copyright license" means, and I'm not arguing that that is the case. [I am arguing, elsewhere, that there are some reasonable moral standards associated with legal conduct in these areas, and that a person could be sued for neglecting those issues. But that's tangential in this context.[ I am arguing, here, that the scope of that license does not include making unlicensed collective works. > Claiming he is being presumptuous without supporting that claim does > not help; it makes it seem like you have no better argument than a > belief that you and the FSF share. My claim that he's being presumption is based on this concept of his claims: < < Further, you're claiming that violations of that license must < < be treated by the court as conduct within the scope of that < < contract. This claim of his is too broad to be valid in all cases. -- Raul
