... forgot the debdiff. cu Andreas
diff -Nru exim4-4.94/debian/changelog exim4-4.94/debian/changelog
--- exim4-4.94/debian/changelog 2021-03-18 13:54:47.000000000 +0100
+++ exim4-4.94/debian/changelog 2021-04-26 18:35:43.000000000 +0200
@@ -1,3 +1,42 @@
+exim4 (4.94-19) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+ * Further updates from heiko/exim-4.94+fixes+taintwarn:
+ + 75_24-Silence-the-compiler.patch
+ + 75_26-Disable-taintchecks-for-mkdir-this-isn-t-part-of-4.9.patch
+ * Upload to unstable.
+
+ -- Andreas Metzler <ametz...@debian.org> Mon, 26 Apr 2021 18:35:43 +0200
+
+exim4 (4.94-18) experimental; urgency=medium
+
+ * Pull patches to temporarily add an option to turn taint errors into
+ warnings. (See #987133)
+ + 75_01-Introduce-main-config-option-allow_insecure_tainted_.patch
+ + 75_02-search.patch
+ + 75_03-dbstuff.patch
+ + 75_04-acl.patch
+ + 75_05-parse.patch
+ + 75_06-rda.patch
+ + 75_07-appendfile.patch
+ + 75_08-autoreply.patch
+ + 75_09-pipe.patch
+ + 75_10-deliver.patch
+ + 75_11-directory.patch
+ + 75_12-expand.patch
+ + 75_13-lf_sqlperform.patch
+ + 75_14-rf_get_transport.patch
+ + 75_15-deliver.patch
+ + 75_16-smtp_out.patch
+ + 75_17-smtp.patch
+ + 75_18-update-doc.patch
+ + 75_20-Set-mainlog_name-and-rejectlog_name-unconditionally.patch
+ + 75_21-tidy-log.c.patch
+ + 75_22-Silence-compiler.patch
+ + 75_23-Do-not-close-the-main-_log-if-we-do-not-see-a-chance.patch
+ * Update NEWS.Debian to describe the feature.
+
+ -- Andreas Metzler <ametz...@debian.org> Sun, 25 Apr 2021 07:42:26 +0200
+
exim4 (4.94-17) unstable; urgency=medium
* Let exim4-config Recommend ca-certificates, needed for certificate
diff -Nru exim4-4.94/debian/NEWS exim4-4.94/debian/NEWS
--- exim4-4.94/debian/NEWS 2021-03-18 13:53:44.000000000 +0100
+++ exim4-4.94/debian/NEWS 2021-04-25 08:08:34.000000000 +0200
@@ -1,19 +1,10 @@
-exim4 (4.94-16) unstable; urgency=medium
+exim4 (4.94-18) experimental; urgency=medium
- The configuration now enforces certificate verification against the
- system trust store on encrypted connections using the
- remote_smtp_smarthost transport (smarthost and satellite setups).
- Delivery will therefore fail if the host certificates are not verifyable
- and non TLS delivery is not available (e.g. because AUTH PLAIN is used).
-
- -- Andreas Metzler <ametz...@debian.org> Wed, 17 Mar 2021 13:50:44 +0100
-
-exim4 (4.94~RC0-2) experimental; urgency=low
-
- Please consider this a *major* exim upgrade. It introduces the concept of
- tainted data read from untrusted sources, like e.g. message sender or
- recipient. This tainted data (e.g. $local_part or $domain) cannot be used
- among other things as a file or directory name or command name.
+ Please consider exim 4.93/4.94 a *major* exim upgrade. It introduces the
+ concept of tainted data read from untrusted sources, like e.g. message
+ sender or recipient. This tainted data (e.g. $local_part or $domain)
+ cannot be used among other things as a file or directory name or command
+ name.
This WILL BREAK configurations which are not updated accordingly.
Old Debian exim configuration files also will not work unmodified, the new
@@ -32,7 +23,27 @@
lookup in further processing instead of the original (remote provided)
value.
- -- Andreas Metzler <ametz...@debian.org> Sun, 10 May 2020 10:27:04 +0200
+ To ease upgrading there is a new main configuration option to temporarily
+ downgrade taint errors to warnings, letting the old configuration work with
+ the newer exim. To make use of this feature add
+ .ifdef _OPT_MAIN_ALLOW_INSECURE_TAINTED_DATA
+ allow_insecure_tainted_data = yes
+ .endif
+ to the exim configuration (e.g. to /etc/exim4/exim4.conf.localmacros)
+ *before* upgrading to exim 4.93/4.94 and check the logfile for taint
+ warnings. This is a temporary workaround which will stop working in 4.95.
+
+ -- Andreas Metzler <ametz...@debian.org> Sun, 25 Apr 2021 07:42:26 +0200
+
+exim4 (4.94-16) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+ The configuration now enforces certificate verification against the
+ system trust store on encrypted connections using the
+ remote_smtp_smarthost transport (smarthost and satellite setups).
+ Delivery will therefore fail if the host certificates are not verifyable
+ and non TLS delivery is not available (e.g. because AUTH PLAIN is used).
+
+ -- Andreas Metzler <ametz...@debian.org> Wed, 17 Mar 2021 13:50:44 +0100
exim4 (4.87-3) unstable; urgency=medium
diff -Nru
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_01-Introduce-main-config-option-allow_insecure_tainted_.patch
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_01-Introduce-main-config-option-allow_insecure_tainted_.patch
---
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_01-Introduce-main-config-option-allow_insecure_tainted_.patch
1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_01-Introduce-main-config-option-allow_insecure_tainted_.patch
2021-04-25 07:27:42.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
+From ec06d64532e4952fc36429f73e0222d26997ef7c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Heiko Schlittermann (HS12-RIPE)" <h...@schlittermann.de>
+Date: Thu, 1 Apr 2021 22:44:31 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 01/23] Introduce main config option
+ allow_insecure_tainted_data
+
+This option is deprecated already now.
+---
+ src/EDITME | 7 +++++
+ src/config.h.defaults | 2 ++
+ src/functions.h | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ src/globals.c | 10 ++++++++
+ src/globals.h | 4 +++
+ src/macros.h | 3 +++
+ src/readconf.c | 3 +++
+ 7 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/EDITME b/src/EDITME
+index 8da36a353..cebb8e2ec 100644
+--- a/src/EDITME
++++ b/src/EDITME
+@@ -749,6 +749,13 @@ FIXED_NEVER_USERS=root
+
+ # WHITELIST_D_MACROS=TLS:SPOOL
+
++# The next setting enables a main config option
++# "allow_insecure_tainted_data" to turn taint failures into warnings.
++# Though this option is new, it is deprecated already now, and will be
++# ignored in future releases of Exim. It is meant as mitigation for
++# upgrading old (possibly insecure) configurations to more secure ones.
++ALLOW_INSECURE_TAINTED_DATA=yes
++
+
#------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ # Exim has support for the AUTH (authentication) extension of the SMTP
+ # protocol, as defined by RFC 2554. If you don't know what SMTP authentication
+diff --git a/src/config.h.defaults b/src/config.h.defaults
+index e17f015f9..4e8b18904 100644
+--- a/src/config.h.defaults
++++ b/src/config.h.defaults
+@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ Do not put spaces between # and the 'define'.
+ #define ALT_CONFIG_PREFIX
+ #define TRUSTED_CONFIG_LIST
+
++#define ALLOW_INSECURE_TAINTED_DATA
++
+ #define APPENDFILE_MODE 0600
+ #define APPENDFILE_DIRECTORY_MODE 0700
+ #define APPENDFILE_LOCKFILE_MODE 0600
+diff --git a/src/functions.h b/src/functions.h
+index 51bb17a09..1e8083673 100644
+--- a/src/functions.h
++++ b/src/functions.h
+@@ -1083,36 +1083,66 @@ if (f.running_in_test_harness && f.testsuite_delays)
millisleep(millisec);
+
+
/******************************************************************************/
+ /* Taint-checked file opens */
++static inline uschar *
++is_tainted2(const void *p, int lflags, const uschar* fmt, ...)
