Source: libdate-manip-perl
Version: 6.99-1
Severity: important
Tags: security upstream
X-Debbugs-Cc: [email protected], Debian Security Team <[email protected]>
Hi,
The following vulnerabilities were published for libdate-manip-perl.
CVE-2026-60074[0]:
| Date::Manip versions through 6.99 for Perl return corrupted dates
| via non-ASCII decimal digits that pass the numeric range tests in
| check. The parse regexes capture year, month and day with the `\d`
| shorthand, which on a character string matches the whole Unicode
| decimal digit property `\p{Nd}` and not just `[0-9]`.
| Date::Manip::Base::check then validates the captured fields with
| numeric comparisons alone (`$y<1 || $y>9999`, `$m<1 || $m>12`, `$d<1
| || $d>$days`), and _parse_check stores the numified fields (`$y+0`).
| Perl truncates a string at the first character that is not an ASCII
| digit, so a field whose leading characters are ASCII digits numifies
| to an in-range prefix and satisfies every test: a year field of
| three ASCII digits followed by U+0664 ARABIC-INDIC DIGIT FOUR
| numifies to 202, giving the year 0202, and one non-ASCII digit in
| the month or day field shifts those fields the same way. The hour,
| minute and second fields match explicit ASCII character classes
| (`0?[0-9]`, `[0-5][0-9]`) and do not shift, though a non-ASCII digit
| in a fractional hour or minute field truncates the fraction. Any
| caller that passes an untrusted character string to ParseDate() or
| Date::Manip::Date->parse() can get back a date that differs from the
| string it parsed, with no parse error. Where the parsed date gates
| logic such as an expiry check or a retention window, the shift goes
| unnoticed.
CVE-2026-60075[1]:
| Date::Manip versions through 6.99 for Perl allow CPU exhaustion via
| quadratic backtracking in the unanchored time substitution in
| _parse_time. _parse_time removes a time from anywhere in the string
| with the unanchored substitution `s/$timerx/ /`, where $timerx is an
| auto-generated alternation of time patterns reached through a
| leading `(?:$atrx|^|\s+)`. The engine therefore retries the match at
| every position of an interior whitespace run: at each start position
| the leading `\s+` consumes the rest of the run greedily, the time
| alternation fails because the run holds no digits, and the engine
| backtracks a space at a time across the run before advancing the
| start position, which is quadratic in the length of the run. No time
| need be present in the string for this to happen, only a long run of
| whitespace, and the parse time rises about fourfold for each
| doubling of the run: a few kilobytes of whitespace costs seconds of
| CPU per parse and tens of kilobytes costs minutes. Any caller that
| passes an untrusted string of unbounded length to ParseDate(),
| Date::Manip::Date->parse() or ->parse_time() can be made to spend
| unbounded CPU in a single parse, a denial of service.
If you fix the vulnerabilities please also make sure to include the
CVE (Common Vulnerabilities & Exposures) ids in your changelog entry.
For further information see:
[0] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-60074
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-60074
https://lists.security.metacpan.org/cve-announce/msg/42266594/
[1] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-60075
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-60075
https://lists.security.metacpan.org/cve-announce/msg/42266599/
Regards,
Salvatore