++{
++va_list ap;
++uschar *msg;
++rmark mark;
++
++if (!is_tainted(p))
++ return NULL;
++
++mark = store_mark();
++va_start(ap, fmt);
++msg = string_from_gstring(string_vformat(NULL,
SVFMT_TAINT_NOCHK|SVFMT_EXTEND, fmt, ap));
++va_end(ap);
++
++#ifdef ALLOW_INSECURE_TAINTED_DATA
++if (allow_insecure_tainted_data)
++ {
++ if LOGGING(tainted) log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Warning: %s", msg);
++ store_reset(mark);
++ return NULL;
++ }
++#endif
++
++if (lflags) log_write(0, lflags, "%s", msg);
++return msg; /* no store_reset(), as the message might be used afterwards and
Exim
++ is expected to exit anyway, so we do not care about the leaked
++ storage */
++}
+
+ static inline int
+ exim_open2(const char *pathname, int flags)
+ {
+-if (!is_tainted(pathname)) return open(pathname, flags);
+-log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted filename '%s'", pathname);
++if (!is_tainted2(pathname, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted filename '%s'",
pathname))
++ return open(pathname, flags);
+ errno = EACCES;
+ return -1;
+ }
++
+ static inline int
+ exim_open(const char *pathname, int flags, mode_t mode)
+ {
+-if (!is_tainted(pathname)) return open(pathname, flags, mode);
+-log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted filename '%s'", pathname);
++if (!is_tainted2(pathname, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted filename '%s'",
pathname))
++ return open(pathname, flags, mode);
+ errno = EACCES;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ static inline int
+ exim_openat(int dirfd, const char *pathname, int flags)
+ {
+-if (!is_tainted(pathname)) return openat(dirfd, pathname, flags);
+-log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted filename '%s'", pathname);
++if (!is_tainted2(pathname, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted filename '%s'",
pathname))
++ return openat(dirfd, pathname, flags);
+ errno = EACCES;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ static inline int
+ exim_openat4(int dirfd, const char *pathname, int flags, mode_t mode)
+ {
+-if (!is_tainted(pathname)) return openat(dirfd, pathname, flags, mode);
+-log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted filename '%s'", pathname);
++if (!is_tainted2(pathname, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted filename '%s'",
pathname))
++ return openat(dirfd, pathname, flags, mode);
+ errno = EACCES;
+ return -1;
+ }
+@@ -1120,8 +1150,8 @@ return -1;
+ static inline FILE *
+ exim_fopen(const char *pathname, const char *mode)
+ {
+-if (!is_tainted(pathname)) return fopen(pathname, mode);
+-log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted filename '%s'", pathname);
++if (!is_tainted2(pathname, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted filename '%s'",
pathname))
++ return fopen(pathname, mode);
+ errno = EACCES;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+@@ -1129,8 +1159,8 @@ return NULL;
+ static inline DIR *
+ exim_opendir(const uschar * name)
+ {
+-if (!is_tainted(name)) return opendir(CCS name);
+-log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted dirname '%s'", name);
++if (!is_tainted2(name, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted dirname '%s'", name))
++ return opendir(CCS name);
+ errno = EACCES;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+diff --git a/src/globals.c b/src/globals.c
+index c34ac9ddd..ff660c352 100644
+--- a/src/globals.c
++++ b/src/globals.c
+@@ -98,6 +98,10 @@ int sqlite_lock_timeout = 5;
+ BOOL move_frozen_messages = FALSE;
+ #endif
+
++#ifdef ALLOW_INSECURE_TAINTED_DATA
++BOOL allow_insecure_tainted_data = FALSE;
++#endif
++
+ /* These variables are outside the #ifdef because it keeps the code less
+ cluttered in several places (e.g. during logging) if we can always refer to
+ them. Also, the tls_ variables are now always visible. Note that these are
+@@ -1033,6 +1037,9 @@ int log_default[] = { /* for initializing
log_selector */
+ Li_size_reject,
+ Li_skip_delivery,
+ Li_smtp_confirmation,
++#ifdef ALLOW_INSECURE_TAINTED_DATA
++ Li_tainted,
++#endif
+ Li_tls_certificate_verified,
+ Li_tls_cipher,
+ -1
+@@ -1100,6 +1107,9 @@ bit_table log_options[] = { /* must be in
alphabetical order,
+ BIT_TABLE(L, smtp_protocol_error),
+ BIT_TABLE(L, smtp_syntax_error),
+ BIT_TABLE(L, subject),
++#ifdef ALLOW_INSECURE_TAINTED_DATA
++ BIT_TABLE(L, tainted),
++#endif
+ BIT_TABLE(L, tls_certificate_verified),
+ BIT_TABLE(L, tls_cipher),
+ BIT_TABLE(L, tls_peerdn),
+diff --git a/src/globals.h b/src/globals.h
+index a4c1143b7..8d72577e0 100644
+--- a/src/globals.h
++++ b/src/globals.h
+@@ -77,6 +77,10 @@ extern int sqlite_lock_timeout; /* Internal lock
waiting timeout */
+ extern BOOL move_frozen_messages; /* Get them out of the normal
directory */
+ #endif
+
++#ifdef ALLOW_INSECURE_TAINTED_DATA
++extern BOOL allow_insecure_tainted_data;
++#endif
++
+ /* These variables are outside the #ifdef because it keeps the code less
+ cluttered in several places (e.g. during logging) if we can always refer to
+ them. Also, the tls_ variables are now always visible. */
+diff --git a/src/macros.h b/src/macros.h
+index f78ae2e3d..322ddbf56 100644
+--- a/src/macros.h
++++ b/src/macros.h
+@@ -498,6 +498,9 @@ enum logbit {
+ Li_smtp_mailauth,
+ Li_smtp_no_mail,
+ Li_subject,
++#ifdef ALLOW_INSECURE_TAINTED_DATA
++ Li_tainted,
++#endif
+ Li_tls_certificate_verified,
+ Li_tls_cipher,
+ Li_tls_peerdn,
+diff --git a/src/readconf.c b/src/readconf.c
+index 948fa2403..133135f8f 100644
+--- a/src/readconf.c
++++ b/src/readconf.c
+@@ -68,6 +68,9 @@ static optionlist optionlist_config[] = {
+ { "add_environment", opt_stringptr, {&add_environment} },
+ { "admin_groups", opt_gidlist, {&admin_groups} },
+ { "allow_domain_literals", opt_bool, {&allow_domain_literals} },
++#ifdef ALLOW_INSECURE_TAINTED_DATA
++ { "allow_insecure_tainted_data", opt_bool,
{&allow_insecure_tainted_data} },
++#endif
+ { "allow_mx_to_ip", opt_bool, {&allow_mx_to_ip} },
+ { "allow_utf8_domains", opt_bool, {&allow_utf8_domains} },
+ { "auth_advertise_hosts", opt_stringptr, {&auth_advertise_hosts} },
+--
+2.30.2
+
diff -Nru exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_02-search.patch
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_02-search.patch
--- exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_02-search.patch 1970-01-01
01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_02-search.patch 2021-04-25
07:27:42.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From b71d675f695c2cf17357b190476129535d5f446c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Heiko Schlittermann (HS12-RIPE)" <h...@schlittermann.de>
+Date: Thu, 1 Apr 2021 22:45:03 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 02/23] search
+
+---
+ src/search.c | 8 ++------
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/search.c b/src/search.c
+index f8aaacb04..f6e4d1f5b 100644
+--- a/src/search.c
++++ b/src/search.c
+@@ -343,12 +343,8 @@ lookup_info *lk = lookup_list[search_type];
+ uschar keybuffer[256];
+ int old_pool = store_pool;
+
+-if (filename && is_tainted(filename))
+- {
+- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
+- "Tainted filename for search: '%s'", filename);
++if (filename && is_tainted2(filename, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted filename
for search '%s'", filename))
+ return NULL;
+- }
+
+ /* Change to the search store pool and remember our reset point */
+
+@@ -639,7 +635,7 @@ DEBUG(D_lookup)
+ /* Arrange to put this database at the top of the LRU chain if it is a type
+ that opens real files. */
+
+-if ( open_top != (tree_node *)handle
++if ( open_top != (tree_node *)handle
+ && lookup_list[t->name[0]-'0']->type == lookup_absfile)
+ {
+ search_cache *c = (search_cache *)(t->data.ptr);
+--
+2.30.2
+
diff -Nru exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_03-dbstuff.patch
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_03-dbstuff.patch
--- exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_03-dbstuff.patch 1970-01-01
01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_03-dbstuff.patch 2021-04-25
07:27:42.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From 35b11dd0e52b5ac176849f807cca8898bcaf0c3d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Heiko Schlittermann (HS12-RIPE)" <h...@schlittermann.de>
+Date: Sun, 28 Mar 2021 10:49:49 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 03/23] dbstuff
+
+---
+ src/dbstuff.h | 6 ++----
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/dbstuff.h b/src/dbstuff.h
+index c1fb54346..dcee78696 100644
+--- a/src/dbstuff.h
++++ b/src/dbstuff.h
+@@ -643,11 +643,9 @@ after reading data. */
+ : (flags) == O_RDWR ? "O_RDWR" \
+ : (flags) == (O_RDWR|O_CREAT) ? "O_RDWR|O_CREAT" \
+ : "??"); \
+- if (is_tainted(name) || is_tainted(dirname)) \
+- { \
+- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted name for DB file not
permitted"); \
++ if (is_tainted2(name, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted name '%s' for DB file
not permitted", name) \
++ || is_tainted2(dirname, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted name '%s' for DB
directory not permitted", dirname)) \
+ *dbpp = NULL; \
+- } \
+ else \
+ { EXIM_DBOPEN__(name, dirname, flags, mode, dbpp); } \
+ DEBUG(D_hints_lookup) debug_printf_indent("returned from EXIM_DBOPEN:
%p\n", *dbpp); \
+--
+2.30.2
+
diff -Nru exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_04-acl.patch
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_04-acl.patch
--- exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_04-acl.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000
+0100
+++ exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_04-acl.patch 2021-04-25 07:27:42.000000000
+0200
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+From 44fd80ad8abcd885fc1c8dbb294fc2140e4ef481 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Heiko Schlittermann (HS12-RIPE)" <h...@schlittermann.de>
+Date: Sun, 28 Mar 2021 10:50:14 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 04/23] acl
+
+---
+ src/acl.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++----------------
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/acl.c b/src/acl.c
+index 90e1ce81d..81beab5f3 100644
+--- a/src/acl.c
++++ b/src/acl.c
+@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ static control_def controls_list[] = {
+ { US"no_delay_flush", FALSE,
+ ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
+ },
+-
++
+ [CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC] =
+ { US"no_enforce_sync", FALSE,
+ ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
+@@ -3598,20 +3598,22 @@ for (; cb; cb = cb->next)
+ #endif
+
+ case ACLC_QUEUE:
+- if (is_tainted(arg))
+- {
+- *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("Tainted name '%s' for queue not
permitted",
+- arg);
+- return ERROR;
+- }
+- if (Ustrchr(arg, '/'))
+ {
+- *log_msgptr = string_sprintf(
+- "Directory separator not permitted in queue name: '%s'", arg);
+- return ERROR;
++ uschar *m;
++ if (m = is_tainted2(arg, 0, "Tainted name '%s' for queue not
permitted", arg))
++ {
++ *log_msgptr = m;
++ return ERROR;
++ }
++ if (Ustrchr(arg, '/'))
++ {
++ *log_msgptr = string_sprintf(
++ "Directory separator not permitted in queue name: '%s'", arg);
++ return ERROR;
++ }
++ queue_name = string_copy_perm(arg, FALSE);
++ break;
+ }
+- queue_name = string_copy_perm(arg, FALSE);
+- break;
+
+ case ACLC_RATELIMIT:
+ rc = acl_ratelimit(arg, where, log_msgptr);
+@@ -4007,10 +4009,8 @@ if (Ustrchr(ss, ' ') == NULL)
+ else if (*ss == '/')
+ {
+ struct stat statbuf;
+- if (is_tainted(ss))
++ if (is_tainted2(ss, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted ACL file name '%s'", ss))
+ {
+- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
+- "attempt to open tainted ACL file name \"%s\"", ss);
+ /* Avoid leaking info to an attacker */
+ *log_msgptr = US"internal configuration error";
+ return ERROR;
+--
+2.30.2
+
diff -Nru exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_05-parse.patch
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_05-parse.patch
--- exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_05-parse.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000
+0100
+++ exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_05-parse.patch 2021-04-25 07:27:42.000000000
+0200
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From 7eeeb6f26af05322814ecc77c87f09c72ab2216a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Heiko Schlittermann (HS12-RIPE)" <h...@schlittermann.de>
+Date: Sun, 28 Mar 2021 10:58:46 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 05/23] parse
+
+---
+ src/parse.c | 6 +-----
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/parse.c b/src/parse.c
+index 3ea758ac9..d1bc79039 100644
+--- a/src/parse.c
++++ b/src/parse.c
+@@ -1402,12 +1402,8 @@ for (;;)
+ return FF_ERROR;
+ }
+
+- if (is_tainted(filename))
+- {
+- *error = string_sprintf("Tainted name '%s' for included file not
permitted\n",
+- filename);
++ if (*error = is_tainted2(filename, 0, "Tainted name '%s' for included
file not permitted\n", filename))
+ return FF_ERROR;
+- }
+
+ /* Check file name if required */
+
+--
+2.30.2
+
diff -Nru exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_06-rda.patch
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_06-rda.patch
--- exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_06-rda.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000
+0100
+++ exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_06-rda.patch 2021-04-25 07:27:42.000000000
+0200
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+From a6da9c67acaee699616516be141d600cc178a633 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Heiko Schlittermann (HS12-RIPE)" <h...@schlittermann.de>
+Date: Sun, 28 Mar 2021 10:59:46 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 06/23] rda
+
+---
+ src/rda.c | 4 +---
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/rda.c b/src/rda.c
+index aed8abc24..6ad7dd8bd 100644
+--- a/src/rda.c
++++ b/src/rda.c
+@@ -179,10 +179,8 @@ struct stat statbuf;
+ /* Reading a file is a form of expansion; we wish to deny attackers the
+ capability to specify the file name. */
+
+-if (is_tainted(filename))
++if (*error = is_tainted2(filename, 0, "Tainted name '%s' for file read not
permitted\n", filename))
+ {
+- *error = string_sprintf("Tainted name '%s' for file read not permitted\n",
+- filename);
+ *yield = FF_ERROR;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+--
+2.30.2
+
diff -Nru exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_07-appendfile.patch
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_07-appendfile.patch
--- exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_07-appendfile.patch 1970-01-01
01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_07-appendfile.patch 2021-04-25
07:27:42.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From c29b50d2fe17cc108d751175ed4f4113c25c1768 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Heiko Schlittermann (HS12-RIPE)" <h...@schlittermann.de>
+Date: Sun, 28 Mar 2021 11:00:06 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 07/23] appendfile
+
+---
+ src/transports/appendfile.c | 8 +++++---
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/transports/appendfile.c b/src/transports/appendfile.c
+index 8ab8b6016..7dbbaa2f9 100644
+--- a/src/transports/appendfile.c
++++ b/src/transports/appendfile.c
+@@ -1286,12 +1286,14 @@ if (!(path = expand_string(fdname)))
+ expand_string_message);
+ goto ret_panic;
+ }
+-if (is_tainted(path))
++{ uschar *m;
++if (m = is_tainted2(path, 0, "Tainted '%s' (file or directory "
++ "name for %s transport) not permitted", path, tblock->name))
+ {
+- addr->message = string_sprintf("Tainted '%s' (file or directory "
+- "name for %s transport) not permitted", path, tblock->name);
++ addr->message = m;
+ goto ret_panic;
+ }
++}
+
+ if (path[0] != '/')
+ {
+--
+2.30.2
+
diff -Nru exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_08-autoreply.patch
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_08-autoreply.patch
--- exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_08-autoreply.patch 1970-01-01
01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_08-autoreply.patch 2021-04-25
07:27:42.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+From 26de37d8960da80473866fb59b9dfd10a5761538 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Heiko Schlittermann (HS12-RIPE)" <h...@schlittermann.de>
+Date: Sun, 28 Mar 2021 11:06:27 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 08/23] autoreply
+
+---
+ src/transports/autoreply.c | 21 ++++++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/transports/autoreply.c b/src/transports/autoreply.c
+index 865abbf4f..ed99de4c6 100644
+--- a/src/transports/autoreply.c
++++ b/src/transports/autoreply.c
+@@ -404,14 +404,15 @@ recipient cache. */
+
+ if (oncelog && *oncelog && to)
+ {
++ uschar *m;
+ time_t then = 0;
+
+- if (is_tainted(oncelog))
++ if (m = is_tainted2(oncelog, 0, "Tainted '%s' (once file for %s transport)"
++ " not permitted", oncelog, tblock->name))
+ {
+ addr->transport_return = DEFER;
+ addr->basic_errno = EACCES;
+- addr->message = string_sprintf("Tainted '%s' (once file for %s transport)"
+- " not permitted", oncelog, tblock->name);
++ addr->message = m;
+ goto END_OFF;
+ }
+
+@@ -515,13 +516,14 @@ if (oncelog && *oncelog && to)
+
+ if (then != 0 && (once_repeat_sec <= 0 || now - then < once_repeat_sec))
+ {
++ uschar *m;
+ int log_fd;
+- if (is_tainted(logfile))
++ if (m = is_tainted2(logfile, 0, "Tainted '%s' (logfile for %s transport)"
++ " not permitted", logfile, tblock->name))
+ {
+ addr->transport_return = DEFER;
+ addr->basic_errno = EACCES;
+- addr->message = string_sprintf("Tainted '%s' (logfile for %s transport)"
+- " not permitted", logfile, tblock->name);
++ addr->message = m;
+ goto END_OFF;
+ }
+
+@@ -548,12 +550,13 @@ if (oncelog && *oncelog && to)
+ /* We are going to send a message. Ensure any requested file is available. */
+ if (file)
+ {
+- if (is_tainted(file))
++ uschar *m;
++ if (m = is_tainted2(file, 0, "Tainted '%s' (file for %s transport)"
++ " not permitted", file, tblock->name))
+ {
+ addr->transport_return = DEFER;
+ addr->basic_errno = EACCES;
+- addr->message = string_sprintf("Tainted '%s' (file for %s transport)"
+- " not permitted", file, tblock->name);
++ addr->message = m;
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ if (!(ff = Ufopen(file, "rb")) && !ob->file_optional)
+--
+2.30.2
+
diff -Nru exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_09-pipe.patch
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_09-pipe.patch
--- exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_09-pipe.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000
+0100
+++ exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_09-pipe.patch 2021-04-25 07:27:42.000000000
+0200
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+From f9628406706112be459adb3f121db8e6cf282c2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Heiko Schlittermann (HS12-RIPE)" <h...@schlittermann.de>
+Date: Fri, 2 Apr 2021 17:30:27 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 09/23] pipe
+
+---
+ src/transports/pipe.c | 9 ++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/transports/pipe.c b/src/transports/pipe.c
+index 27422bd42..4c9e68beb 100644
+--- a/src/transports/pipe.c
++++ b/src/transports/pipe.c
+@@ -599,13 +599,16 @@ if (!cmd || !*cmd)
+ tblock->name);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+-if (is_tainted(cmd))
++
++{ uschar *m;
++if (m = is_tainted2(cmd, 0, "Tainted '%s' (command "
++ "for %s transport) not permitted", cmd, tblock->name))
+ {
+- addr->message = string_sprintf("Tainted '%s' (command "
+- "for %s transport) not permitted", cmd, tblock->name);
+ addr->transport_return = PANIC;
++ addr->message = m;
+ return FALSE;
+ }
++}
+
+ /* When a pipe is set up by a filter file, there may be values for
$thisaddress
+ and numerical the variables in existence. These are passed in
+--
+2.30.2
+
diff -Nru exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_10-deliver.patch
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_10-deliver.patch
--- exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_10-deliver.patch 1970-01-01
01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_10-deliver.patch 2021-04-25
07:27:42.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From 2fee91ae42e974c21202e0b5e17185f6a87bf8af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Heiko Schlittermann (HS12-RIPE)" <h...@schlittermann.de>
+Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2021 23:12:44 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 10/23] deliver
+
+---
+ src/deliver.c | 16 +++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/deliver.c b/src/deliver.c
+index d85edd70e..8b7998f37 100644
+--- a/src/deliver.c
++++ b/src/deliver.c
+@@ -5538,10 +5538,11 @@ FILE * fp = NULL;
+ if (!s || !*s)
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
+ "Failed to expand %s: '%s'\n", varname, filename);
+-else if (*s != '/' || is_tainted(s))
+- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
+- "%s is not %s after expansion: '%s'\n",
+- varname, *s == '/' ? "untainted" : "absolute", s);
++else if (*s != '/')
++ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "%s is not absolute after expansion:
'%s'\n",
++ varname, s);
++else if (is_tainted2(s, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted %s after expansion:
'%s'\n", varname, s))
++ ;
+ else if (!(fp = Ufopen(s, "rb")))
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Failed to open %s for %s "
+ "message texts: %s", s, reason, strerror(errno));
+@@ -6148,12 +6149,13 @@ else if (system_filter && process_recipients !=
RECIP_FAIL_TIMEOUT)
+ {
+ uschar *tmp = expand_string(tpname);
+ address_file = address_pipe = NULL;
++ uschar *m;
+ if (!tmp)
+ p->message = string_sprintf("failed to expand \"%s\" as a "
+ "system filter transport name", tpname);
+- if (is_tainted(tmp))
+- p->message = string_sprintf("attempt to used tainted value '%s'
for"
+- "transport '%s' as a system filter", tmp, tpname);
++ if (is_tainted2(tmp, 0, m = string_sprintf("Tainted values '%s' "
++ "for transport '%s' as a system filter", tmp, tpname)))
++ p->message = m;
+ tpname = tmp;
+ }
+ else
+--
+2.30.2
+
diff -Nru exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_11-directory.patch
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_11-directory.patch
--- exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_11-directory.patch 1970-01-01
01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_11-directory.patch 2021-04-25
07:27:42.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+From 5f41e800ce9cc7ad154047298914df955e905bf4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Heiko Schlittermann (HS12-RIPE)" <h...@schlittermann.de>
+Date: Thu, 1 Apr 2021 21:28:59 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 11/23] directory
+
+---
+ src/directory.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/directory.c b/src/directory.c
+index 2d4d565f4..9f88f4141 100644
+--- a/src/directory.c
++++ b/src/directory.c
+@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ uschar c = 1;
+ struct stat statbuf;
+ uschar * path;
+
++if (is_tainted2(name, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted path '%s' for new
directory", name))
++ { p = US"create"; path = US name; errno = EACCES; goto bad; }
++
+ if (parent)
+ {
+ path = string_sprintf("%s%s%s", parent, US"/", name);
+--
+2.30.2
+
diff -Nru exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_12-expand.patch
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_12-expand.patch
--- exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_12-expand.patch 1970-01-01
01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_12-expand.patch 2021-04-25
07:27:42.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From c02ea85f525ff256d78e084d6f76fe3032fd52e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Heiko Schlittermann (HS12-RIPE)" <h...@schlittermann.de>
+Date: Thu, 1 Apr 2021 21:33:50 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 12/23] expand
+
+---
+ src/expand.c | 8 ++++----
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/expand.c b/src/expand.c
+index 05de94c49..21b86ebf5 100644
+--- a/src/expand.c
++++ b/src/expand.c
+@@ -4383,13 +4383,13 @@ DEBUG(D_expand)
+ f.expand_string_forcedfail = FALSE;
+ expand_string_message = US"";
+
+-if (is_tainted(string))
++{ uschar *m;
++if (m = is_tainted2(string, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted string '%s' in
expansion", s))
+ {
+- expand_string_message =
+- string_sprintf("attempt to expand tainted string '%s'", s);
+- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "%s", expand_string_message);
++ expand_string_message = m;
+ goto EXPAND_FAILED;
+ }
++}
+
+ while (*s != 0)
+ {
+--
+2.30.2
+
diff -Nru exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_13-lf_sqlperform.patch
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_13-lf_sqlperform.patch
--- exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_13-lf_sqlperform.patch 1970-01-01
01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_13-lf_sqlperform.patch 2021-04-25
07:27:42.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From 9810dfc25d8b9687b46e57963a3ac30bf5c9b2c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Heiko Schlittermann (HS12-RIPE)" <h...@schlittermann.de>
+Date: Thu, 1 Apr 2021 21:36:12 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 13/23] lf_sqlperform
+
+---
+ src/lookups/lf_sqlperform.c | 14 +++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/lookups/lf_sqlperform.c b/src/lookups/lf_sqlperform.c
+index ad1df29d1..eda3089e2 100644
+--- a/src/lookups/lf_sqlperform.c
++++ b/src/lookups/lf_sqlperform.c
+@@ -102,11 +102,13 @@ if (Ustrncmp(query, "servers", 7) == 0)
+ }
+ }
+
+- if (is_tainted(server))
+- {
+- *errmsg = string_sprintf("%s server \"%s\" is tainted", name, server);
++ { uschar *m;
++ if (m = is_tainted2(server, 0, "Tainted %s server '%s'", name, server))
++ {
++ *errmsg = m;
+ return DEFER;
+ }
++ }
+
+ rc = (*fn)(ss+1, server, result, errmsg, &defer_break, do_cache, opts);
+ if (rc != DEFER || defer_break) return rc;
+@@ -158,11 +160,13 @@ else
+ server = ele;
+ }
+
+- if (is_tainted(server))
++ { uschar *m;
++ if (is_tainted2(server, 0, "Tainted %s server '%s'", name, server))
+ {
+- *errmsg = string_sprintf("%s server \"%s\" is tainted", name, server);
++ *errmsg = m;
+ return DEFER;
+ }
++ }
+
+ rc = (*fn)(query, server, result, errmsg, &defer_break, do_cache, opts);
+ if (rc != DEFER || defer_break) return rc;
+--
+2.30.2
+
diff -Nru exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_14-rf_get_transport.patch
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_14-rf_get_transport.patch
--- exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_14-rf_get_transport.patch 1970-01-01
01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_14-rf_get_transport.patch 2021-04-25
07:27:42.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+From 015fff57c854184f8bce61476c46a2830a97daf8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Heiko Schlittermann (HS12-RIPE)" <h...@schlittermann.de>
+Date: Fri, 2 Apr 2021 08:36:24 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 14/23] rf_get_transport
+
+---
+ src/routers/rf_get_transport.c | 4 +---
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/routers/rf_get_transport.c b/src/routers/rf_get_transport.c
+index 4a43818ff..32bde9ec3 100644
+--- a/src/routers/rf_get_transport.c
++++ b/src/routers/rf_get_transport.c
+@@ -66,10 +66,8 @@ if (expandable)
+ "\"%s\" in %s router: %s", tpname, router_name, expand_string_message);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+- if (is_tainted(ss))
++ if (is_tainted2(ss, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted tainted value '%s' from
'%s' for transport", ss, tpname))
+ {
+- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
+- "attempt to use tainted value '%s' from '%s' for transport", ss,
tpname);
+ addr->basic_errno = ERRNO_BADTRANSPORT;
+ /* Avoid leaking info to an attacker */
+ addr->message = US"internal configuration error";
+--
+2.30.2
+
diff -Nru exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_15-deliver.patch
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_15-deliver.patch
--- exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_15-deliver.patch 1970-01-01
01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_15-deliver.patch 2021-04-25
07:27:42.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From 2bafe3fc82cf62f0c21f939f5891b8d067f3abc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Heiko Schlittermann (HS12-RIPE)" <h...@schlittermann.de>
+Date: Sat, 3 Apr 2021 10:54:22 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 15/23] deliver
+
+---
+ src/deliver.c | 5 +++--
+ test/paniclog/0622 | 2 +-
+ test/stderr/0622 | 2 +-
+ 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/deliver.c b/src/deliver.c
+index 8b7998f37..87e944b03 100644
+--- a/src/deliver.c
++++ b/src/deliver.c
+@@ -6153,9 +6153,10 @@ else if (system_filter && process_recipients !=
RECIP_FAIL_TIMEOUT)
+ if (!tmp)
+ p->message = string_sprintf("failed to expand \"%s\" as a "
+ "system filter transport name", tpname);
+- if (is_tainted2(tmp, 0, m = string_sprintf("Tainted values '%s' "
+- "for transport '%s' as a system filter", tmp, tpname)))
++ { uschar *m;
++ if (m = is_tainted2(tmp, 0, "Tainted values '%s' " "for transport
'%s' as a system filter", tmp, tpname))
+ p->message = m;
++ }
+ tpname = tmp;
+ }
+ else
+--
+2.30.2
+
diff -Nru exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_16-smtp_out.patch
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_16-smtp_out.patch
--- exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_16-smtp_out.patch 1970-01-01
01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_16-smtp_out.patch 2021-04-25
07:27:42.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From b9b967cca71a4da51506f8ba596b9ae40cfcef57 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Heiko Schlittermann (HS12-RIPE)" <h...@schlittermann.de>
+Date: Thu, 1 Apr 2021 21:42:38 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 16/23] smtp_out
+
+---
+ src/smtp_out.c | 7 ++-----
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/smtp_out.c b/src/smtp_out.c
+index c4c409677..9c160e697 100644
+--- a/src/smtp_out.c
++++ b/src/smtp_out.c
+@@ -53,11 +53,8 @@ if (!(expint = expand_string(istring)))
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+-if (is_tainted(expint))
++if (is_tainted2(expint, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted value '%s' from '%s' for
interface", expint, istring))
+ {
+- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
+- "attempt to use tainted value '%s' from '%s' for interface",
+- expint, istring);
+ addr->transport_return = PANIC;
+ addr->message = string_sprintf("failed to expand \"interface\" "
+ "option for %s: configuration error", msg);
+@@ -425,7 +422,7 @@ if (ob->socks_proxy)
+ {
+ int sock = socks_sock_connect(sc->host, sc->host_af, port, sc->interface,
+ sc->tblock, ob->connect_timeout);
+-
++
+ if (sock >= 0)
+ {
+ if (early_data && early_data->data && early_data->len)
+--
+2.30.2
+
diff -Nru exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_17-smtp.patch
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_17-smtp.patch
--- exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_17-smtp.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000
+0100
+++ exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_17-smtp.patch 2021-04-25 07:27:42.000000000
+0200
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From 8b7d4ba8903ace7e3e3db70343798a5a0b7cea23 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Heiko Schlittermann (HS12-RIPE)" <h...@schlittermann.de>
+Date: Thu, 1 Apr 2021 22:02:27 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 17/23] smtp
+
+---
+ src/transports/smtp.c | 5 +----
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/transports/smtp.c b/src/transports/smtp.c
+index 6540e4d2b..8fecf7eef 100644
+--- a/src/transports/smtp.c
++++ b/src/transports/smtp.c
+@@ -4715,11 +4715,8 @@ if (!hostlist || (ob->hosts_override && ob->hosts))
+ else
+ if (ob->hosts_randomize) s = expanded_hosts = string_copy(s);
+
+- if (is_tainted(s))
++ if (is_tainted2(s, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted host list '%s' from '%s'
in transport %s", s, ob->hosts, tblock->name))
+ {
+- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
+- "attempt to use tainted host list '%s' from '%s' in transport %s",
+- s, ob->hosts, tblock->name);
+ /* Avoid leaking info to an attacker */
+ addrlist->message = US"internal configuration error";
+ addrlist->transport_return = PANIC;
+--
+2.30.2
+
diff -Nru exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_18-update-doc.patch
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_18-update-doc.patch
--- exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_18-update-doc.patch 1970-01-01
01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_18-update-doc.patch 2021-04-25
07:36:39.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+From 77cc1ad3058e4ef7ae82adb914ccff0be9fe2c8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Heiko Schlittermann (HS12-RIPE)" <h...@schlittermann.de>
+Date: Sat, 3 Apr 2021 09:29:13 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 18/23] update doc
+
+---
+ doc/doc-docbook/spec.xfpt | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ doc/NewStuff | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/doc/NewStuff
++++ b/doc/NewStuff
+@@ -4,10 +4,55 @@
+ This file contains descriptions of new features that have been added to Exim.
+ Before a formal release, there may be quite a lot of detail so that people can
+ test from the snapshots or the Git before the documentation is updated. Once
+ the documentation is updated, this file is reduced to a short list.
+
++Version 4.95
++------------
++
++ 1. The fast-ramp two phase queue run support, previously experimental, is
++ now supported by default.
++
++ 2. The native SRS support, previously experimental, is now supported. It is
++ not built unless specified in the Local/Makefile.
++
++ 3. TLS resumption support, previously experimental, is now supported and
++ included in default builds.
++
++ 4. Single-key LMDB lookups, previously experimental, are now supported.
++ The support is not built unless specified in the Local/Makefile.
++
++ 5. Option "message_linelength_limit" on the smtp transport to enforce (by
++ default) the RFC 998 character limit.
++
++ 6. An option to ignore the cache on a lookup.
++
++ 7. Quota checking during reception (i.e. at SMTP time) for appendfile-
++ transport-managed quotas.
++
++ 8. Sqlite lookups accept a "file=<path>" option to specify a per-operation
++ db file, replacing the previous prefix to the SQL string (which had
++ issues when the SQL used tainted values).
++
++ 9. Lsearch lookups accept a "ret=full" option, to return both the portion
++ of the line matching the key, and the remainder.
++
++10. A command-line option to have a daemon not create a notifier socket.
++
++11. Faster TLS startup. When various configuration options contain no
++ expandable elements, the information can be preloaded and cached rather
++ than the provious behaviour of always loading at startup time for every
++ connection. This helps particularly for the CA bundle.
++
++12. Proxy Protocol Timeout is configurable via "proxy_protocol_timeout"
++ main config option.
++
++13. Option "smtp_accept_msx_per_connection" is now expanded.
++
++13. A main config option "allow_insecure_tainted_data" allows to turn
++ taint errors into warnings.
++
+ Version 4.94
+ ------------
+
+ 1. EXPERIMENTAL_SRS_NATIVE optional build feature. See the experimental.spec
+ file.
+--- a/doc/spec.txt
++++ b/doc/spec.txt
+@@ -8650,12 +8650,20 @@
+ Whether a string is expanded depends upon the context. Usually this is solely
+ dependent upon the option for which a value is sought; in this documentation,
+ options for which string expansion is performed are marked with * after the
+ data type. ACL rules always expand strings. A couple of expansion conditions
do
+ not expand some of the brace-delimited branches, for security reasons, and
+-expansion of data deriving from the sender ("tainted data") is not permitted.
+-
++expansion of data deriving from the sender ("tainted data") is not permitted
++(including acessing a file using a tainted name). The main config
++option allow_insecure_tainted_data can be used as mitigation during
++uprades to more secure configurations.
++
++Common ways of obtaining untainted equivalents of variables with tainted
++values come down to using the tainted value as a lookup key in a trusted
++database. This database could be the filesystem structure, or the
++password file, or accessed via a DBMS. Specific methods are indexed
++under "de-tainting".
+
+ 11.1 Literal text in expanded strings
+ -------------------------------------
+
+ An uninterpreted dollar can be included in an expanded string by putting a
+@@ -12946,10 +12954,12 @@
+
+
+ 14.1 Miscellaneous
+ ------------------
+
++add_environment environment variables
++allow_insecure_tainted_data turn taint errors into warnings
+ bi_command to run for -bi command line option
+ debug_store do extra internal checks
+ disable_ipv6 do no IPv6 processing
+ keep_malformed for broken files - should not happen
+ localhost_number for unique message ids in clusters
+@@ -13553,10 +13563,20 @@
+ true, and also to add "@[]" to the list of local domains (defined in the named
+ domain list local_domains in the default configuration). This "magic string"
+ matches the domain literal form of all the local host's IP addresses.
+
+ +-----------------------------------------------------+
++|allow_insecure_tainted_data main boolean false |
+++-----------------------------------------------------+
++
++The handling of tainted data may break older (pre 4.94) configurations.
++Setting this option to "true" turns taint errors (which result in a temporary
++message rejection) into warnings. This option is meant as mitigation only
++and deprecated already today. Future releases of Exim may ignore it.
++The taint log selector can be used to suppress even the warnings.
++
+++-----------------------------------------------------+
+ |allow_mx_to_ip|Use: main|Type: boolean|Default: false|
+ +-----------------------------------------------------+
+
+ It appears that more and more DNS zone administrators are breaking the rules
+ and putting domain names that look like IP addresses on the right hand side of
+@@ -35316,10 +35336,11 @@
+ smtp_mailauth AUTH argument to MAIL commands
+ smtp_no_mail session with no MAIL commands
+ smtp_protocol_error SMTP protocol errors
+ smtp_syntax_error SMTP syntax errors
+ subject contents of Subject: on <= lines
++*taint taint errors or warnings
+ *tls_certificate_verified certificate verification status
+ *tls_cipher TLS cipher suite on <= and => lines
+ tls_peerdn TLS peer DN on <= and => lines
+ tls_sni TLS SNI on <= lines
+ unknown_in_list DNS lookup failed in list match
+@@ -35604,11 +35625,13 @@
+
+ * tls_certificate_verified: An extra item is added to <= and => log lines
+ when TLS is in use. The item is "CV=yes" if the peer's certificate was
+ verified using a CA trust anchor, "CA=dane" if using a DNS trust anchor,
+ and "CV=no" if not.
+-
++ * taint: Log warnings about tainted data. This selector can't be
++ turned of if allow_insecure_tainted_data is false (which is the
++ default).
+ * tls_cipher: When a message is sent or received over an encrypted
+ connection, the cipher suite used is added to the log line, preceded by
X=.
+
+ * tls_peerdn: When a message is sent or received over an encrypted
+ connection, and a certificate is supplied by the remote host, the peer DN
diff -Nru
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_20-Set-mainlog_name-and-rejectlog_name-unconditionally.patch
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_20-Set-mainlog_name-and-rejectlog_name-unconditionally.patch
---
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_20-Set-mainlog_name-and-rejectlog_name-unconditionally.patch
1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_20-Set-mainlog_name-and-rejectlog_name-unconditionally.patch
2021-04-25 07:27:42.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From 41c494e2465efadc2e82002a07430e8aec85bc9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Heiko Schlittermann (HS12-RIPE)" <h...@schlittermann.de>
+Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2021 08:41:44 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 20/23] Set mainlog_name and rejectlog_name unconditionally.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 3f06b9b4c7244b169d50bce216c1f54b4dfe7efb)
+---
+ src/log.c | 10 ++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/log.c b/src/log.c
+index 99eba5f90..011c4debc 100644
+--- a/src/log.c
++++ b/src/log.c
+@@ -402,18 +402,20 @@ it gets statted to see if it has been cycled. With a
datestamp, the datestamp
+ will be compared. The static slot for saving it is the same size as buffer,
+ and the text has been checked above to fit, so this use of strcpy() is OK. */
+
+-if (type == lt_main && string_datestamp_offset >= 0)
++if (type == lt_main)
+ {
+ Ustrcpy(mainlog_name, buffer);
+- mainlog_datestamp = mainlog_name + string_datestamp_offset;
++ if (string_datestamp_offset > 0)
++ mainlog_datestamp = mainlog_name + string_datestamp_offset;
+ }
+
+ /* Ditto for the reject log */
+
+-else if (type == lt_reject && string_datestamp_offset >= 0)
++else if (type == lt_reject)
+ {
+ Ustrcpy(rejectlog_name, buffer);
+- rejectlog_datestamp = rejectlog_name + string_datestamp_offset;
++ if (string_datestamp_offset > 0)
++ rejectlog_datestamp = rejectlog_name + string_datestamp_offset;
+ }
+
+ /* and deal with the debug log (which keeps the datestamp, but does not
+--
+2.30.2
+
diff -Nru exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_21-tidy-log.c.patch
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_21-tidy-log.c.patch
--- exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_21-tidy-log.c.patch 1970-01-01
01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_21-tidy-log.c.patch 2021-04-25
07:27:42.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+From 8021b95c2e266861aba29c97b4bb90dc6f7637a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Heiko Schlittermann (HS12-RIPE)" <h...@schlittermann.de>
+Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2021 09:19:21 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 21/23] tidy log.c
+
+(cherry picked from commit 0327b6460eec64da6b0c1543c7e9b3d0f8cb9294)
+---
+ src/log.c | 97 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/log.c b/src/log.c
+index 011c4debc..7ef7074ec 100644
+--- a/src/log.c
++++ b/src/log.c
+@@ -397,62 +397,53 @@ people want, I hope. */
+
+ ok = string_format(buffer, sizeof(buffer), CS file_path, log_names[type]);
+
+-/* Save the name of the mainlog for rollover processing. Without a datestamp,
+-it gets statted to see if it has been cycled. With a datestamp, the datestamp
+-will be compared. The static slot for saving it is the same size as buffer,
+-and the text has been checked above to fit, so this use of strcpy() is OK. */
+-
+-if (type == lt_main)
++switch (type)
+ {
+- Ustrcpy(mainlog_name, buffer);
+- if (string_datestamp_offset > 0)
+- mainlog_datestamp = mainlog_name + string_datestamp_offset;
+- }
+-
+-/* Ditto for the reject log */
+-
+-else if (type == lt_reject)
+- {
+- Ustrcpy(rejectlog_name, buffer);
+- if (string_datestamp_offset > 0)
+- rejectlog_datestamp = rejectlog_name + string_datestamp_offset;
+- }
+-
+-/* and deal with the debug log (which keeps the datestamp, but does not
+-update it) */
+-
+-else if (type == lt_debug)
+- {
+- Ustrcpy(debuglog_name, buffer);
+- if (tag)
+- {
+- /* this won't change the offset of the datestamp */
+- ok2 = string_format(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%s%s",
+- debuglog_name, tag);
+- if (ok2)
+- Ustrcpy(debuglog_name, buffer);
+- }
+- }
+-
+-/* Remove any datestamp if this is the panic log. This is rare, so there's no
+-need to optimize getting the datestamp length. We remove one non-alphanumeric
+-char afterwards if at the start, otherwise one before. */
+-
+-else if (string_datestamp_offset >= 0)
+- {
+- uschar * from = buffer + string_datestamp_offset;
+- uschar * to = from + string_datestamp_length;
++ case lt_main:
++ /* Save the name of the mainlog for rollover processing. Without a
datestamp,
++ it gets statted to see if it has been cycled. With a datestamp, the
datestamp
++ will be compared. The static slot for saving it is the same size as
buffer,
++ and the text has been checked above to fit, so this use of strcpy() is
OK. */
++ Ustrcpy(mainlog_name, buffer);
++ if (string_datestamp_offset > 0)
++ mainlog_datestamp = mainlog_name + string_datestamp_offset;
++ case lt_reject:
++ /* Ditto for the reject log */
++ Ustrcpy(rejectlog_name, buffer);
++ if (string_datestamp_offset > 0)
++ rejectlog_datestamp = rejectlog_name + string_datestamp_offset;
++ case lt_debug:
++ /* and deal with the debug log (which keeps the datestamp, but does not
++ update it) */
++ Ustrcpy(debuglog_name, buffer);
++ if (tag)
++ {
++ /* this won't change the offset of the datestamp */
++ ok2 = string_format(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%s%s",
++ debuglog_name, tag);
++ if (ok2)
++ Ustrcpy(debuglog_name, buffer);
++ }
++ default:
++ /* Remove any datestamp if this is the panic log. This is rare, so
there's no
++ need to optimize getting the datestamp length. We remove one
non-alphanumeric
++ char afterwards if at the start, otherwise one before. */
++ if (string_datestamp_offset >= 0)
++ {
++ uschar * from = buffer + string_datestamp_offset;
++ uschar * to = from + string_datestamp_length;
+
+- if (from == buffer || from[-1] == '/')
+- {
+- if (!isalnum(*to)) to++;
+- }
+- else
+- if (!isalnum(from[-1])) from--;
++ if (from == buffer || from[-1] == '/')
++ {
++ if (!isalnum(*to)) to++;
++ }
++ else
++ if (!isalnum(from[-1])) from--;
+
+- /* This copy is ok, because we know that to is a substring of from. But
+- due to overlap we must use memmove() not Ustrcpy(). */
+- memmove(from, to, Ustrlen(to)+1);
++ /* This copy is ok, because we know that to is a substring of from. But
++ due to overlap we must use memmove() not Ustrcpy(). */
++ memmove(from, to, Ustrlen(to)+1);
++ }
+ }
+
+ /* If the file name is too long, it is an unrecoverable disaster */
+--
+2.30.2
+
diff -Nru exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_22-Silence-compiler.patch
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_22-Silence-compiler.patch
--- exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_22-Silence-compiler.patch 1970-01-01
01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_22-Silence-compiler.patch 2021-04-25
07:27:42.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
+From 2c9869d0622cc690b424cc74166d4a8393017ece Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Heiko Schlittermann (HS12-RIPE)" <h...@schlittermann.de>
+Date: Fri, 23 Apr 2021 17:40:40 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 22/23] Silence compiler
+
+---
+ src/acl.c | 2 +-
+ src/deliver.c | 3 +--
+ src/expand.c | 6 +++++-
+ src/functions.h | 2 +-
+ src/lookups/lf_sqlperform.c | 4 ++--
+ src/parse.c | 2 +-
+ src/rda.c | 2 +-
+ src/transports/appendfile.c | 4 ++--
+ src/transports/autoreply.c | 12 ++++++------
+ src/transports/pipe.c | 4 ++--
+ 10 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/acl.c b/src/acl.c
+index 81beab5f3..b62af5c65 100644
+--- a/src/acl.c
++++ b/src/acl.c
+@@ -3600,7 +3600,7 @@ for (; cb; cb = cb->next)
+ case ACLC_QUEUE:
+ {
+ uschar *m;
+- if (m = is_tainted2(arg, 0, "Tainted name '%s' for queue not
permitted", arg))
++ if ((m = is_tainted2(arg, 0, "Tainted name '%s' for queue not
permitted", arg)))
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = m;
+ return ERROR;
+diff --git a/src/deliver.c b/src/deliver.c
+index 87e944b03..b40eed4f9 100644
+--- a/src/deliver.c
++++ b/src/deliver.c
+@@ -6149,12 +6149,11 @@ else if (system_filter && process_recipients !=
RECIP_FAIL_TIMEOUT)
+ {
+ uschar *tmp = expand_string(tpname);
+ address_file = address_pipe = NULL;
+- uschar *m;
+ if (!tmp)
+ p->message = string_sprintf("failed to expand \"%s\" as a "
+ "system filter transport name", tpname);
+ { uschar *m;
+- if (m = is_tainted2(tmp, 0, "Tainted values '%s' " "for transport
'%s' as a system filter", tmp, tpname))
++ if ((m = is_tainted2(tmp, 0, "Tainted values '%s' " "for transport
'%s' as a system filter", tmp, tpname)))
+ p->message = m;
+ }
+ tpname = tmp;
+diff --git a/src/expand.c b/src/expand.c
+index 21b86ebf5..dc4b4e102 100644
+--- a/src/expand.c
++++ b/src/expand.c
+@@ -4384,7 +4384,7 @@ f.expand_string_forcedfail = FALSE;
+ expand_string_message = US"";
+
+ { uschar *m;
+-if (m = is_tainted2(string, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted string '%s' in
expansion", s))
++if ((m = is_tainted2(string, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted string '%s' in
expansion", s)))
+ {
+ expand_string_message = m;
+ goto EXPAND_FAILED;
+@@ -7629,10 +7629,12 @@ while (*s != 0)
+ /* Manually track tainting, as we deal in individual chars below */
+
+ if (is_tainted(sub))
++ {
+ if (yield->s && yield->ptr)
+ gstring_rebuffer(yield);
+ else
+ yield->s = store_get(yield->size = Ustrlen(sub), TRUE);
++ }
+
+ /* Check the UTF-8, byte-by-byte */
+
+@@ -8193,6 +8195,7 @@ that is a bad idea, because expand_string_message is in
dynamic store. */
+ EXPAND_FAILED:
+ if (left) *left = s;
+ DEBUG(D_expand)
++ {
+ DEBUG(D_noutf8)
+ {
+ debug_printf_indent("|failed to expand: %s\n", string);
+@@ -8212,6 +8215,7 @@ DEBUG(D_expand)
+ if (f.expand_string_forcedfail)
+ debug_printf_indent(UTF8_UP_RIGHT "failure was forced\n");
+ }
++ }
+ if (resetok_p && !resetok) *resetok_p = FALSE;
+ expand_level--;
+ return NULL;
+diff --git a/src/functions.h b/src/functions.h
+index 1e8083673..b4d23c4bc 100644
+--- a/src/functions.h
++++ b/src/functions.h
+@@ -1084,7 +1084,7 @@ if (f.running_in_test_harness && f.testsuite_delays)
millisleep(millisec);
+
/******************************************************************************/
+ /* Taint-checked file opens */
+ static inline uschar *
+-is_tainted2(const void *p, int lflags, const uschar* fmt, ...)
++is_tainted2(const void *p, int lflags, const char* fmt, ...)
+ {
+ va_list ap;
+ uschar *msg;
+diff --git a/src/lookups/lf_sqlperform.c b/src/lookups/lf_sqlperform.c
+index eda3089e2..38b7c2ad3 100644
+--- a/src/lookups/lf_sqlperform.c
++++ b/src/lookups/lf_sqlperform.c
+@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ if (Ustrncmp(query, "servers", 7) == 0)
+ }
+
+ { uschar *m;
+- if (m = is_tainted2(server, 0, "Tainted %s server '%s'", name, server))
++ if ((m = is_tainted2(server, 0, "Tainted %s server '%s'", name, server)))
+ {
+ *errmsg = m;
+ return DEFER;
+@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ else
+ }
+
+ { uschar *m;
+- if (is_tainted2(server, 0, "Tainted %s server '%s'", name, server))
++ if ((m = is_tainted2(server, 0, "Tainted %s server '%s'", name,
server)))
+ {
+ *errmsg = m;
+ return DEFER;
+diff --git a/src/parse.c b/src/parse.c
+index d1bc79039..0622b3127 100644
+--- a/src/parse.c
++++ b/src/parse.c
+@@ -1402,7 +1402,7 @@ for (;;)
+ return FF_ERROR;
+ }
+
+- if (*error = is_tainted2(filename, 0, "Tainted name '%s' for included
file not permitted\n", filename))
++ if ((*error = is_tainted2(filename, 0, "Tainted name '%s' for included
file not permitted\n", filename)))
+ return FF_ERROR;
+
+ /* Check file name if required */
+diff --git a/src/rda.c b/src/rda.c
+index 6ad7dd8bd..bba0b719b 100644
+--- a/src/rda.c
++++ b/src/rda.c
+@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ struct stat statbuf;
+ /* Reading a file is a form of expansion; we wish to deny attackers the
+ capability to specify the file name. */
+
+-if (*error = is_tainted2(filename, 0, "Tainted name '%s' for file read not
permitted\n", filename))
++if ((*error = is_tainted2(filename, 0, "Tainted name '%s' for file read not
permitted\n", filename)))
+ {
+ *yield = FF_ERROR;
+ return NULL;
+diff --git a/src/transports/appendfile.c b/src/transports/appendfile.c
+index 7dbbaa2f9..6772b338b 100644
+--- a/src/transports/appendfile.c
++++ b/src/transports/appendfile.c
+@@ -1287,8 +1287,8 @@ if (!(path = expand_string(fdname)))
+ goto ret_panic;
+ }
+ { uschar *m;
+-if (m = is_tainted2(path, 0, "Tainted '%s' (file or directory "
+- "name for %s transport) not permitted", path, tblock->name))
++if ((m = is_tainted2(path, 0, "Tainted '%s' (file or directory "
++ "name for %s transport) not permitted", path, tblock->name)))
+ {
+ addr->message = m;
+ goto ret_panic;
+diff --git a/src/transports/autoreply.c b/src/transports/autoreply.c
+index ed99de4c6..80c7c0db0 100644
+--- a/src/transports/autoreply.c
++++ b/src/transports/autoreply.c
+@@ -407,8 +407,8 @@ if (oncelog && *oncelog && to)
+ uschar *m;
+ time_t then = 0;
+
+- if (m = is_tainted2(oncelog, 0, "Tainted '%s' (once file for %s transport)"
+- " not permitted", oncelog, tblock->name))
++ if ((m = is_tainted2(oncelog, 0, "Tainted '%s' (once file for %s transport)"
++ " not permitted", oncelog, tblock->name)))
+ {
+ addr->transport_return = DEFER;
+ addr->basic_errno = EACCES;
+@@ -518,8 +518,8 @@ if (oncelog && *oncelog && to)
+ {
+ uschar *m;
+ int log_fd;
+- if (m = is_tainted2(logfile, 0, "Tainted '%s' (logfile for %s transport)"
+- " not permitted", logfile, tblock->name))
++ if ((m = is_tainted2(logfile, 0, "Tainted '%s' (logfile for %s transport)"
++ " not permitted", logfile, tblock->name)))
+ {
+ addr->transport_return = DEFER;
+ addr->basic_errno = EACCES;
+@@ -551,8 +551,8 @@ if (oncelog && *oncelog && to)
+ if (file)
+ {
+ uschar *m;
+- if (m = is_tainted2(file, 0, "Tainted '%s' (file for %s transport)"
+- " not permitted", file, tblock->name))
++ if ((m = is_tainted2(file, 0, "Tainted '%s' (file for %s transport)"
++ " not permitted", file, tblock->name)))
+ {
+ addr->transport_return = DEFER;
+ addr->basic_errno = EACCES;
+diff --git a/src/transports/pipe.c b/src/transports/pipe.c
+index 4c9e68beb..fc44fa585 100644
+--- a/src/transports/pipe.c
++++ b/src/transports/pipe.c
+@@ -601,8 +601,8 @@ if (!cmd || !*cmd)
+ }
+
+ { uschar *m;
+-if (m = is_tainted2(cmd, 0, "Tainted '%s' (command "
+- "for %s transport) not permitted", cmd, tblock->name))
++if ((m = is_tainted2(cmd, 0, "Tainted '%s' (command "
++ "for %s transport) not permitted", cmd, tblock->name)))
+ {
+ addr->transport_return = PANIC;
+ addr->message = m;
+--
+2.30.2
+
diff -Nru
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_23-Do-not-close-the-main-_log-if-we-do-not-see-a-chance.patch
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_23-Do-not-close-the-main-_log-if-we-do-not-see-a-chance.patch
---
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_23-Do-not-close-the-main-_log-if-we-do-not-see-a-chance.patch
1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_23-Do-not-close-the-main-_log-if-we-do-not-see-a-chance.patch
2021-04-25 07:27:42.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+From 235c7030ee9ee1c1aad507786506a470b580bfe2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Heiko Schlittermann (HS12-RIPE)" <h...@schlittermann.de>
+Date: Fri, 23 Apr 2021 22:41:57 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 23/23] Do not close the (main)_log, if we do not see a chance
+ to open it again.
+
+The process doing local deliveries runs as an unprivileged user. If this
+process needs to log failures or warnings (as caused by the
+is_tainting2() function), it can't re-open the main_log and just exits.
+---
+ src/log.c | 84 ++++++++++++++++-----------------
+ src/transports/appendfile.c | 6 +++
+ 2 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/log.c b/src/log.c
+index 7ef7074ec..c2ef698e7 100644
+--- a/src/log.c
++++ b/src/log.c
+@@ -646,18 +646,36 @@ return total_written;
+ }
+
+
+-
+-static void
+-set_file_path(void)
++void
++set_file_path(BOOL *multiple)
+ {
++uschar *s;
+ int sep = ':'; /* Fixed separator - outside use */
+-uschar *t;
+-const uschar *tt = US LOG_FILE_PATH;
+-while ((t = string_nextinlist(&tt, &sep, log_buffer, LOG_BUFFER_SIZE)))
++uschar *ss = *log_file_path ? log_file_path : LOG_FILE_PATH;
++
++logging_mode = 0;
++while ((s = string_nextinlist(&ss, &sep, log_buffer, LOG_BUFFER_SIZE)))
+ {
+- if (Ustrcmp(t, "syslog") == 0 || t[0] == 0) continue;
+- file_path = string_copy(t);
+- break;
++ if (Ustrcmp(s, "syslog") == 0)
++ logging_mode |= LOG_MODE_SYSLOG;
++ else if (logging_mode & LOG_MODE_FILE) /* we know a file already */
++ {
++ if (multiple) *multiple = TRUE;
++ }
++ else
++ {
++ logging_mode |= LOG_MODE_FILE;
++
++ /* If a non-empty path is given, use it */
++
++ if (*s)
++ file_path = string_copy(s);
++
++ /* If the path is empty, we want to use the first non-empty, non-
++ syslog item in LOG_FILE_PATH, if there is one, since the value of
++ log_file_path may have been set at runtime. If there is no such item,
++ use the ultimate default in the spool directory. */
++ }
+ }
+ }
+
+@@ -665,7 +683,11 @@ while ((t = string_nextinlist(&tt, &sep, log_buffer,
LOG_BUFFER_SIZE)))
+ void
+ mainlog_close(void)
+ {
+-if (mainlogfd < 0) return;
++/* avoid closing it if it is closed already or if we do not see a chance
++to open the file mainlog later again */
++if (mainlogfd < 0 /* already closed */
++ || !(geteuid() == 0 || geteuid() == exim_uid))
++ return;
+ (void)close(mainlogfd);
+ mainlogfd = -1;
+ mainlog_inode = 0;
+@@ -780,38 +802,7 @@ if (!path_inspected)
+ /* If nothing has been set, don't waste effort... the default values for the
+ statics are file_path="" and logging_mode = LOG_MODE_FILE. */
+
+- if (*log_file_path)
+- {
+- int sep = ':'; /* Fixed separator - outside use */
+- uschar *s;
+- const uschar *ss = log_file_path;
+-
+- logging_mode = 0;
+- while ((s = string_nextinlist(&ss, &sep, log_buffer, LOG_BUFFER_SIZE)))
+- {
+- if (Ustrcmp(s, "syslog") == 0)
+- logging_mode |= LOG_MODE_SYSLOG;
+- else if (logging_mode & LOG_MODE_FILE)
+- multiple = TRUE;
+- else
+- {
+- logging_mode |= LOG_MODE_FILE;
+-
+- /* If a non-empty path is given, use it */
+-
+- if (*s)
+- file_path = string_copy(s);
+-
+- /* If the path is empty, we want to use the first non-empty, non-
+- syslog item in LOG_FILE_PATH, if there is one, since the value of
+- log_file_path may have been set at runtime. If there is no such item,
+- use the ultimate default in the spool directory. */
+-
+- else
+- set_file_path(); /* Empty item in log_file_path */
+- } /* First non-syslog item in log_file_path */
+- } /* Scan of log_file_path */
+- }
++ if (*log_file_path) set_file_path(&multiple);
+
+ /* If no modes have been selected, it is a major disaster */
+
+@@ -1431,7 +1422,7 @@ if (opts)
+ resulting in certain setup not having been done. Hack this for now so we
+ do not segfault; note that nondefault log locations will not work */
+
+-if (!*file_path) set_file_path();
++if (!*file_path) set_file_path(NULL);
+
+ open_log(&fd, lt_debug, tag_name);
+
+@@ -1453,5 +1444,12 @@ debug_file = NULL;
+ unlink_log(lt_debug);
+ }
+
++void
++open_logs(const char *m)
++{
++set_file_path(NULL);
++open_log(&mainlogfd, lt_main, 0);
++open_log(&rejectlogfd, lt_reject, 0);
++}
+
+ /* End of log.c */
+diff --git a/src/transports/appendfile.c b/src/transports/appendfile.c
+index 6772b338b..706af6dde 100644
+--- a/src/transports/appendfile.c
++++ b/src/transports/appendfile.c
+@@ -217,6 +217,9 @@ Arguments:
+ Returns: OK, FAIL, or DEFER
+ */
+
++void
++openlogs();
++
+ static int
+ appendfile_transport_setup(transport_instance *tblock, address_item *addrlist,
+ transport_feedback *dummy, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, uschar **errmsg)
+@@ -231,6 +234,9 @@ dummy = dummy;
+ uid = uid;
+ gid = gid;
+
++/* we can't wait until we're not privileged anymore */
++open_logs("appendfile");
++
+ if (ob->expand_maildir_use_size_file)
+ ob->maildir_use_size_file =
expand_check_condition(ob->expand_maildir_use_size_file,
+ US"`maildir_use_size_file` in transport", tblock->name);
+--
+2.30.2
+
diff -Nru exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_24-Silence-the-compiler.patch
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_24-Silence-the-compiler.patch
--- exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_24-Silence-the-compiler.patch 1970-01-01
01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_24-Silence-the-compiler.patch 2021-04-26
18:27:39.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+From 33d5b8e8e4c2f23b4e834e3a095e3c9dd9f0686b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Heiko Schlittermann (HS12-RIPE)" <h...@schlittermann.de>
+Date: Sun, 25 Apr 2021 18:58:35 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/4] Silence the compiler
+
+---
+ src/log.c | 4 ++--
+ src/transports/appendfile.c | 4 ++--
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/log.c b/src/log.c
+index c2ef698e7..11d259197 100644
+--- a/src/log.c
++++ b/src/log.c
+@@ -651,7 +651,7 @@ set_file_path(BOOL *multiple)
+ {
+ uschar *s;
+ int sep = ':'; /* Fixed separator - outside use */
+-uschar *ss = *log_file_path ? log_file_path : LOG_FILE_PATH;
++const uschar *ss = *log_file_path ? log_file_path : US LOG_FILE_PATH;
+
+ logging_mode = 0;
+ while ((s = string_nextinlist(&ss, &sep, log_buffer, LOG_BUFFER_SIZE)))
+@@ -1445,7 +1445,7 @@ unlink_log(lt_debug);
+ }
+
+ void
+-open_logs(const char *m)
++open_logs(void)
+ {
+ set_file_path(NULL);
+ open_log(&mainlogfd, lt_main, 0);
+diff --git a/src/transports/appendfile.c b/src/transports/appendfile.c
+index 706af6dde..c0f4de4c8 100644
+--- a/src/transports/appendfile.c
++++ b/src/transports/appendfile.c
+@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ Returns: OK, FAIL, or DEFER
+ */
+
+ void
+-openlogs();
++open_logs(void);
+
+ static int
+ appendfile_transport_setup(transport_instance *tblock, address_item *addrlist,
+@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ uid = uid;
+ gid = gid;
+
+ /* we can't wait until we're not privileged anymore */
+-open_logs("appendfile");
++open_logs();
+
+ if (ob->expand_maildir_use_size_file)
+ ob->maildir_use_size_file =
expand_check_condition(ob->expand_maildir_use_size_file,
+--
+2.30.2
+
diff -Nru
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_26-Disable-taintchecks-for-mkdir-this-isn-t-part-of-4.9.patch
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_26-Disable-taintchecks-for-mkdir-this-isn-t-part-of-4.9.patch
---
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_26-Disable-taintchecks-for-mkdir-this-isn-t-part-of-4.9.patch
1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++
exim4-4.94/debian/patches/75_26-Disable-taintchecks-for-mkdir-this-isn-t-part-of-4.9.patch
2021-04-26 18:27:39.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+From 1416743e923cacf42955392e92995f5fe7e1c680 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Heiko Schlittermann (HS12-RIPE)" <h...@schlittermann.de>
+Date: Sun, 25 Apr 2021 10:19:32 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 3/4] Disable taintchecks for mkdir, this isn't part of 4.94
+
+---
+ src/directory.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/directory.c b/src/directory.c
+index 9f88f4141..ece1ee8f3 100644
+--- a/src/directory.c
++++ b/src/directory.c
+@@ -44,8 +44,10 @@ uschar c = 1;
+ struct stat statbuf;
+ uschar * path;
+
++/* does not work with 4.94
+ if (is_tainted2(name, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted path '%s' for new
directory", name))
+ { p = US"create"; path = US name; errno = EACCES; goto bad; }
++*/
+
+ if (parent)
+ {
+--
+2.30.2
+
diff -Nru exim4-4.94/debian/patches/series exim4-4.94/debian/patches/series
--- exim4-4.94/debian/patches/series 2021-03-18 13:53:44.000000000 +0100
+++ exim4-4.94/debian/patches/series 2021-04-26 18:29:13.000000000 +0200
@@ -66,4 +66,28 @@
74_60-Fix-list-expansion-for-various-domainlists-having-in.patch
74_61-Bulid-fix-DISABLE_PIPE_CONNECT-build.-Bug-2703.patch
74_62-Docs-fix-description-of-hosts_try_dane.-Bug-2704.patch
+75_01-Introduce-main-config-option-allow_insecure_tainted_.patch
+75_02-search.patch
+75_03-dbstuff.patch
+75_04-acl.patch
+75_05-parse.patch
+75_06-rda.patch
+75_07-appendfile.patch
+75_08-autoreply.patch
+75_09-pipe.patch
+75_10-deliver.patch
+75_11-directory.patch
+75_12-expand.patch
+75_13-lf_sqlperform.patch
+75_14-rf_get_transport.patch
+75_15-deliver.patch
+75_16-smtp_out.patch
+75_17-smtp.patch
+75_18-update-doc.patch
+75_20-Set-mainlog_name-and-rejectlog_name-unconditionally.patch
+75_21-tidy-log.c.patch
+75_22-Silence-compiler.patch
+75_23-Do-not-close-the-main-_log-if-we-do-not-see-a-chance.patch
+75_24-Silence-the-compiler.patch
+75_26-Disable-taintchecks-for-mkdir-this-isn-t-part-of-4.9.patch
90_localscan_dlopen.dpatch
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